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1. SUMMARY: The question is whether the exclusion 
of newspaper reporters, along with all other members of the 
public, from a two-day murder trial in state court, pursuant 
to a Virginia statute, is consistent with the First, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments, in light of this Court's recent 







2. FACTS & DECISION BELOW: On September 11, 1978, 
at the start of a murder trial in a state circuit court in 
Hanover, Virginia, the defendant's attorney moved "that 
everybody be excluded from the Courtroom because I don't want 
any information being shuffled back and forth when we have a 
recess as to what --who testified to what." After confirming 
that the defense wished to exclude the press, as well as the 
rest of the public, the prosecutor stated that he had no ob-
jection to the motion. The trial judge, noting that "the 
1/ 
statute gives me that power specifically,"- ruled "that the 
Courtroom be kept clear of all parties except the witnesses when 
they testify." After the courtroom was cleared of all members 
of the public, including appellants Wheeler and McCarthy, who 
are reporters for appellant Richmond Newspapers, the trial com-
menced in secret. 
At the close of the first day of trial, the trial judge 
held a hearing on a motion by appellants to vacate the closure 
order and to reopen the trial. Because the closure order re-
~---- ~------------------~ 
mained in effect, appellants were excluded from this hearing, 
while their counsel argued the motion on their behalf. 
Appellants' counsel argued that because no findings 
were made as to the danger of prejudicial publicity or the 
}:_I 
Virginia Code § 19.2-266 provides in pertinent part: "In 
the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or 
misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude 
from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the 
conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused 





availability of alternative measures to ensure a fair trial, 
the closure order violated the Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial and appellants' First Amendment rights to receive and to 
report information. Defense counsel argued that exclusion of the 
press was proper to prevent the jurors from being exposed to 
prejudicial publicity. The defense attorney noted that the trial 
was being held in a small community and that" the defendant was on 
2/ 
trial for murder for the fourth time. -
The trial judge noted that this was the defendant's 
vfourth trial and that because of the "layout of the Courtroom 
having people in the Courtroom is distracting to the jury." After 
expressing general agreement with defense counsel's argument, the 
trial judge denied the motion to vacate the closure order. 
The trial continued in secret on the following day. For 
reasons unknown, the trial judge granted a defense motion to strike 
the prosecution's evidence and entered a directed verdict of ac-
quittal on September 12, 1978. 
Appellants appealed the closure order to the Virginia 
Supreme Court. Appellants also petitioned the Virginia Supreme 
Court for writs of mandamus and prohibition to prevent the trial 
2/ 
At his first trial, the defendant was convicted of second 
degree murder, but the conviction was reversed on appeal because 
a bloodstained shirt had been improperly admitted into evidence. 
The defendant's second trial ended in a mistrial because a juror 
asked to be excused due to a nervous condition. The defendant's 
third trial ended in a mistrial, a~parently because a prospective 
juror had read about the defendant s previous trials and had re-
lated information about them to other prospective jurors. 
( 
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judge from denying them access to the murder trial and future 
criminal proceedings. On July 9, 1979, the Virginia Supreme 
Court refused the petition for appeal and dismissed appellants' 
petitions for mandamus and prohibition. In brief orders, each 
concluding with a citation of this Court's decision in Gannett 
Co. v. DePasguale, 47 U.S.L.W. 4902 (July 2, 1979), the court 
stated only that there was "no reversible er ror in the judgment" 
and that the writs "should not issue." 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appellants argue that this case 
presents the Court with an opportunity to determine whether 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale permits the exclusion of the public 
and press from entire criminal trials. Appellants contend that 
the Virginia courts, by rejecting appellants' constitutional 
challenge to the closure order, ha.ve upheld the validity of 
Virginia Code § 19.2-266 (see n.l ) against the claim that it 
violates the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal 
constitution. Appellants maintain that the statute is unconstitu-
tional on its face and as applied. 
Insofar as it permits the total excl\lsion of the public 
and the press from an entire criminal trial, the Virginia closure 
statute violates the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Appellants maintain that, regardles~ of its specific constitutional 
source, public access to criminal trials is a fundamental constitu-
tional right. Appellants note that in Gannett four members of this 
Court grounded the right of public access to criminal trials in the 





Gannett took the contrary view, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, whose 
concurrence was decisive, insisted that the Court'~ision 
only dealt with the closure of pretrial hearings. MR. JUSTICE 
POWELL expressed the view that the First Amendment provides 
reporters with a right of access to criminal proceedings. Ap-
pellants argue that the right of public access to criminal trials, 
like other fundamental constitutional rights, can be derived from 
its long and unbroken observance as well as its central role in 
preserving other rights. Because the Virginia statute authorizes 
the wholesale abrogation of the right of public access to trials 
at the trial court's uncontrolled discretion, the statute is un-
constitutional on its face. While closures of pretrial hearings 
may be justified in certain circumstances to prevent prospective 
jurors from being exposed to prejudicial information, it is not 
possible to justify closure of an entire trial because after the 
trial has commenced a variety of other means exist to prevent jurors 
from exposure to such information. 
Appellants also argue that the Virginia closure statute is 
unconstitutional as applied because it permits secret trials without 
any showing that they are necessary to accommodete significant 
countervailing interests. No showing was ever made that an open 
trial would threaten any significant interest. Defense counsel 
simply alluded to potential problems of prejudicial publicity with-
out explaining why they necessitated closure of the trial. No 
showing was ever made that less drastic measures, such as sequestra-
tion of the jury or exclusion of witnesses while not testifying, 
( 
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were unavailable to protect the interests of the accused. The 
trial court made no attempt to accommodate the rights of the 
public and the press and there was no showing that exclusion of 
these groups would prove effective in preventing prejudicial 
publicity. 
Appe llees maintain that the appeal should be dismissed 
for want of jurisdiction because appellants failed to challenge 
the validity of the Virginia statute in the courts below. Because 
appellants never mentioned the Virginia statute when challenging 
the closure order, the state courts were never given an opportunity 
to construe the statute in a manner that might have saved it from 
constitutional infirmity. While a state court's judgment upholding 
action taken under a statute may have the effect of upholding the 
statute, for this Court to have appellate jurisdiction it is 
necessary that the statute be challenged explicitly in the state 
court. 
Appellants argue that an appeal is properly taken because 
the trial judge relied on the Virginia statute as his sole source 
of authority for excluding the public from the trial. Appellants 
note that the trial judge referred to the statute when entering the 
closure order. 
On .the merits, appellees argue tha t a ppellants fail to 
raise a substantial federal question in L ) ·1t of Gannett's holding 
that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public trial is a right 
personal to the accused. The Virginia statute does not provide 
state courts with unbridled discretion to close criminal trials 
( 
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because it only authorizes the exclusion of "persons whose 
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial." While 
there is a strong societal interest in public trials, ap-
pellees maintain that the state court properly balanced the 
"rights" of the public against the rights of the accused, 
particularly in light of problems with prejudicial publicity 
at the defendant's previous trials. 
4. DISCUSSION: Although this case presents 
substantial federal questions that merit consideration by 
I 
this Cou~t, v;;;;ellants failed to challenge the validity of 
Virginia Code § 19.2-266 in the courts below. Although the 
trial judge noted that "the statute gives me that power [to 
. ' 
close trials] specifically," it is unclear whether the closure 
order was premised on the statute or the inherent powers of the 
court to supervise the conduct of trials. Appellants never 
mentioned the Virginia statute when they challenged the closure 
order and the state courts never interpreted the statute. Thus 
IL l'> 
this appeal probably is improvidently taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1257(2). ---.. 
Treating the papers as a petition for certiorari, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2103, it appears that this case presents 
substantial federal questions that may merit review by this Court. 
Although this Court upheld the exclusion of the public and the 
press from a pretrial suppression hearing in Gannett, that deci-
sion may not sanction the wholesale exclusion of the public and 
the press from entire criminal trials, particularly on the facts 





The majority opinion in Gannett recognized that at 
pretrial suppression hearings the dangers of prejudicial 
publicity are greater, and the availability of prophylactic 
alternatives to closure is less, than at trial. The Gannett 
majority also recognized that closed pretrial proceedings 
were more common historically than secret trials. THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE, in his concurrence, emphasized that Gannett involved 
a pretrial proceeding, rather than a trial. Although these 
distinctions could conceivably justify a different Sixth 
Amendment standard for the closure of trials, MR. JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST's concurrence expressed the view that the majority's 
holding that the Sixth Amendment confers the right to a public 
trial only upon the defendant permits the closure of both pre-
trial hearings and trials whenever the parties consent to it. 
This case could present the Court with an opportunity to clarify 
whether there is any distinction for Sixth Amendment purposes 
between the closure of pretrial proceedings and the closure of 
an entire criminal trial. 
This case could also provide the Court with an 
opportunity to consider the First Amendment issues that were 
reserved in Gannett. The majority opinion in Gannett declined 
to reach the question whether reporters have a First and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to attend criminal trials on the 
ground that the trial court had struck a proper balance betv.'een 
any First Amendment interests and the right of the defendants to 




had found a "reasonable probability of prejudice" to the 
defendants and that "[o]nce the danger of prejudice had 
dissipated, a transcript of the suppression hearing was made 
available." MR. JUSTICE POWELL, in his concurrence, expressed 
the view that the First and Fourteenth Amendments did provide 
reporters with a right of access to criminal proceedings, but 
that the trial court had adequately respected that right. 
If there is a First and Fourteenth Amendment right of 
public access to criminal trials, it is doubtful that the trial 
court in this case gave it appropriate deference. Although the 
trial judge and the defense attorney mentioned the possibility 
of prejudicial publicity, no explanation was ever offered as to 
the nature of this danger or the reasons why it justified closure 
of the entire trial. Although the defendant was on trial for the 
fourth time, closure of the trial did nothing to prevent public 
access to prejudicial information about the previous trials. 
Moreover, it is inconceivable that the interest in preventing the 
jury from having access to inadmissible information could justify 
exclusion of the public and the press from the proceedings that 
occurred in the presence of the jury. It is also doubtful that 
the trial judge's corrment that the presence of the public might 
distract the jury could justify the .extraordinary remedy of 
conducting the trial in secret. 
Although the trial has now been completed, the case is 
not moot because, as in Gannett, the underlying issue is "capable 
~




Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press indicates that 
efforts to deny public access to criminal proceedings are being 
made with increasing frequency. In the seven weeks following 
Gannett, 51 attempts have been made to deny public access to 
~
criminal proceedings, and more than half of them have been 
successful. Although most of the closure motions have involved 
pretrial proceedings, some trials have also been closed. 
I recommend that the appeal be dismissed for want of 
jurisdiction, but that, treating the jurisdictional statement as 
a petition for cert, that cert be granted. 
There is a motion to dismiss and a reply and three amicus 
briefs in support of the jurisdictional statement. 
9/25/79 
ME 
Percival Opinions in 
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Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 . . . 
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC 
Also motion to dismiss. 
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LAW SCHOOL 
The Honorable Michael Rodak, Jr. 
Clerk of the Court 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
GRISWOI.D HALL 307 
CAMBRIDGE, M ASSAC HUsE·rrs OliJ8 
(6t7) 495·4621 
February 21, 1 
REC!lJVED 
F£ B i{ (4 l~t5U 
8 oOf'ICE Of ~ JJ· .~~ SU~-· .... ~oJo&Miolt__t 
RE: Richmond Newspapers, Inc., et al. 
v. Virginia, ~tal., No. 79-243 
Dear Mr. Rodak: 
As Counsel for Appellants, I should appreciate your 
informing the Members of the Court of the following development 
in the above-captioned case. In his oral argument, the 
Attorney General of Virginia made reference to a statute 
that his office had introduced to control trial closures in 
Virginia by amending Virginia Code §19.2-266. I have learned 
that the Attorney General's Bill, H.B. 700, was referred to 
the Committee for Courts of Justice of the Virginia House of 
Delegates on February 1, 1980, but that this Bill was carried 
over to the 1981 Session on February 15, 1980, four days 
before the oral argument in the above-captioned case. February 
18, 1980 was the last day on which new Bills for the 1980 
Session could be put before the full House of Delegates. No 
Bill on this subject is therefore pending in the current 
Session of the Virginia Legislature. 
LHT/is 
Yours truly( 
Laurence H. Tribe 
Counsel for Appellants 
February 27, 1980 
The Honorable Michael Rodak, Jr. 
Clerk, United States Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Building 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Re: Richmond Newspapers, Inc., et al. 
v. 
Virginia, et al., No. 79-243 
Dear Mr. Rodak: 
FEB 2 9 1980 
OffiCE OF THE ClERK 
SUPREM£ COU~T. U.S. 
I am in receipt of a copy of the letter addressed to you 
in this matter from Laurence H. Tribe, Counsel for 
Appellants, under date of February 21, 1980, and received by 
this Office yesterday. This letter states that the proposed 
Virginia Public Trial Act introduced in the 1980 General 
Assembly Session at my request has been carried over to the 
1981 Session. 
I did suggest in oral argument that state legislation or 
court rules would be the appropriate response to any problems 
of closed trials violating the tradition of public trials or 
to maverick rulings by trial judges. In this context, I . 
argued that constitutionalizing one more aspect of a state 
trial was not appropriate--especially in view of the highly 
unusual circumstances of this case which involved the fourth 
trial for the same offense and the lateness of the motion to 
reopen. 
As pointed out in footnote 10 at page 17 of our brief, 
the decision to prepare and introduce legislation in Virginia 
was made prior to the Appellants' appeal to this Court, and 
these efforts were pursued at a. time when the lawyer for the 
Appellants stated publicly that the Virginia Supreme Court's 
denial of relief was not unexpected in the wake of Gannett 
and tha t an appeal to the United State s Supr eme Cour t was not 
anticipated. 
The Honorable Michael Rodak, Jr. 
February 27, 1980 
Page 2 
In view of some concern in the Virginia General Assembly 
about enacting legislation on issues currently pending a 
ruling by the United States Supreme Court, and after 
consultation with the patron of our proposals, the bill was 
carried over to the next Session without objection from this 
Office. The proposed legislation, however, remains pending 
before the House Courts of Justice Committee, which continues 
to work on such bills until the next Session. House 
Rule 24(a) provides that bills may be continued on the agenda 
("carried over") for hearings and committee action. 
If Counsel for appellant had felt it significant that 
the legislation would not be enacted this year, he was free 
to make his point in his rebuttal argument. 
As Counsel for Appellees, I would appreciate your 
bringing my comments to the attention of the Court in view of 
Professor Tribe's letter. 
1/173 
'. 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Marshall Coleman, Attorney General of Virginia and 
Counsel for Appellees, hereby certify that on February 27, 
1980, a copy of the enclosed letter was sent by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid, to Laurence H. Tribe, Counsel for 













~uprtmt (!fotu--t ltt tlft ·~unttb ,:t:itatt.G 
'JJU~tlllfittgicrtt. ~. QJ. 20p){..;l 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
May 27, 1980 
Re: 79-243 - Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Enclosed is a Wang draft of the opinion in this 
case, as delivered to the Printer. 
I have refrained from relying on the Ninth 
Amendment but the discussion of its genesis gives at 
least "lateral support" to the central theme. The 
Jefferson-Madison correspondence and other records seem 
to make this worthwhile in terms of pointing out 
Madison's rationale, 
9~~~~~~~~~)415 
~ ~l.o C9 ~41-
~ ivv 1 ~ JA., )1 I~ , ' ~ ~ l£r. 1\JBtiC9 BN: 
~~,w~~~~ ~~ -1~ 
zl • Justice varshal~ ,n A . /.1 i ~ wr. Juat co Blackmun 
~~ ~ ~VVJ .• J ;tce'Powell 
.,. 1--:--_ _ • J t ,.. , '1nquist 
r/-p ~". ~ · tceStevena 
~ ~. ~hA- /7 /7, ~ 
~~~~~~~ t 
•' 1~"!-C 
-~'{ 2 7_ ,980 . 
VJ J f': I A .... ~:.~.·t.\0\U.:~-
t' I '1 I I ,. -. 
r.ct~ ~P-(~.~~ 
~ ..e-p ~. o. 79-2~ of q~~ 
~R~ ~wspapers, Inc.~t al. v. Virsinia, et al•d':::;;L' 
4:_bu. 
Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the~ 
~,7k.. 
L~ 
The question presented in this case is whether the rig~~ 
attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the 
Constitution. 
I 
In March 1976, one Stevenson was indicted 





for tl:J.24Inurde r of . 
~~L-1A,... 
de~~ 
2, 1975. Tried promptly in July 1976, Stevenson ic~ 
of second-degree murder in the Circuit Court of ~e~Co~t~~ 
Virginia. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed t  
in October 1977, holding that a bloodstained shi~ ~~~~~ 
belonging to Stevenson had been improperly admitted into ~ 
7~LJ-.,t:v 
evidence. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, ~' 
779 (1977). 
14k~~ ~ 




Stevenson was retried in the same court. This second trial 
ended in a mistrial on May 30, 1978 when a juror asked to be 
excused after trial had begun and no alternate was available. 1 
A third trial, which began in the same court on June 6, 
1978, also ended in a mistrial. It appears that the mistrial 
may have been declared because a prospective juror had read 
about Stevenson's previous trials in a newspaper and had told 
other prospective jurors about the case before the retrial 
began. See App., at 35a-36a. 
Stevenson was tried in the same court for a fourth time 
beginning on September 11, 1978. Present in the courtroom when 
the case was called were appellants Wheeler and McCarthy, 
reporters for appellant Richmond Newspapers, Inc. Before the 
triai began, counsel for the defendant moved that the it be 
closed to the public: 
"[T]here was this woman that was with the family of the 
deceased when we were here before. She had sat in the 
Courtroom. I would like to ask that everybody be excluded 
from the Courtroom because I don't want any information 
being shuffled back and forth when we have a recess as to 
what--who testified to what." Trans. of Sept. 11, 1978 
Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Close Trial to the Public, 
2-3. 
The trial judge, who had presided over two of the three 
previous trials, asked if the prosecution had any objection to 
clearing the courtroom. The prosecutor stated he had no 
objection and would leave it to the discretion of the court. 
Id., at 4. Presumably referring to Virginia Code§ 19.2-266, 
the trial judge then announced: "(T]he statute gives me that 
power specifically and the defendant has made the motion." He 
. . 
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then ordered "that the Courtroom be kept clear of all parties 
2 except the witnesses when they testify." Id., at 4-5 . The 
record does not show that any objections to the closure order 
were made by anyone present at the time, including appellants 
Wheeler and McCarthy. 
Later that same day, however, appellants sought a hearing 
on a motion to vacate the closure order. The trial judge 
granted the request and scheduled a hearing to follow the close 
of the day's proceedings. When the hearing began, the court 
ruled that the hearing was to be treated as part of the trial; 
accordingly, he again ordered the reporters to leave the 
courtroom, and they complied. 
At the closed hearing, counsel for appellants observed that 
no evidentiary findings had been made by the court prior to the 
entry of its closure order, and pointed out that the court had 
falied to consider any other, less drastic measures within its 
power to ensure a fair trial. Trans. of Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing 
on Motion to Vacate, 11-12. Counsel fo~ appellants argued that 
constitutional considerations mandated that before ordering 
closure, the court should first decide that the rights of the 
defendant could be protected in no other way. 
Counsel for defendant Stevenson pointed out that this was 
the fourth time he was standing trial. He also referred to 
"difficulty with information between jurors," and stated that 
he "didn't want information to leak out," be published by the 
media, perhaps inaccurately, and then be seen by the jurors. 
Defense counsel argued that these things, plus the fact that 
. . 
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"this is a s mall community," made this a prope r case for 
closure. Id., at 16-18. 
The trial judge noted that counsel for the defendant had 
made similar statements at the morning hearing. The court also 
stated: 
"[O]ne of the other points that we take into consideration 
in this particular Courtroom is layout of the Courtroom. I 
think that having people in the Courtroom is distracting to 
the jury. Now, we have to have certain people in here and 
maybe that's not a very good reason. When we get into our 
new Court Building, people can sit in the audience so the 
jury can't see them. The rule of the Court may be 
different under those circumstances ...• " Id., at 19. 
The prosecutor again declined comment, and the court summed up 
by saying: 
"I'm inclined to agree with [defense counsel] that, if I 
feel that the rights of the defendant are infringed in any 
way, [when] he makes the motion to do something and it 
doesn't completely override all rights of everyone else, 
then I'm inclined to go along with the defendant's 
motion." Id., at 20. 
The court denied the motion to vacate and ordered the trial to 
continue the following morning "with the press and public 
excluded." Id., at 27: App., at 2la. 
What transpired when the closed trial resumed the next day 
was disclosed in the following manner by an order of the court 
entered September 12, 1978: 
"[I]n the absence of the jury, the defendant by counsel 
made a Motion that a mis-trial be declared, which motion 
was taken under advisement. At the conclusion of the 
Commonwealth's evidence, the 'attorney for the de fend ant 
moved the Court to strike the Commonwleath's evidence on 
grounds stated to the record, which Motion was sustained by 
the Court. And the jury having been excused, the Court 
doth find the accused NOT GUILTY of Murder, as charged in 





On September 27, 1978 the trial court granted appellants' 
motion to intervene nunc pro tunc in the Stevenson case. 
Appellants then petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for writs 
of mandamus and prohibition and filed an appeal from the trial 
court's closure order. On July 9, 1979, the Virginia Supreme 
Court dismissed the mandamus and prohibition petitions and, 
· finding no reversible error, denied the petition for appeal . 
• 
App., at 23a-28a. 
Appellants then sought review in this Court, invoking both 
our appellate, 28 u.s.c. § 1257(2), and certiorari 
jurisdiction. 28 u.s.c. § 1257(3). We postponed further 
consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the 
hearing of the case on the merits. u.s. (1979). We 
conclude that jurisdiction by appeal does not lie4 ; however, 
treating the filed papers as a petition for a writ of 
certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2103, we grant the petition. 
The criminal trial which appellants sought to attend has 
long since ended, and there is thus some suggestion that the 
case is moot. This Court has frequently recognized, however, 
that its jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated by the 
practical termination of a contest which is short-lived by 
nature. See, e.g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 
368, 377-378 (1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 
539, 546-547 (1976). If the underlying dispute is "capable of 
repetition, yet evading review," Southern Pacific Terminal Co. 
v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911), it is therefore not moot. 
The Virginia Supreme Court's decision, "[f]inding no 
. . 
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reversible error in the judgment complained of," App. at 24a, 
sanctions total closure in this case and can reasonably be seen 
as opening the way for similar closure orders at future trials 
from which appellants, and others who desire to attend, are 
likely to be excluded. Most trials will be of sufficiently 
short duration that a closure order "will evade review, or at 
least considered plenary review in this Court." Nebraska 
Press, supra, at 547. Accordingly, we turn to the merits. 
II 
We begin consideration of this case by noting that the 
precise issue presented here has not previously been before 
this Court for decision. In prior cases the Court has treated 
questions of whether publicity would impair a defendant's right 
to a fair trial; as we observed in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. 
Stuart, 427 u.s. 539, 547 (1976), "[t]he problems presented by 
this [conflict] are almost as old as the Republic." See also, 
e.g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 u.s. 368 (1979); 
Murphy v. Florida, 421 u.s. 794 (1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 
384 u.s. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 u.s. 532 (1965). But ~ 
here for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a 
H - "' criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the 
-------------~---------
unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration 
that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior 
right to a fair trial, or that some other overriding 




The origins of the proceeding which has become the modern 
trial in Anglo-American justice can be traced back beyond 
reliable historical records. We need not here review all 
details of its development; what is significant for present 
purposes is that throughout its evolution, the criminal trial 
has been open to all who cared to observe. 
In the days before the Norman Conquest, cases in England 
were generally brought before moots, such as the local court of 
the hundred or the county court, which were attended by the 
freemen of the community. Pollock, English Law Before the 
Norman Conquest, in 1 Selected Essays in Anglo-American Legal 
History 89 (1907}. Somewhat like modern jury duty, attendance 
at these meetings was compulsory on the part of the freemen, 
who were collectively called upon to render judgment. Id., at 
89-90; see also 1 w. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 10, 
12 (1927}. 5 
With the gradual evolution of the jury system in the years 
after the Norman Conquest, see, e.g., 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 
316, the duty of all freemen to attend trials to render 
judgment was relaxed, but there is no indication that criminal 
trials did not remain public. When certain groups were excused 
from compelled attendence, see The Statute of Marleborough, 
1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 10; 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 79 & n.4, the 
statutory exemption did not prevent them from attending; Lord 
Coke observed that those excused "are not compellable to come, 
but left to their own liberty." 2 E. Coke, Institutes of the 
.· 
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Laws of England 121 (6th ed. 1681) . 6 
Although there appear to be few contemporary statements on 
the subject, reports of the Eyre of Kent, a general court held 
in 1313-1314, evince a recognition of the importance of public 
attendance apart from the "jury duty" aspect. It was explained 
that: 
"the King's will was that all evil doers should be punished 
after their deserts, and that justice should be ministered 
indifferently to rich as to poor; and for the better 
accomplishing of this, he prayed the community of the 
county by their attendance there to lend him their aid in 
the establishing of a happy and certain peace that should 
be both for the honour of the realm and for their own 
welfare." 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 268, quoting from the 
S.S. edition of the Eyre of Kent, vol. i., p. 2 (emphasis 
added) . 
From these early times, although great changes in courts 
and procedure took place, one thing remained constant: the 
public character of the trial at which guilt or innocence was 
decided. Sir Thomas Smith, writing in 1565 about "the 
definitive proceedinges in causes criminall," explained that, 
while the indictment was put in writing as in civil law 
countries: 
"All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the 
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so 
manie as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all 
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men m~ 
heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses what 
is saide." T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum 101 (Alston ed. 
1972) (emphasis added). 
Three centuries later, Sir Frederick Pollock was able to state 
of the "rule of publicity" that, "[h]ere we have one tradition, 
at any rate, which has persisted through all changes." F. 
Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law 30-31 (1904). See 
'. 
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also E. Jenks, The Book of English Law 73-74 (6th ed. 1967): 
"[O]ne of the most conspicuous features of English justice, 
that all judicial trials are held in open court, to which the 
public have free access, ... appears to have been the rule in 
England from time immemorial." 
If 
We have found nothing to suggest that th~p~sump~ive 
' ---
openness of the trial~ which English courts were later to call 
""-.. '---
"one of the essential qualities of a court of justice," Daubney 
v. Cooper, 10 B. & c. 237, 240, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K.B. 
1829), was not also an attribute of the judicial systems of 
colonial America. In Virginia, for example, such records as -------
there are of early criminal trials indicate that they were 
open, and nothing to the contrary has been cited. See A. 
Scott, Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 128-129 (1930): 
Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, 
in 1 Selected Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 405 
(1907). When in the mid-1600's the Virginia Assembly felt that 
the respect due the courts was "by the clamorous unmannerlynes 
of the people lost, and order, gravity and decoram which should 
manifest the authority of a court in the court it selfe 
neglected," the response was not to restrict the openness of 
the trials to the public, but instead to prescribe rules for 
the conduct of those attending them. See Scott, supra, at 132. 
In some instances, the openness of trials was explicitly 
recognized as part of the fundamental law of the colony. The 




"That in all publick courts of justice for tryals of 
causes, civil or criminal, any person or person, 
inhabitants of the said Province may freely come into, and 
attend the said courts, and hear and be present, at all or 
any such tryals as shall be there had or passed, that 
· justice may not be done in a corner nor in any covert 
manner." Reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties 188 (R. 
Perry ed. 1959). See also 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of 
Rights: A Documentary History 129 (1971). 
The Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682 also provided 
"[t]hat all courts shall be open ... ," Sources of Our Liberties, 
supra, , at 217; 1 B. Schwartz, supra, at 140, and this 
declaration was reaffirmed in section 26 of the Constitution 
adopted by Pennsylvania in 1776. See 1 B. Schwartz, supra, at 
271. See also Sections 12 and 76 of the Massachusetts Body of 
Liberties, 1641, reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra, at 73, 80. 
Other contemporary writings confirm the recognition that 
part of the very nature of a criminal trial was its openness to 
those who wished to attend. Perhaps the best indication of 
this is found in an address to the inhabitants of Quebec which 
was drafted by a committee consisting of Thomas Cushing, 
Richard Henry Lee, and John Dickinson and approved by the First 
Continental Congress on October 26, 1774. 1 Journals of the 
Continental Congress, 1774-1789 at 101, 105 (1904). This 
address, written to explain the position of the colonies and to 
gain the support of the people of Quebec, is an "exposition of 
the fundamental rights of the colonists, as they were 
understood by a representative assembly chosen from all the 
colonies." 1 Schwartz, supra, at 221. Because it was intended 




another form of government" and had only recently become 
English subjects, it was thought desirable for the Contintental 
Congress to explain "the inestimable advantages of a free 
English constitution of government, which it is the privilege 
of all English subjects to enjoy." 1 Journals 106. 
"[One] great right is that of trial by jury. This 
provides, that neither life, liberty nor property, can be 
taken from the possessor, until twelve of his 
unexceptionable countrymen and peers of his vicinage, who 
from that neighbourhood may reasonably be supposed to be 
acquainted with his character, and the characters of the 
witnesses, upon a fair trial, and full enquiry, face to 
face, in open Court, before as many of the people as chuse 
to attend, shall pass their sentence upon oath against 
him .•.. " 1 Journals 107 (emphasis added). 
B. /:±1~~ 
The historical evidence demonstrates co;tlusively that a
the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials 
..... ....._.... ---...... -----
both here and in England had long been presumptively open. 
This is no quirk of history; rather, it has long been 
recognized as an indispensible attribute of an Anglo-American 
trial. Both Hale in the seventeenth century and Blackstone in 
the eighteenth saw the importance of openness to the proper 
functioning of a trial; it gave assurance that the proceedings 
were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged 
perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on 
secret bias or partiality. See, e.g . , M. Hale, The History of 
the Common Law of England 343-345 (6th ed. 1820); 3 w. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *372-373. Jeremy Bentham not only 





"Without publicity, all are insufficient: in 
comparison of public· , all other checks are of small 
account. Recordat' n, appeal, whatever other institutions 
might present t mselves in the character of checks, would 
be found to o rate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks 
·in reality, as checks only in appearance." 1 J. Bentham, 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827) .7 
on the values of openness were by no means 
the English. Foreign observers of 
English criminal procedure in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries came away impressed by the very fact that 
they had been admitted to the courts, as many were not in their 
own homelands. See L. Radzinowicz, A History of English 
Criminal Law 715 & n.96 (1948). They marveled that "the whole 
juridical procedure passes in public," 2 P.J. Grosley, ~Tour 
to London; or new Observations on Engl~nd 142 (Nugent trans. 
1772), quoted in Radzinowicz, supra, at 717, and one 
commentator declared that: 
"The main excellence of the English judicature consists in 
publicity, in the free trial by jury, and in the 
extraordinary despatch with which business is transacted. 
The publicity of their proceedings is indeed astonishing. 
Free access to the courts is universally granted." C. 
Goede, A Foreigner's Opinion of England 214 (Horne trans. 
1822) (emphasis added). 
The nexus between openness, fairness, and the perception of 
fairness was not lost on them: 
"[T]he judge, the counsel, and the jury, are constantly 
exposed to public animadversion; and this greatly tends to 
augment the extraordinary confidence, which the English 
repose in the administration of justice." Goede, supra, at 
215. 
This last observation raises the important point that 
"[t]he publicity of a judicial proceeding is a requirement of 
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much broader bearing than its mere effect on the quality of 
testimony." 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1834 at p. 435 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1976). 8 The early history of open trials in part 
reflects the widespread acknowledgement, long before there were 
behavioral scientists, that public trials had significant 
community therapeutic value. Even without such experts to 
frame the concept in words, people sensed that, especially in 
the administration of criminal justice, the means used to 
achieve justice must have the support derived from public 
acceptance of both the process and its results. When a 
shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and 
public protest often follows. See H. Weihofen, The Urge to 
Punish 130-131 (1956). Thereafter the open processes of 
justice serve a prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for 
community concern, hostility, and emotion. Without an 
awareness that society's responses to criminal conduct are 
underway, natural human reactions of outrage and protest are 
frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form of vengeful 
"self-help", as indeed they did regularly in the activities of 
vigilante "committees" on our frontiers. "The accusation and 
conviction or acquital, as much perhaps as the execution of 
punishment, operate[) to restore the imbalance which was 
created by the offense or public charge, to reaffirm the 
temporarily lost feeling of security, and, perhaps, to satisfy 
that latent 'urge to punish.'" Mueller, Problems Posed by 
Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 u. Pa. L. Rev. 
1, 6 (1961). 
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Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the 
vigilante the enforcement of the criminal laws, but they cannot 
erase from people's consciousness the fundamental, natural 
yearning to see justice done--or even the urge for 
retribution. The crucial prophylactic aspects of the 
administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no 
community catharsis can occur if justice is "done in a corner 
[or] in any covert manner." Supra, at It is not enough 
to say that results alone will satiate the natural community 
desire for "satisfaction." A result considered untoward may 
undermine public confidence, and where the trial has been 
concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a 
reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst has 
been corrupted. To work effectively, society's criminal 
process "must satisfy the appearance of justice," Offutt v. 
United States, 348 u.s. 11, 14 (1954), and the appearance of 
justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it. 
Looking back, we see that when the ancient "town meeting" 
form of trial became too cumbersome, twelve members of the 
community were delegated to act as its surrogates, but the 
community did not surrender its right to observe the conduct of 
trials. The right to attend was in a sense a "right of 
visitation" which enabled the people to satisfy themselves that 
justice was in fact being done. 
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from 
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what 
they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial is 
,, 
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conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity both 
for understanding the system in general and its workings in a 
particular case: 
"The educative effect of public attendance is a material 
· advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and 
intellegent acquaintance acquired with the methods of 
government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies is 
secured which could never be inspired by a system of 
secrecy." 6 Wigmore, supra, at 438. See also 1 Bentham, 
supra, at 525. 
In earlier times, both in England and America, attendance 
at court was a common mode of "passing the time." See, e.g., 6 
Wigmore, supra, at 436; Mueller, supra, at 6. With the press, 
or reality of the real life drama once available only in the 
courtroom, attendance at court is no longer a widespread 
-' ., pastime. Ye~'.'. [i] t is not unrealistic even in this day to .r• __ _ 
believe that public inclusion affords cJ._t.i zen.s a form of legal -
education and hopefully promotes confidence in the fair 
administration of justice." State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 
87-88, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (1966). Instead of acquiring 
information about trials by firsthand observation or by word of 
mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly 
In a sense, this 
validates media claim of functioning as "surrogates" for the .__ _____ _ 
public. While media representatives enjoy the same right of 
access as the public, they often are provided special seating 
and priority of entry so that they may report what people in 
.L ...,....--..... ~ ); 
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the 
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functioning of the entire criminal justice system ...• " 
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 u.s. 539, 587 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
c. 
From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by 
reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to 
conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very 
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice. This 
conclusion is hardly novel; without a direct holding on 
the issue, the Court has voiced its recognitiion of it in a 
variety of contexts over the years9 . Even while holding, in 
Levine v. United States, 362 u.s. 611 (1960), that a criminal 
contempt proceeding was not a "criminal prosecution" within the 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the Court was careful to note 
that more than the Sixth Amendment was involved: 
"[W]hile the right to a 'public trial' is explicitly 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment only for 'criminal 
prosecutions,' that provision is a reflection of the 
notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that 'justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice.' ... [D]ue process demands 
appropriate regard for the requirements of a public 
proceeding in cases of criminal contempt .. as it does for 
all adjudications through the exercise of the judicial 
power, barring narrowly limited categories of 
exceptions. V"' ." Id., at 616 (citations omitted) .10 
And recently in Gannett Co. Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 
(1979), both the majority, 443 u.s. at 384, 386 n.l5, and 
dissenting opinions, 443 u.s. at 423, agreed that open trials 
~
were part of the common law t r adition.~ 
.: '· 
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Despite the history of criminal 
open since long before the Constitution, 
~~ 
r(~~~ 
, t:f- I._;-~ 
presumptively 
State presses its 
contention that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights 
contains any provision which by its terms guarantees to the 
public the right to attend criminal trials. Standing alone, 
this is correct, but there remains the question whether, absent 
an explicit provision, the Constitution affords protection 
against exclusion of the public from criminal trials. 1 1 
--------------------~----------------------------!!!. 
A. 
The First Amendment guarantees "freedom of speech [and] of ______ ._....,. 
the press; [and] the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble." The latter has been described as a right which is 
"cog~ate to those of free speech and free press and is equally 
fundamental." DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). 
When the First Congress was debating the Bill of Rights, it 
was contended that there was no need separately to assert the 
right of assembly because is was subsumed in freedom of 
speech. Mr. Sedgwick of Massachusetts argued that inclusion of 
"assembly" among the enumerated rights would tend to make the 
Congress 
"appear trifling in the eyes of their constituents .... If 
people freely converse together, they must assemble for 
that purpose; it is a self-evident, unalienable right which 
the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never 
would be called in question .... " 1 Annals of Congress 731 
(1789). 
Since the right existed independent of any written guarantee, 
he went on to argue that if it were the drafting committee's 
~ ·., 
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purpose to protect all inherent rights of the people by listing 
them, "they might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of 
rights," but this was unnecessary, he said, "in a Government 
where none of them were intended to be infringed." 1 Annals of 
Congress 732. 
Mr. Page of Virginia responded, however, that at times 
"such rights have been opposed," and that "people have ... been 
prevented from assembling together on their lawful occasions:" 
[T]herefore it is well to guard against such stretches of 
authority, by inserting the privilege in the declaration of 
rights. If the people could be deprived of the power of 
assembling under any pretext whatsoever, they might be 
deprived of every other privilege contained in the 
clause." Ibid. 
R.. The motion to s1\ike "assembly" from the list of rights was 
defeated. Id., at 733. ~~ 
This background emphasizes the common origin and affinity ~ 
~-------------,,__________________________________________ ,\ 
between the guarantees of speech, ~s and ass~bly. ItifJ
clear that from the outset the right of assembly was regarded 
not only as as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the 
other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately 
linked by the draftsmen, but also as an independent right which 
is not merely cumulative. People assemble in public places not 
only to speak or to take action, but also to listen, observe, 
and learn; indeed, they may "assembl[e] for any lawful 
purpose," Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939) (Opinion 
of Stone, J.). More recently we characterized the right to 
assemble as "the right of the people to gather in public places 
for social or political purposes." Coates v. City of 
'·'· 
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Cincinnati, 402 u.s. 611, 615 (1971). 
Among the protections of the right of assembly is the 
guarantee of access to public places at which the people have 
~~-------------~------------
traditionally gathered. In Hague v. C.I.O., supra, at 515, Mr. 
Justice Roberts reminded that: 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they 
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes 
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and 
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the 
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens." 
The right to attend and observe criminal trials, which have 
been open to the public since ancient times, thu~_can be seen 
as inherent in the freedom of assembly. 
It is of course true that the right of assembly in our Bill -------of Rights was in large part drafted in reaction to restrictions 
on such rights in England. See, e.g., 1714, 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, 
c. 5; cf. 1795, 36 Geo. 3, c. 8. As we have shown, the right 
of Englishmen to attend trials was not similarly limited; but 
it would be ironic indeed if the very historic openness of the 
trial could militate against protection of the right to attend 
it. The Constitution guarantees more than simply freedom from 
those abuses which led the Framers to single out particular 
rights. The very purpose of the First Amendment is to 
guarantee all facets of each right described; its draftsmen 
sought both to protect the "rights of Englishmen" and to 
enlarge their scope. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 
263-265 (1941). 
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"There are no contrary implications in any part of the 
history of the period in which the First Amendment was 
framed and adopted. No purpose in ratifying the Bill of 
Rights was clearer than that of securing for the people of 
the United States much greater freedom of religion, 
expression, assembly, and petition than the people of Great 
Britain had ever enjoyed." Id., at 265. 
The expressly guaranteed freedoms of speech, press, and 
~are the co~on core purpose of informing people on 
the functioning of their government. And it would be difficult 
to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and 
importance to the people than how their public servants 
actually administer criminal justice; recognition of this 
pervades the centuries of history of open criminal trials. 
That the right to attend may be exercised by people less 
frequently today when information as to trials generally 
reaches them by way of print and electronic media in no way 
alters the basic right. Instead of relying on personal 
observation or reports from neighbors as in the past, most 
people receive information concerning trials through the media 
whose representatives "are entitled to the same rights [to 
attend trials] as the general public." Estes v. Texas, supra, 
at 540. 
It is not crucial whether we describe this right of ·--
a}tend~c~_ to hear, see, and communicate observations 
concerning a trial as a "right of access" or a "right to gather 
information." We have recognized that "without some protection 
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). 
The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish reports 
•" ,: . 
. . 
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of a trial would lose much meaning if the right to observe it 
were totally foreclosed. Thus the right of access to places 
traditionally open to the public, such as criminal trials, may 
be seen as assured by the amalgam of First Amendment 
guarantees; but at the very least it is embraced in the 
~
guaranteed right to assemble in such places to observe criminal 
~
trials. The doors to these trials having been traditionally 
open, save for those unusual situations where openness would 
jeopardize a higher right, they can be closed only to protect 
such a right.12 
The debates over the need for a Bill of Rights also support 
this conclusion. There were some who thought--and not without 
good reason--that there were dangers in undertaking to catalog 
some rights because of the attendant risk that other equally 
important rights, not expressed, would be treated as not 
guaranteed. 13 In a letter to Thomas Jefferson in October of 
1788, James Madison gave reasons why he, although "in favor of 
a bill of rights," had "not viewed it in an important light" up 
to that time: "I conceive that in a certain degree ... the 
rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the 
federal powers are granted." He went on to state "there is 
great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the 
most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite 
latitude." 5 Writings of James Madison 271 (Hunted. 1904). 
On the floor of Congress the following June, Madison offered 




"It has been objected also against a bill of rights, 
that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of 
power, it would disparage those rights which were not 
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by 
implication, that those rights that were not placed in that 
· enumeration, that those rights which were not singled out, 
were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General 
Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of 
the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged 
against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; 
but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have 
attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last 
clause of the fourth resolution." 1 Annals of Cong. 439 
(1789). 
The last clause of Madison's fourth resolution provided: 
"The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made 
in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as 
to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by 
the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the 
Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such 
powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution." 1 
Annals of Cong. 435. 
Madison's comments reveal clearly that the Ninth Amendment 
was intended to function as a sort of constitutional "saving 
clause," which, among other things, would serve to foreclose 
application to the Bill of Rights of the maxim that the an 
affirmation of particular rights implies a negation of those 
not expressly defined. See, e.g., 2 J. Story, Commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States 651 (5th ed. 1891). 
Madison's efforts, culminating in the Ninth Amendment, served 
to allay the fears of those who were concerned that expressing 
certain guarantees could be read as excluding others. 
This Court's interpretation of the enumerated rights has 
neither followed the maxim of exclusivity nor totally ignored 
it. Notwithstanding the appropriate caution exercised against 
., .. 
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reading into the Constitution rights not explicitly defined, 
the Court has determined that certain unarticulated rights are 
implicit in enumerated guarantees. For example, the rights of 
association and of privacy, the rights to be presumed innocent 
_:.--- -
and to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel, are 
not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution or Bill of 
Rights. Yet these important but unarticulated rights have 
nonetheless been found to share constitutional protection in 
common with explicit guarantees.l 4 We see that, in a sense, 
one of Madison's objectives has thus been fulfilled; certain 
fundamental rights have been recognized by the Court as 
indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined. 
B. 
Given the right of the public to attend criminal trials, 
guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, we turn 
to the closure order entered in this case. Despite the fact 
that this was the fourth trial of the accused and that none of 
the prior trials had been closed, we find nothing in the record 
to indicate an imperative need for closure; nor is there 
anything to suggest that alternative solutions would not meet 
the need to ensure fairness. See, e.g., Nebraska Press 
Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563-565; Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 u.s. at 357-362. There was no showing that any 
problems with witnesses could not have been dealt with by their 





trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 u.s., at 359. There is 
nothing to indicate that sequestration of the jurors would not 
have prevented the reception by them of any improper 
information. All of the alternatives admittedly present 
difficulties for trial judges, but none are beyond the realm of 
the manageable. In short, no reason adequate to support 
closure was shown here; absent an overriding interest 
articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be 





· lA newspaper account published the next day reported the 
mistrial and went on to note that "[a] key piece of evidence in 
Stevenson's original conviction was a bloodstained shirt 
obtained from Stevenson's wife soon after the killing. The 
Virginia Supreme Court, however, ruled that the shirt was 
entered into evidence improperly." App., at 34a. 
2virginia Code § 19.2-266 provides in part: 
"In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be 
felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its 
discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose 
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided 
that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not 
be violated." 
3At oral argument, it was respresented to the Court that 
tapes of the trial were available to the public as soon as the 
trial terminated. Trans. of Oral Arg., at 36. 
4 In our view, the validity of Virginia Code § 19.2-266 
was not sufficiently drawn in question by appellants before the 
Virginia courts to invoke our appellate jurisdiction. "It is 
essential to our jurisdiction on appeal ... that there be an 
explicit and timely insistence in the state courts that a state 
statute, as applied, is repugnant to the federal Constitution, 
treaties or laws." Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. 
Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 185 (1945). Appellants never 
explicitly challenged the statute's validity. In both the 
trial court and the state supreme court, appellants argued that 
constitutional rights of the public and the press prevented the 
court from closing a trial without first giving notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing to the public and the press and 
exhausting every alternative means of protecting the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. Given appellants' failure 
explicitly to challenge the statute, we view these arguments as 
constituting claims of rights under the Constitution, which 
rights are said to limit the exercise of the discretion 
conferred by the statute on the trial court. Cf. Phillips v. 
United States, 312 U.S. 246, 252 (1941) ("[A)n attack on 
lawless exercise of authority in a particular case is not an 
attack upon the constitutionality of a statute conferring the 






Court by way of our certiorari, rather than appellate, 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kulka v. California Superior Court, 
436 u.s. 84, 90 n.4 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 u.s. 235, 
244 & n.4 (1958). We shall, however, continue to refer to the 
parties as appellants and appellee. See Kulka, supra. 
· 5That there is little in the way of a contemporary record 
from this period is not surprising. It has been noted by 
historians, see E. Jenks, A Short History of English Law 3-4 
(2d ed. 1922), that the early Anglo-Saxon laws "deal rather 
with the novel and uncertain, than with the normal and 
undoubted rules of law .... Why trouble to record that which 
every village elder knows? Only when a disputed point has long 
caused bloodshed and disturbance, or when a successful 
invader ... insists on a change, is it necessary to draw up a 
code." Ibid. 
6coke interpreted certain languge of an earlier chapter 
of the same statute as specifically indicating that court 
proceedings were to be public in nature: "These words [In 
curia Domini Regis] are of great importance, for all Causes 
ought to be heard, ordered, and determined before the Judges of 
the King's Courts openly in the King's Courts, whith~~all 
persons may resort .... " 2 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of 
~ngland 103 (6th ed. 1681) (emphasis added). 
?Bentham also emphasized that open proceedings enhanced 
the performance of all involved, protected the judge from 
imputations of dishonesty, and served to educate the public. 1 
Bentham, supra, at 522-525. 
8A collateral aspect seen by Wigmore was the possibility 
that someone in attendance at the trial or who learns of the 
proceedings through publicity may be able to furnish evidence 
in chief or contradict "falsifiers." 6 Wigmore, supra, at 
436. Wigmore gives examples of such occurrences. IQ., at 436 
& n.2. 
9"of course trials must be public and the public have a 
deep interest in trials." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 
331, 361 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
"The trial is a public event. What transpires in the court 
room is public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 
374 (1947) (Douglas, J.). 
"[W]e have been unable to find a single instance of a 
criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, 
t • 
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or municipal court during the history of this country. Nor 
have we found any record of even one such secret criminal 
trial in England since abolition of the Court of Star 
Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted 
people secretly is in dispute .... This nation's accepted 
practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has 
its roots in our English common law heritage. The exact 
· date of its origin is obscure, but it likely evolved long 
before the settlement of our land as an accompaniment of 
the ancient institution of jury trial." In re Oliver, 333 
u.s. 257, 266 (1948) (Black, J.) (footnotes omitted). 
"One of the demands of a democratic society is that the 
public should know what goes on in courts by being told by 
the press what happens there, to the end that the public 
may judge whether our system of criminal justice is fair 
and right." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 
U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from 
denial of cert.). 
"It is true that the public has the right to be informed as 
to what occurs in its courts, ... reporters of all media, 
including television, are always present if they wish to be 
and are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open 
court .... " Estes v. Texas, 381 u.s. 532, 541-542 (1965) 
(Clark, J.); see also id., at 583-584 (Warren, C.J., 
concurring) (The Court-ruled, however, that the televising 
of the criminal trial over the defendant's objections 
violated his due process right to a fair trial.) 
"The principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of 
silence has long been reflected in the 'Anglo-American 
distrust for secret trials.'" Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 
U.S. 333, 349 (1966) (Clark, J.). 
lOThe Court went on to hold that, "on the particular 
circumstances of the case," 362 u.s., at 616, the accused could 
not complain on appeal of the "so-called 'secrecy' of the 
proceedings," id., at 617, because, with counsel present, he 
had failed to object or to request the judge to open the 
courtroom at the time. 
llThe Court in~nett, supra, dealing with a ~trial \ 
suppression hearing, d1d not reach or decide the question of ) 
whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right 
of members of the public to attend criminal trials. See 443 
U.S., at 392 & n.24. 
12we have no ocassion here to define the circumstances in ~ 
which all or parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the ~ 




13see, e.g., A. Hamilton, The Federalist no. 84: 
"I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the 
sense and to the extent in which they are contended for, 
are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but 
· would even be dangerous. They would contain various 
exceptions to powers not granted~ and, on this very 
account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more 
than were granted. For why declare that things shall not 
be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, 
should it be said that liberty of the press shall not be 
restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions 
may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision 
would confer a regulating power~ but it is evident that it 
would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible 
pretense for claiming that power." 
14see, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 u.s. 449 (1958) (right 
of association)~ Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 u.s. 479 (1965) 
and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to privacy)~ 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) and Taylor v. 
Kentucky, 436 U.S-.-478, 483-486 (1978) (presumption of 
inno~ence) ~ In re Winship, 397 u.s. 358 (1970) (standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt)~ United States v. Guest, 383 
u.s. 745, 757-759 (1966) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
630 (1969) (right to interstate travel). 
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"MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment. 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368 ( 19'79), held th!lit 
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was personal to 
·the accused, conferring no right of access to pretrial proceed-
ings that is separately enforceable by the public or the }Yress. 
·-The instant case raises the question whether the First Amend-
ment, of its own force and as applied to the "States thi'ough 
'the Fourteenth 'Amendment, secures the public an independent 
"right of access to trial proceedings. Because I"Mlieve that the 
First Amendment:r-of itself and as applied to the States 
·through the· Fourteenth Amendment:r-secures such a public 
· right of access, -r agree with the Court that, without more, 
agreement of the tfiai juclge and the parties cannot constitu• 
. 'tiona1ly close a triai to the ptib1ic.1 
' 1 Df course, the Sixtb Amendment remains the source of the accused's 
own right to insist upon public judicial proceedings. Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
That the Sixth Amendment explicitly establishes a public trial right 
does not impliedly foreclose the derivation of such a right from other 
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution was not framed as a 
·work of carpentry, in which all joints must fit snugly without overlapping. 
Of necessity, a document that designs a form of government will address 
central political concerns from a variety of perspectives. Significantly, 
this Court has recognized the open trial right both as a matter of the 
Sixth Amendment and as an ingredient in Fifth Amendment due process. 
See Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 614, 616 (1960) ; cf. In re 
Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) (Fourteenth Amendment due process). 
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While freedom of expression is made inviolate by the First. 
Amendment, and, with only rare and stringent exceptions, may 
not be suppressed. see. e. g., Brown v. Glines,- U. S. -, - -
{1979) (BRENNAN, . J., dissenting}~. Nebraska Press Assn: v. 
-stuart, 427 U. s .. 539. 558-559 (1976); id., at 590 (BRENNAN, 
J., concurring in judgmeJ:tt); Ne.w York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U . .S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam opinio~); Ne-ar 
.v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-716 (19?1). t_he First A:mend-
ment has not been viewed by the Court_ in .. ap ~e~tings as 
providing an equally categorical assurance of the. correlative 
·freedom of access to information, see. e. g., Saxbe v. Washing-
ton Post Co., 417 U.-S. 843,849 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 
·- 1, 16-17 (1965); see also Jfouchins v. K!JED, 4~8 U. _S. 1, 8-9 
. (1978) (opinion of .BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 16 (STEWART, J., 
concurring in the .judgment); _Gannet.t _Co. v. _De_Pasquile, 
supra, at 404-405 (REHNQUIST, .J., concurring). But cf. iii., 
at 397-398 (POWELL,.J., concurring); lfouc_hins, mpra, at 27-
38 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Saxbe, supra, at 856-864 (Pow-
ELL, J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 839_:842. 
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 2 Yet the Court has not 
ruled out a public access component to the First Amendment 
.in every circumstance. Read. with care and. in context. our 
Analogously, racinl segregation has been found. independently offcn:;ive 
to the Equal Protection and Fifth Amendment Due Proress Clauses. Com-
pare Brown v. E.oard of Education, 347_ U.S. 483, 49& (1954), with Bolling 
v. Shm·pe. 347_ U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) . 
2 A conceptually separate, yet related , question is whether the media 
should enio~· greater access rights than the general public . See, e. g., 
SCJxb.e v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 
4i7 U. S. 817, 834-835 (1974) . But no such contention is at stake here. 
Sinre the media's right of access is at least equal to tha.t of the general 
public, see ibid., thiR case is resolved by a decision that the state statute 
unronstitutionally re~tricts public acress to trials . As a ]Jractical matter;· 
however, the in::;titutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary 
of 3; right of access because it serves as the "agent" of interested citizens, 
~~1~ £_~nn~l~ i?foV?~tion a~o-~~ tri~ls t?, a l~l~~~ ~W~~er of in~ivi~it{,a~~- · 
' ~ .. 
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decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that 
any privilege of access to governmental information is subject 
to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the informa-
tion and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality. 
See Houchins, supra, ·at 8-9 (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.) (access 
to prisons); Saxbe, supra, at 849 (same); Pell, supra, at 831-
832 (same); Estes v. Te:t:a.~, 381 U. S. 532. 541-542 (1965) 
(television in courtroom); Ze·mel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 
, (1965) (validation of passport to unfriendly country). These 
cases neither comprehensively nor absolutely deHy that public 
access to informa.tion may at times be implied by the First 
Amendment and the principles which animate it. 
The Court's approach in right of access cases simply reflects 
the special nature of a claim of First Amendment right to 
gather information. Customari1y, First Amendment guaran-
tees are interposed to protect communication between speaker 
and listener. When so emp1oyed aga:inst prior restraints, free 
speech protections are a1most insurmountable. See Nebraska 
Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S., at 558-559 (1976); New 
York Times Co. v. United States, supra, 403 U.S., at 714 ( 1971) 
(per curiam opinion). See generally Brennan, Address, 32 
Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 176 (1979). But the First Amendment 
·embodies more than a commitment to free expression and 
'Communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a 
slructural ·role to play in securing and fostering our republican 
'System of self-government. See United States v. Carotene 
Prods. Co., 304 U. S. 144. 152-153, n. 4 (1938): Grosjean v. 
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233. 249-250 (1936); Stromberg 
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Brennan , supra, at 176-
177; Ely, Democracy and Distrust 93-94 (1980); Emerson, 
The Svstem of Freedom of Expression 7 (1970); Meiklejohn, 
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948); 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
~ems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 23 (1971). Implicit in this structural 
role is not only "the principle that debate on public issues 
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'Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), but the 
antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well 
as other civic 'behavior-must be informed. The structura:l 
modelliiiks the First Amendment to that process of communi-
cation necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entai:Is 
·solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the indis-
pensable conditions of meaningful communication.8 
However, because uthe stretch of this protection is theoreti-
ca1ly endless," Brennan, supra, at 177, it must be invoked 
w!th discrimination and temperance. For so far as the par-
ticipating citizen's need for information is concerned, "[t]here 
-are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by 
'ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow." 
Zemel v. Rusk, supra. 381 U. S .. at 16-17. An assertion of the 
prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed 
by considering the information sought and the opposing inter-
ests invaded.4 
s ThP technique of deriving specific· right. from the structure oi our 
constitutional govPrnmcnt, or from other explicit rights, is not novel. The 
right of suffragP has been inferred from the nature of "a free and dcmo-
crntie Rocict~·" and from its importnnce a~ n "preservative of othPr basic 
civil and political rights .... " Reunolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 561-562 
(1964); San Antonio School Dist. "· Rochiguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34, n. 74 (1973). 
So, too, the explicit frpedoms of speech, petition, and a8sembl:v have 
yielded a correlative guarnntee of certain a8Sociational activities. NAACP 
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963). Se<' also Rodriguez, supra, at 33-34 
(indicating that rights may be implicitly rmbeddecl in the Con~titution); ul., 
at. 62-()3 (BR~;NNAN , J., di~enting); id., at 112-115 (MAHSHALL, J., clisf'f'lll-
)ng) ; Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 308 (1965) (BH~<:N­
NAN, J., concurring). 
4 Analogously, we have been somewhat cautiou"' in hppl~·ing First 
Amendment protections to communication by way of nonverbal and non-
pictorial conduct. Some behavior is so intimately connected with expres-
·s1on that. for practical purposes it partakes of the same trano,ceudental 
constitutional value as pure speech. See, e. g. , 'l'inker v. Des Moines 
School District. 393 U. S. 503, 505-506 (1969). Yet where the connec-
tion betwt>en rxprei'.Sion and action is percein:-d a::. mon• tenuou;:, c·om· 
·mupicative interests may be overridden by eompeting social values. See1 
<t~. g., Hu(lhe;s v. Superior Court, -339 U.S. 460, 464-465 (l9q0), 
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"'' This judicial task is-as much a matter of sensitivity to prac-· 
tical necessities as it is of abstract reasoning. But at least 
two helpful principles may be sketched. First, the case for a 
right of access has sp~cial force when drawn from an enduring 
and vital tradition of public entree to -particular proceedings 
or information. Compare lrr te Winship~397 U.S. 358, 361.=..362' 
(1970). Such a tradition commands respect in part because 
the. Constitution .. -carries the gloss of history. More impor-
tantly, a tradition of acl!es~ibility implies the favorable· judg-
ment of experiet~ce. ~econd, the· value of access must be 
·measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical 
. statements that all information bea.rs upon public issues; what 
is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular 
goy_ernment process is important in terms of that very process. 
. To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult 
historical and .current practice with respect to open trials, 
an<l: weigh the importance of public access to the trial process 
itself. 
II 
. . . ' 
"This natioi1's ~ccepted practice of guar~nteeing a pu~lic 
.tri~l to an ~ccused has it~. ~oots in . ~ur English 9ommon law 
heritage." · In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257) 266 (194~~; s~~ Gan-
nett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., at 419-420 (BLAcK-
·MuN, J., dissenting). · Indeed, historically and functionaily, 
open trials have been closely associated with the development 
of the fun-damental procedure of tri~l by ·jury. '!n re Oliver, 
supra, at 266 ;nadit{;;The Right to a Public Trial, 6'"'femp. ~L. 
.,_. Q~ 381,-388 (f932}.5 Pre-eminent English legal observers arid 
s "[The public trial] seems almost a necessary incident of jury trials, 
' since the presence of a jury ... already insured the presence of a large 
part of the pi.lblic. We need scarcely be reminded that the jitry was the 
pat1·ia, the 'country' and that it was in that. capacity and not as judges, 
that it, was summoned." Radin, The Right to a Public Trial; 6 Temp. 
L . Q. 381, 388 ( 1932); see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England *349 (!3th ed': 1800) (" trial oy jury ; called' a lso the trial per 
tJ RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRCINIA 
commentators have unreservedly acknowledged and applauded 
·· the public character of the common-law trial process. See 
T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum 77, 81-82 (Hl70); o· 2 E . 
Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 103 (6th ed. 168i); 3 
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *372-
373 (13th ed. 1800); 7 M. Hale. The History of the Common 
Law of England 342-344 (6th ed. 1820); ~ 1 J. Bentham. Ra-
tionale of Judicial Evidence 584-585 (1827). And it appears 
that "there is' little record, if any, of secret proceedings, crimi-
nal or civil. having occurred at any time' in ·knoWn English 
history." Gannett, supra, ·at 420 (BLACKM'tiN.T, dissenting); 
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 269, 1L 22; Radin, supra. R.t 
38~387. ;;.,. .• 
This legacy of open justice was inherited by the English 
settlers in America: The· earliest charters of colonial govern-
ment expressly perpetuated the accepted practice of public 
trials. See Con·cessions and Agreements of ·West -New Jersey, 
1677,- ch. XXIII; 9 Pennsylvania Frame of Government, 1682, 
Laws Agreed Upon in England, V.10 HThere •is no evidence 
that any colonial court conducted criminal trials behind closed 
doors. . . ':'' 'Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 425. 
(BLACKMUN, J., 'dissenting). Subsequently framed state con-
stitutions also prescribed open trial proceedings. See, e. (J., 
Pennsylvania-Dec1aration of Rights, 1776, IX; 11 North Caro-
'lina Declaration of Rights. 1776, IX; 12 Vermont Declaration 
of Rights, X (1777); 1 3 see also In re Oliver, supra, 333 U.S., 
pais, or b.tt the country"); T . Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1583) 79 
'(1970 ed.) . 
6 First publi:;hed in 1583. 
7 First published in 1765. 
a First t>dition published in 1713. 
u Quoted in 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights : A Documentary History 
129 (1971). 
10 /d., at 140. 
11 /d., at 265. 
12 !d., at 287. 
ta /d.,. at 323. 
. ' "t 
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at' 267. "Following the ratification in 1791 of the Federal 
-Constitution's Sixth Amendment, .. . . most of the original 
states and those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted 
similar constitutionali provisions." lbid. 14 Today, the over-
whelming majbrity of States secure the right to public trials. 
Gannett, supra, at 414-415. n. 3· (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); 
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 267-268, 271, and nn. 17-20: 
This Court too has persistently defended the public charac., 
ter of the trial' process. Tn re Oliver established that the Due 
Process Clause of the ·Fourteenth Amendment forbids closed 
• C'riminal trials. Noting the "universal rule against secret 
trials," 333 U. S., at 266, the Court held that 
"[i] n view of this nation's historic distrust of secret pro-
ceedings, their inherent dangers to freedom. and the 
universal requirement of our federal and state govern-
. ments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of 
his liberty without due process of law meaHs at least that 
an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison." !d., at 
273.15 
14 To be sure, somr of these constitutions, such as the Pennsylvania 
Declaration of Rights, couched their public trial guarantee:, in the language 
of the accu1*'d 's rights. But although tf1e Court has read the FedemJ 
Constitution's explicit public trial provi;;ion, U. S. ConsL Amend. VI, as 
benefiting thP defendant alone, it doe~ not follow that comparably worded 
state guarantees must be so construed. See Gmmett Co. v. DePMquale, 
supra. 443 U. S., at 425, and n. 9 (BLACKMUN, ,1., dio~;enting) ; cf. also 
Mallott v. Alaska, - Ata . - , -, n. 12 (1980) . And even if the 
specific state public trial proiections must be invoked by defendants, those 
state con><titutional clauses sti11 provide evidenc·e of the importance 
attached to open trials by tl1e founder,; of our state government!:;. Indeed, 
it rna~· have been thought that linking public triaL to the accused 's privi-
leges was the most effective way of assuring a vigorous repr!':lentative for 
the popular interest. 
1~ Notabl~· , Olive1· did not rest upon the simple incorporAtion of the 
Si'Xth Amendment i11to the Fourteenth, b\1t upon notions intrinsic to due 
prece$it, because the criminal · cont<'mpt proceedings at issue in the case 
• I 
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Even more significantly for our present purpose, Oliver recog-
nized that open trials are bulwarks of our free and democratic 
government: public access to court proceedings is one of the 
numerous 11Checks and balances' ' of our system, because 11con-
temporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an 
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," ·id., at 
270. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 350 (1966) . 
Indeed, the Court focused with particularity upon the public 
trial guarantee 11as a safeguard against any attempt to employ 
our courts as instruments of persecution," or "for the suppres-
sion of political and religious heresies." Oliver, S'Upra, at 270. 
Thus. Oliver a{)knowledged that open trials are indispensable 
to First Amendment political and religious freedoms. 
By the same token. a special solicitude for the public char-
acter of judicial proceedings is evident in the Court's rulings 
upholding the right to report about the administration of 
justice. While these decisions are impelled by the classic pro-
tections afforded by the First Amendment to pure communi-
cation, they are also bottomed upon a keen appreciation oi' 
the structural interest served in opening the judicial system 
to public inspection.10 So, in upholding a privilege for repOI·t-
ing truthful information about judicial misconduct proceed-
ings, Landmark Cornrn'Unications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 
829 (1978) , emphasized that public scrutiny of the operation 
of a judicia.I disciplinary body implicates a major purpose of 
the First Amendment-"discussion of governmental affairs," 
id., at 839. Again, Nebraska Press Assn. v. St'Uart, s'Upra, 427 
U. S., at 559, noted that the traditional gua.rantee against 
were "not within 'all criminal prosecution~' lo which [the Sixth] . . • 
Amendment applies." Levine v. United States, 36:2 (J . S. 610, 616 ( 1960) ; 
see also n. 1, supra. 
16 As Nlr. Ju~tice Holmc.>s pointc.>d out in his opinion for the Mussachu-
setto Supreme Judicial Court in Cowley v. Pulsifer. 137 Ma:;s. 392, 394 
(1884) , " the privilege [to publii:lh report i:l of judicial procc.>eding8] and the 
access of the public to the courts stand in reason upou common ground.'l 
See Lewis v. Levy, E!., Bl., & El. 537 (1858) . 
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prior restraint "should have particular force as applied to 
reporting of criminal proceedings .. . . " And Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975), instructed that 
" [ w] ith respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the func-
tion of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and 
to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon 
the administration of justice." See 1'irne, Inc. v. Firestone, 
424 U.S. 448, 473-474, 476-478 (1976) (BRENNAN. J., dissent-
ing) (open judicial process is essential to fulfill "the First 
Amendment guarantees to the people of this Nation that they 
shall retain the necessary means of control over their 
. t't t' ") ms 1 u IOns. . . . . 
·Tradition, contemporaneous state practice, and this Court's 
own decisions manifest a common understanding that "[a] 
trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is 
·public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). 
As a matter of law and virtually immemoria.l custom, public 
trials have been the essentially uHwavering rule in ancestral 
England and in our own Nation. See In re Oliver, 13upra, 333 
·u.S., at 266-268; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale suw·a. 443 U. ., 
at 386, n. 15; id., at 418-432.(n. 11 (BLACKMUN, J .. dissent-
ing) .17 Such abiding adherence to the principle of open 
trials "reflect[s] a profound judgment about the way in which 
·law should be enforced and justice administered." D'uncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968). 
III 
Publicity serves to advance several of the particular pur-
poses of the trial (and, indeed, the judicial) process. Open 
trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our 
17 The dictum in Branzburg v.llayes, 408 U. S. 665, 684-685 (1972), that 
"[n]ewsmen .. . may be prohibited from attending or publishing informa-
tion about trials if such restrictions are nece:s~:~ary to a:ssure a defendant 
a fair trial ... ," is not to the contrary ; it simply note, that rights of 
access may be curtailed where there are snfficiently l)OWerfttl countervail .. 
ing considerations. Sec ante, at 4. 
•. 
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judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and 
accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence. See, e. g., Estes 
v. Tex·as, supra, 381 U. S., at 538-539 (1965). But, as a fea-
ture of our governing system of justice, the trial process serves 
other, broadly political, interests. and public access advauces 
these objectives as well. To that extent, trial access possesses 
specific structural significance.18 
The trial is a means of meeting "the notion, deeply rooted 
in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the appearance 
of justice.'" Levine v. United States , 362 U. S. 610, 616 
(1960), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11 , 14 
(1954); accord, Gannett Co. v. DePasqua'le, supra, 443 U. S., 
at 429 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); see Cow·ley v. Pulsifer, 
137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) (Holmes, J.). For a civilization 
founded upon principles of ordered liberty to survive and 
flourish, its members must share the conviction that they 
are governed equitably. "That necessity underlies constitu-
tion~il provisions as diverse as the rule against takin~s with-
out 'just compensation, see PruneYard Shopping Cenler v. 
Robins, - U. S. -, -, and n. 7 (1980), and the Equal 
Protection Clause. It also mandates a system of justice that 
18 B~· way of analogy, we 'have fushionrd rulrs of criminal procedure to 
serve intC'rests implicated in fhe trial proces~ be~ide those of the defendant . 
'For example, the exclusionary rule is prompted not only L~· the· accu~ed s 
interest in vindicating his own rig'hts, but also 'in part by the independent 
"'imperative of judicial integrity.'" Sec, e. g., Terril v. Ohio. 392 U. S. 
1, 12-13 (1968) , quoting Elki1•s v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); 
United States v. Calundru, 414 U.S. :338, 357-359 (1\)74) (Blu:NNAN, J., -'-llsS' 
dissenting) ; Olmstead "· United 8tates, 277 U. S. 438, 484 [(1928) 
(Brandei~, .T .. dit;Senting) ; id ., at. 470 (Holmes, J., di~enting) . And four 
Member:; of this Court. have insisted that criminal entrapment cannot, Lc 
"countC'nauced " because the "obligation" to avoid "enforcement of the 
'law by lawless mean~ ... goe~ beyond the eonvicticn of thr particular 
defendant. before the court. Public confidence in the fair and houorablt~ 
admini~tration of ju~tice . .. i:; the t runsceudmg value at :stake." She1·~ 
·man v. United States, 356 U. S. 369, 380 (1P58) (Fraukfurter, J ., concur~ 
ring in result). 
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- demonstrates the fairness of the law to our citizens. One 
major function of the trial; hedged Lwith procedural protec-
tions and conducted with conspicuous respect for the rule of 
law, is to make that· demonstration. See In re Oliver, supra, 
333 U. S., at 270, il~ 24. 
Secrecy is profoundly ·inimical to this demonstrative pur-
pose of the trial process. Open trials assure the public that 
procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded 
equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbi-
trariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law. Public 
access is essential, therefore. if trial adjudication is to achieve 
the objective of ma.intaining public confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice. See Ga·nnett, supra, at 428-429 (BLACK-
MUN, J., dissenting). 
But the trial is more than a demonstrably just method' of 
adjudicating disputes and protecting rights. It plays a. pivotaf 
role in the entire judicial process. and·. oy extension, in our 
form of government. Under our system, fudges are not mere 
umpires, but, in their own sphere, Tawmakers-a coordinate 
branch of governrnent. 10 While individual cases turn upon 
the controversies between parties, or involve particu18r prose-
cutions, court rulings ii.npose official and· practical conse-
quences upon memoers of society at large. Moreover, judges 
bear responsioility for tlie vitally important task of constru-
to The interpretation and· application of con:stitutional and statutory law, 
while not legislation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is subject to special 
con:straiilts and· iilformrd· by uniqur con:sidrrations. Guided and confined 
oy the Con:stitution and pertinent statuteo:, judgPI:i arP obliged to hE' dis-
cerning, exercii;e judgment, and prE'I:icribP rulrs. Indeed, at timrs ,indges 
wield· con:sidt>rablr authority to formulate legal policy in dc:si!!nated arras . 
SPe, e. g .. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U. S. 375 (1970): Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964) ; Textile Workers 
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 456-457 (1957) ; P. Arceda, Anti-
trust Analysis 45-46 (2d eel. 1974) ("Sherman Act [is] ... a generni 
authority to do what common law courts usually do : to u~P certain cus-
tomary techniques of judicial reasoning ... and to develop, refine, and 
bmovate in the dynamic common law tradition."). 
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ing and securing constitutional rights. Thus, so far as thet 
trial is the mechanism for judicial factfinding, as well as the 
initial forum for legal decisionmaking, it is a genuine govern-: 
mental proceeding. 
It follows that the ~onduct of the trial is preeminently a 
matter of public interest. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 
supra, 420 U. S., at 491-492; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio. 
Show, 338 U. S. 912, 920 ( 1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J'., 
respecting denial of certiorari). More importantly, public 
access to trials acts as an important. check, akiu in purpose to 
the other checks and balances that i11fuse our system of gov-
ernment. "The knowledge tha.t every criminal trial is subJect 
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is 
an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," In re 
Oliver, supra, at 270-an abuse that, in many cases, would 
have ramifications beyond the impact upon the parties before 
the court. Indeed, "'[w]ithout publicity, all other checks 
are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks 
are of small account.l" Ibid., at 271. quoting 1 Bentham) 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524; see 3 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries, *372; Hale. History of the Common Law 344 ; 1 J. 
Bryce, The American Commonwealth 514 (1931) . 
Finally, with some limitations, a trial aims at true and 
accurate factfinding. Of course. proper factfinding is to the 
benefit of criminal defendants and of the parties in civil pro-
ceedings. But other, comparably urgeut, interests are also 
often at stake. A miscarriage of justice that imprisons an 
innocent accused also leaves a guilty party at large, a con-
tinuing threat to society. Also, mistakes of fact in civil liti-
gation may inflict costs upon others than the plaintiff and 
defendant. Facilitation of the trial factfinding process, there-
fore. is of concern to the public as well as to the parties.to 
Publicizing trial proceedings aids accurate factfinding. 
20 Further, the interest in insuring that the innocent are not punished 
n\ay be shared by the geneml public, in u.ddltlon to the accused him~elf. 
·~ 
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"Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown 
to the parties." In re Oliver, supra, at 270, n. 24; see Tanksley 
v. United States, 145 F. 2d 58, 59 (CA9 1944); 6 J. Wig-
more, Evidence in Trials in Common Laws § 1834 (Chadbourn 
Tev. 1976). Shrewd legal observers have averred that 
"open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence 
of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing 
up of truth, than the private and secret examination ... 
where a witness may frequently depose that in private, 
which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn 
tribunal." 
'3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *373; see Tanksley v. United 
States, supra, at 59-60; Hale, History of the Common Law, 
345; 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 522-523. 
And experience has borne out these assertions about the truth-
'finding role of publicity. See 2 Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 433-434, 437-438 
(1966). 
Popular attendance at trials, in sum, substantially furthers 
the particular public purposes of that critical judicial proceed-
1ng.21 In that sense, public access is an indispensable element 
of the trial process itself. Trial access, therefore, assumes 
structural importance in our 11government of Iaws,' 1 Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803). 
21 In advancing these pnTposes, the availability of a tria! tran~cript is 
no substitute for a public presence at the trial itself. As any experienced 
appellate judge can attest, tf1e "cold'~ record' is a very i'mperfect reproduc-
tion of events tf1at transpi're i'n tl'1e courtroom. Indeed, to the extent that 
publi'ci'ty serves as a. cnecfc upon t ri'al offi'ci'als, " [ r Jecorcfation .. . wonfd' 
oo found to operate mther us cloak[] than check[] ; u;, cloak[J i'n rE'ali'ty, 
as check[] only i'n appearance."' In re Olwer, supra, 333' U. S., al 27!, 
quoting 1 Bentl'wm, R<tti'onale of Jlttdimn.D Evidence 52'4 ((1821.) ; seeo 
llllmtluu!il\ swprw,. a:t Sil.T.-57&.. 
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IV 
As previously noted, resolution of First Amendment publio 
access claims in individual cases must be strongly influenced. 
by the weight of historical practice and by an assessment of 
the specific structural value of public access in the circum-
stances. With regard to the case at hand, our ingrained tradi-
tion of public trials and the importance of public access to the 
broader purposes of the trial process, tip the balance strongly 
toward the rule that trials be open.22 What countervailing 
interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this pre-
sumption of openness need not concern us now/8 for the stat-
ute at stake here authorizes trial closures at the unfettered dis-
cretion of the judge and parties.24 Accordingly, Va. Code 
19.2-266 violates the First a.nd Fourteenth Amendments, and 
the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court to the contrary 
should be reversed. 
22 The presumption of public trials is, of course, not at all incompatible 
\vith reasonable restrictions lmpo~~ed upon courtroom behavior in the inter-
ests of decorum. Cf. lllirun's v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) . Thus, whe1\ 
engaging in interchanges at the bench, the trial judge is not required to 
allow public or press intrusion upon the huddle. Nor does this opinion 
intimate that judges are restricted in their ability to conduct conferences 
in chambers, inasmuch as such conferences are distinct from trial 
proceedings. 
28 For example, national security concerns about confidentiality may 
sometimes warrant closures during sensitive portions of trial proceedings, 
such as testimony about state secrets. Cf. United State~ v. Nixon, 418 
U. S. 683, 714-716 (1974). 
2 ~ Significantly, closing a trial lacks even the justification for barring the 
door to pretrial hearings: the necessity of preventing dissemination of sup-
pressible prejudicial evidence to the public before the jury pool hM 
become, in a practical $Cnse, finite and subject to sequestration. 
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JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
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Re: 79-243 - Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 
Dear Chief, 
Although I thought, and still do, that the 
Sixth Amendment is the preferable approach to the 
issue of public access to both pre-trial and trial 
proceedings, particularly the latter, it does not 
appear that the Conference is prepared to proceed 
on this basis. Having this in mind, I join your 
opinion based on the First Amendment and would ex-
pect to stay hitched if three or more Justices in 
addition to myself join your opinion. If there is 
a Court only for the judgment, I may leave you and 
say my own piece. 
I should also add, that as I see it, your 
invocation of the Ninth Amendment is unnecessary, 
and in any event, it may be that I shall disasso-
ciate myself from that portion of the opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment. 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), held that 
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was personal to 
the accused, conferring no right of access to pretrial proceed-
ings that is separately enforceable by the public or the press. 
The instant case raises the question whether the First Amend-
ment, of its own force and as applied to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, secures the public an independent 
right of access to trial proceedings. Because I believe that the 
First Amendment-of itself and as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment-secures such a public 
right of access, I agree with the Court that, without more, 
agreement of the trial judge and the parties cannot constitu-
tionally close a trial to the public.1 
1 Of course, the Sixth Amendment remains the source of the accused's 
own right to insist upon public judicial proceedings Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368 (1979). 
ThaL the Sixth Amendment, explicitly establishes a public trial right 
does not impliedly foreclose the derivation of such a right from othet 
provisiono of the Constitution. The Constitution was not framed as a 
work of carpentry, in which all joints must fit snugly without overlapping. 
Of necessity, a document that designs a form of government will address 
central polit1ral concerns from a variety of perspective:;. Significantly, 
this Court has recognized the open trial right both as a matter of the 
Sixth Amendment and as an ingredient in Fifth Amendment due process. 
See Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 614, 616 (1960); cf. In re 
'Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) (Fourteenth Amendment due procesl:l). 
T t t 111 tenr.an 
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While freedom of expression is made inviolate by the First 
Amendment, and, with only rare and stringent exceptions, may 
not be suppressed, see, e. r;., Brown v. Glines,- U. S. -,-
(1979) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Nebraska Press Assn. v. 
Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 558-559 (1976); id., at 590 (BRENNAN, 
J., concurring in judgment); New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam opinion); Near 
v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 715-716 ( 1931), the First Amend-
ment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as 
providing an equally categorical assurance of the correlative 
freedom of access to information, see, e. g., Saxbe v. Washi-ng-
ton Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849 ( 1974); Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S. 
1, 16-17 (1965); see also Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 8-9 
(1978) (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 16 (STEWART, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 
supra, at 404-405 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). But cf. id., 
at 397-398 (PowELL. J., concurring); Houchins, supra, at 27-
38 (STEVENS, J .. dissenting); Saxbe, supra, at 856-864 (Pow--ELL. J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817. 839-842 
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 2 Yet the Court has not 
ruled out a public access component to the First Amendment 
in every circumstance. Read with care and in context, our 
Analogously, rarial srgregation has been found independently olfensive 
to the Equal Protrrtion and Fifth Amrndment Due Prore~R Clnu~ef'. Com-
pare Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U . S. 4 3, 495 (1954), with Bolling 
v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) . 
2 A conceptually separate, yet related, qurstion is whether the media 
should rnioy grPatrr acrr~s rights than the genrrnl puhlir . See, e. g., 
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U . S. 843, 850 (1974) ; Pe/l v Procunier, 
417 U.S. 817, 834-835 (1974) . But no such contentiOn i~ at stak<' hrre. 
Sinre the medirr's right of access is at least equal to that of the general 
public, see ibid., this rase is resolved by a derision thai the state statute 
unconst itutionall~r reRtrirts public access to trials . As a practical matter, 
however, the institutional prrss i~ the likely, and fitting, chief benefiriary 
of a right of access because it serves as the "agent" of interestt'd citizens, 
and funnels information about trials to a large number of individuals 
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decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that 
any privilege of access to governmental information is subject 
to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the informa-
tion and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality. 
See Houchins, supra, ·at 8-9 (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.) (access 
to prisons); Saxbe, supra, at 849 (same); Pell, supra, at 831-
832 (same); Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 541- 542 (1965) 
(television in courtroom); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 
(1965) (validation of passport to unfriendly country). These 
cases neither comprehensively nor absolutely deny that public 
access to information may at times be implied by the First 
Amendment and the principles which auimate it. 
The Court's approach in right of access cases simply reflects 
the special nature of a claim of First Amendment right to 
gather information. Customarily, First Amendment guaran-
tees are interposed to protect communication between speaker 
and listener. When so employed against prior restraints, free 
speech protections are almost insurmountable. See Nebraska 
Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S., at 558-559 (1976); New 
York Times Co. v. United States, supra, 403 U.S., at 714 ( 1971) 
(per curiam opiuion). See generally Brennan, Address, 32 
Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 176 ( 1979). But the First Amendment 
embodies more than a commitment to free expression and 
communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a 
structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican 
system of self-government. See United States v. Carotene 
Prods. Co., 304 U. S. 144. 152-153, n. 4 (1938): Grosjean v. 
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-250 ( 1936); Stromberq 
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 ( 1931); Brennan. supra, at 176-
177; Ely. Democracy and Distrust 93- 94 (1980) ; Emerson, 
The Svstem of Freedom of Expression 7 ( 1970); Meiklejohn, 
Free Speech and Its Relation to SE'lf-Government (1948); 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems. 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 23 (1971). Implicit in this structuraf 
role is not only "the principle that debate on public issues 
ehould be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," New York 
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Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), but the 
antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well 
as other civic behavior-must be informed. The structural 
model links the First Amendment to that process of communi-
cation necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails 
solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the indis-
pensable conditions of meaningful communication.8 
However, because "the stretch of this protection is theoreti-
cally endless," Brennan, supra, at 177, it must be invoked 
with discrimination and temperance. For so far as the par-
ticipating citizen's need for information is concerned, " [ t] here 
are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by 
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow." 
Zemel v. Rusk, supra, 381 U. S., at 16-17. An assertion of the 
prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed 
by considering the information sought and the opposing inter-
ests invaded.4 
s The technique of deriving specific rights from the Rtrurtnre of our 
constitutional government. or from other explicit right,, i ~ not novel. The 
right of suffmge hns bren infrrred from the nature of "11 free nnd drmo-
crntic society" and from its importance as a "presrrva1iYe of other bnf'ir 
civil and political rights .... " Reunolds " · Sims, 377 n. S. 533. 561-562 
(1964); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34. n. 74 (Hl73). 
So, too, the explicit freedoms of speerh, prtition, nncl a~sembly hnve 
yi0ldcd a rorrelntiw guarantee of certain nssorintional artiviti0s. NAACP 
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963). See nlso Rodriguez , supra, at 33-34 
(indicnting that rights may br implicitly emb0dded in the Constitution); id., 
at 62-63 (BRI-:NNAN, J., dissenting) ; id., at.ll2-115 (ilfAHSHALL, J., di"sont-
ing); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 308 (1965) (BHEN-
NAN, J., concurring). 
4 Analogously, we hnve been somewhat cautious in applying First 
Amendment protections to communication by wa~· of nonycrbal nnd non-
pirtorinl conduct. Some behavior is so intimnt0ly connected with expres-
sion that for practical purposPs it partak0s of the same tr::msrendPntal 
ronstitutionnl value as pure speech. See, e. (]. , Tinker v. D es Moines 
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 505--506 (1969) . Yet where the connec-
tion between expresi'ion nnd action is perceived as more tenuous, com-
municative interests may be overridden by compet ing sorinl values. See, 
e. g., Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-465 (1950) . 
·"'. •;.:,_.: .. I 
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This judicial task is as much a matter of sensitivity to prac-
tical necessities as it is of abstract reasoning. But at least 
two helpful principles may be sketched. First, the case for a 
right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring 
and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings 
or information. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-362 
(1970). Such a tradition commands respect in part because 
the Constitution carries the gloss of history. More impor-
tantly, a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judg-
ment of experience. Second, the value of access must be 
measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical 
statements that all information bears upon public issues; what 
is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular 
government process is important in terms of that very process. 
To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult 
historical and current practice with respect to open trials, 
and weigh the importance of public access to the trial process 
itself. 
II 
"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public 
trial to an accused has its roots in our English common law 
heritage." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 266 (1948); see Gan-
nett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., at 419-420 (BLACK-
MUN, J., dissenting) . Indeed, historically a.nd functionally, 
open trials have been closely associated with the development 
of the fundamental procedure of trial by jury. In re Oliver, 
supra, at 266; Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. 
Q. 381, 388 (1932) .5 Pre-eminent English legal observers and 
5 "[The public trial] seems almost a necessary incident of jury irials, 
since the presence of a jury .. . already insured the presence of a large 
part of the public. We need scarcely be reminded that the jury wa~ the 
patria, the 'country' and that it was in tha.t capacity and not as judges, 
that it was summoned." Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. 
L. Q. 381, 388 (1932); see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
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commentators have unreservedly acknowledged and applauded 
the public character of the common-law trial process. See 
T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum 77, 81- 82 (1970) ; 6 2 E. 
Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 103 (6th eel. 1681); 3 
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *372-
373 (13th eel. 1800); 7 M. Hale, The History of the Common 
Law of England 342-344 (6th eel. 1820); s 1 J. Bentham, Ra-
tionale of Judicial Evidence 584-585 (1827). And it appears 
that "there is little record, if any, of secret proceedings, crimi-
nal or civil, having occurred at any time in known English 
history." Gannett, supra, at 420 (BLACKMUN. J ., dissenting); 
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 269, n. 22; Radin , supra, at 
386-387. 
This legacy of open justice was inherited by the English 
settlers in America. The earliest charters of colonial govern-
ment expressly perpetuated the accepted practice of public 
trials. See Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, 
1677, ch. XXIII; 9 Pennsylvania Frame of Government. 1682. 
Laws Agreed Upon in England, V. 10 "There is no evidence 
that any colonial court conducted criminal trials behind closed 
doors. . . ." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 425. 
(BLACKMUN, J. , dissenting). Subsequently framed state con-
stitutions also prescribed open trial proceedings. See, e. g., 
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, 1776, IX; 11 North Caro-
lina Declaration of Rights, 1776. IX; 1 2 Vermont Declaration 
of Rights, X (1777); 13 see also In re Oliver, supra, 333 U.S. , 
pais, or by the country") ; T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1583) 79 
(1970 ed.). 
6 First published in 1583. 
7 First published in 1765. 
8 First edition published in 1713. 
9 Quoted in 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 
129 (1971) . 
1 0 !d., at 140. 
11 !d., at 265. 
12 !d., at 287. 
18 !d., at 323. 
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at 267. "Following the ratification in 17!.Jl of the Federal 
Constitution's Sixth Amendment, ... most of the original 
states and those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted 
similar constitutional provisions." Ibid. 11 Today, the over-
whelming majority of States secure the right to public trials. 
Gannett, supra, at 414-415, n. 3 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) ·; 
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 267-268, 271, and nn. 17-20. 
This Court too has persistently defended the public charac-
ter of the trial process. In re Oliver established that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids closed 
criminal trials. Noting the "universal rule against secret 
trials," 333 U. S., at 266, the Court held that 
"[i]n view of this nation's historic distrust of secret pro-
ceedings, their inherent dangers to freedom, and the 
universal requirement of our federal and state govern-
ments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of 
his liberty without due process of la.w means at ]east that 
an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison." I d. , at 
273.15 
14 To be 'ttre, some of these constitu1ions, such a. th<' Pennsylvnni::t 
Declaration of Rights, couched their JHthlic trial11:uarantee~ in the lnngnage 
of the nccul:'ecl 's rights. But nlthough the Court has read the Federal 
Constitution'll explieit public trial provi~ion, U. S. Const. Amend. VI, ns 
benefiting the defendnnt alone, it does not follow that romparnblv worded 
state guarantees must be so construed. See Gannett Co . v. DePasquale, 
su7Jra, 443 U. S., at 425, nnd n. !) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); rf. also 
Mallott v. Alaska, - Ala. -, -, n. 12 (1980) . And even if the 
sperific state public trinl protections mu~t be invoked br defendants , those 
state constitutional clauses still provide evidence of tlw importance 
attached to oprn trials by the founder" of onr statr governments. Indeed, 
it mar hnve bren thought that linking public trials to thr nrru~ed'~< privi-
lege;; was the mo~t effective way of m;~uring a vigorom; rcprescnbt tive for 
the popular intere;;t. 
1 5 NotnbJ~r , Oliver did not rest upon the i;imple incorporation of the 
Sixth Amcndmrnt into th<· Fourtrruth , but upon notions intrin~ir to duE> 
process, brcau~e the criminal contempt proceedings at i~~ue in the rase 
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Even more significantly for our present purpose, Oliver recog-
nized that open trials are bulwarks of our free and democratic 
government: public access to court proceedings is one of the 
numerous "checks and balances'' of our system, because "con-
temporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an 
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," id., at 
270. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 350 (1966). 
Indeed, the Court focused with particularity upon the public 
trial guarantee "as a safeguard against any attempt to employ 
our courts as instruments of persecution," or "for the suppres-
sion of political and religious heresies." Oliver, supra, at 270. 
Thus, Oliver acknowledged that open trials are indispensable 
to First Amendment political and religious freedoms. 
By the same token, a special solicitude for the public char-
acter of judicial proceedings is evident in the Court's rulings 
upholding the right to report about the administration of 
justice. While these decisions are impe11ed by the classic pro-
tections afforded by the First Amendment to pure communi-
cation , they are also bottomed upon a keen appreciation of 
the structural interest served in opening the judicial system 
to public inspection.10 So, in upholding a privilege for report-
ing truthful information about judicial misconduct proceed-
ings, Landmark Communications. Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 
829 (1978) , emphasized that public scrutiny of the operation 
of a .i udicial disciplinary body implicates a major purpose of 
the First Amendment- "discussion of governmental affairs." 
id., at 839. Again, Ne braska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 
U. S., at 559, noted that the traditional guarantee against 
were "not within 'all criminal proFeeutions' to which [the Sixth] . . . 
Amendment applie!:<." Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616 (19()0) ; 
see also n . 1, supra . 
16 As Mr . .Justice Holmes pointed out in his opinion fo r the 1\Ias::;a ehu-
setts Supreme .J udirial Court in Cowley v. Pulsifer, 1 :~7 Ma~s. 392, 394 
(1884), " the privilege [to publish reports of judicial proceedings] and the 
access of the public to the courts stand in reason upon common ground ." 
See Lewis v. Levy, El., Bl., & El. 537 (1858). 
' . 
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prior restraint "should have particular force as applied to 
reporting of criminal proceedings .... " And Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975), instructed that 
"[w]ith respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the func-
tion of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and 
to briug to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon 
the administration of justice." See Tirne, Inc. v. Firestone, 
424 U.S. 448, 473- 474, 476-478 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissent-
ing) (open judicial process is essential to fulfill "the First 
Amendment guarantees to the people of this Nation that they 
shall retain the necessary means of control over their 
. t't t' ") ms 1 u wns. . . . . 
Tradition, contemporaneous state practice, and this Court's 
own decisions manifest a common understanding that " [a] 
trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is 
public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). 
As a matter of law and virtually immemorial custom, public 
trials have been the essentially unwavering rule in ancestral 
England and in our own Nation. See In re Oliver, su'f)ra. 333 
U. S., at 266-268; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., 
at 386. 11. 15; id., at 418-432, and n. 11 (BLACKMUN, J., dis-
senting) .n Such abiding adherence to the principle of open 
trials "reftect[s] a profound judgment about the way in which 
law should be enforced and justice administered." Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968). 
III 
Publicity serves to advance severa.I of the particular pur-
poses of the trial (and, indeed. the judicial) process. Open 
trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our 
17 The dictum in Branzbura v. Hayes , 408 U. S. 665, 684-685 (1972), that 
"rnJewsmen ... may be prohibited from attending or publishing informa-
tion about trials if such restrictions are necessa ry to assure a defendant 
a fair trial ... ," is not to the contrary; it simply notes that rights of 
access may be curtniled where there are sufficiently powerful counten·ail~ 
ing considerations. See ante, at 4. 
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judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and 
accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence. See, e. g., Estes 
v. Texas, supra, 381 U.S., at 538-539 (1965). But, a.s a fea-
ture of our governing system of justice, the trial process serves 
other, broadly political, interests, and public access advances 
these objectives as well. To that extent, trial access possesses 
specific structural significance?8 
The trial is a means of meeting "the notion, deeply rooted 
in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the appearance 
of justice.' " Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610. 616 
(1960), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14 
(1954); accord, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., 
at 429 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); see Cowley v. Pulsifer, 
137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) (Holmes, J.). For a civilization 
founded upon principles of ordered liberty to survive and 
flourish, its members must share the conviction that they 
are governed equitably. That necessity underlies constitu-
tional provisions as diverse as the rule against takings with-
18 By way of analogy, we have fushionell rules of criminal procedure to 
serve intere~ts implicated in the trial process beside those of the defl?ndnnt. 
For example, the exclusionary rule is prompted not only b~· the ncru~ed's 
interest in vindicating his own rights, but also in part by the independrnt 
"'imperative of judicial integrity.'" See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio. 392 U. S. 
1, 12-13 (1968), quoting Elkins v. United States. 3()4 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); 
United States v. C'alandm, 414 U. S. 338, 357-359 (1974) (BBENNAN, J., 
dis:sPnting) ; Olmstrad v. Ctl'itrd States, 277 U. S. 438, 484-485 (Hl28) 
(Brandeis, .J., di~s?ntil'g) ; id .. at 470 (Holmes, J ., di:s!cnting) . And sevrral 
Members of this Court. have in~isterl that criminal rntrapmcnt cannot be 
"countenanced" becau::;e the '' obligation" to avoid "enforcement of the 
law by lawless means ... goes beyond the convicticn of the particular 
defendant before the court. Public confidenee in the fair and honorable 
admini~trntiou of justice ... is thr transcending value at stakr." Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U. S. :369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring in re~ult ; ~ee United States v. Russell, 411 U. S. 42:3, 436-439 (1973) 
(Douglas, .T., di:sl'enting) ; id., at 442- 443 (STEWART, .J. , di;:~~nting); 
Sorrl'l!s \' . United States. 287 U. S. 4:35, 455 (1932) (oninion of Robert s, 
J .); Casey v. United States, 276 lJ . S. 413, 423, 425 (1921:1) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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out just compensation, see PruneYard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, - U. S. -, -, and n. 7 (1980), and the Equal 
Protection Clause. It also mandates a system of justice that 
demonstrates the fairness of the law to our citizens. One 
major function of the trial, hedged with procedural protec-
tions and conducted with conspicuous respect for the rule of 
law, is to make that demonstration. See In re Oliver, supra, 
333 U. S., at 270, n. 24. 
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative pur-
pose of the trial process. Open trials assure the public that 
procedural rights are respected. and that justice is afforded 
equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbi-
trariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law. Public 
access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve 
the objective of maintaining public confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice. See Gannett, supra, at 428-429 (BLACK-
MUN, J., dissenting). 
But the trial is more than a demonstrably just method of 
adjudicating disputes and protecting rights. It plays a pivotal 
role in the entire judicial process. and, by extension, in our 
form of government. Under our system, judges are not mere 
umpires. but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate 
branch of government.lfl While individual cases turn upon 
the controversies between parties, or involve particular prose-
19 The interpretntion and application of constitutional and statutor~· lnw, 
while not lrgiHlation, is lnwmnking, albrit of n kind that is subjrct to special 
constraints and informPd h~· unique consideratiom;. Guidrd and confinrd 
by the Conl:ititution and prrtinent statutes, judgrs are obligrd to be dif-'-
cerning, exerci:;e judgm<>nt, and prescribe rules. Inderd, at timr:< judgrs 
wield <·ousidernblP nut horit~· to formula tr legal polir~· in deRignntrd area~. 
See, e. g., llforaonP v. States Marine Lines. 398 U.S. 375 (1970): Banco 
Nacional de Cuba " · 8abbatiuo. 376 U. S. 398 (1964) ; Trxtile Workers 
Union v. Lincolu Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 456-457 (1957): P . Arerdtt, Anti-
trust Analysi..;;: 45-46 (2d ed. 1974) ("Sherman Act [is] ... a genernf 
authority to do whnt common law courts usually do : to UHe certain cus-
tomary tE-chniques of jutlicinl reasoning ... and to develop, refinr, and 
innovate ~n the dynm:nic comm.on law tradition!'), 
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cutions, court rulings impose official and practical conse-. 
quences upon members of society at large. Moreover, judges 
bear responsibility for the vitally important task of constru-
ing and securing constitutional rights. Thus, so far as the 
trial is the mechanism for judicial factfinding, as well as the 
initial forum for legal decisionmaking, it is a genuine govern-
mental proceeding. 
It follows that the conduct of the trial is preeminently a 
matter of public interest. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 
supra, 420 U. S., at 491-492; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio 
Show, 338 U. S. 912, 920 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., 
respecting denial of certiorari). More importantly, public 
access to trials acts as an important check, akin in purpose to 
the other checks and balances that infuse our system of gov-
ernment. "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject 
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is 
an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," In re 
Oliver, supra, at 270-an abuse that, in many cases, would 
have ramifications beyond the impact upon the parties before 
the court. Indeed, " 1 [ w] ithout publicity, all other checks 
are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, a.Il other checks 
are of small account.'" Ibid., at 271, quoting 1 Bentham, 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524; see 3 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries, *372; Hale, History of the Common Law 344; 1 J. 
Bryce, The American Commonwealth 514 (1931). 
Finally, with some limitations, a trial aims at true and 
accurate factfinding. Of course, proper factfinding is to . the 
benefit of criminal defendants and of the parties in civil pro-
ceedings. But other, comparably urgent, interests are also 
often at stake. A miscarriage of justice that imprisons an 
innocent accused also leaves a guilty party at large, a con-
tinuing threat to society. Also, mistakes of fact in civil liti-
gation may inflict costs upon others than the plaintiff and 
defendant. Facilitation of the trial factfinding process, there-
fore, is of <;:oncern to the public as well as to the parties.20 
20 Further, the interest in insuring that the innocent are not puni:;hed 
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Publicizing trial proceedings aids accurate factfinding. 
"Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown 
to the parties." In re Oliver, supra, at 270, n. 24; see Tanksley 
v. United States, 145 F. 2d 58, 59 (CA9 1944); 6 J. Wig-
more, Evidence in Trials in Common Laws§ 1834 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1976). Shrewd legal observers have averred that 
"open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence 
of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing 
up of truth, than the private and secret examination ... 
where a witness may frequently depose that in private, 
which he will be ashamed to te~tify in a public and solemn 
tribunal." 
3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *373; see Tanksley v. United 
States, supra, a.t 59-60; Hale, History of the Common Law, 
345; 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 522-523. 
And experience has borne out these assertions about the truth-
finding role of publicity. See 2 Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 433-434, 437-438 
(1966). 
Popular attendance at trials, in sum, substantially furthers 
the particular public purposes of that critical judicial proceed-
ing.21 In that sense, public access is an indispensable element 
of the trial process itself. Trial access, therefore, assumes 
may be shnred by the general public, in addition to the accused himself. 
21 In advancing these purposes, the availability of a trial transcript is 
no substitute for a public presence at the trial itself. As any experienced 
appellate judge can attel:lt, the "cold" record is a very imperfect reproduc-
tion of events thnt transpire in the courtroom. Indeed, to the extent that 
publicity serves as a check upon trial officials, "[rlecordation ... would 
be found to operate rather as cloak[] than check[]; as cloak[] in reality, 
as check[] only in appearance." In re Oliver, supra, 333 U. S., at 271, 
quoting 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827); se& 
~entham, supra, at 577-578 .. 
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~tructural importance in our "government of laws," lvf arbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803). / 
IV 
As previously noted, resolution of First Amendment public 
access claims in individual cases must be strongly influenced 
by the weight of historical practice and by an assessment of 
the specific structural Yalue of public access in the circum-
stances. With regard to the case at hand, our ingrained tradi-
tion of public trials and the importance of public access to the 
broader purposes of the trial process, tip the balance strongly 
toward the rule that trials be open.~2 What countervailing 
interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this pre-
sumption of openness need not concern us now,":' for the stat-
ute at stake here authorizes trial closures at the unfettered dis-
cretion of the judge and parties.24 Accordingly, Va. Code 
19.2- 266 violates the First aud Fourteenth Amendments, and 
the decision of the Yirginia Supreme Court to the contrary 
should be reversed. 
22 The preHunption of publil' trial~ is. of c·oHr;;e, not at all in compatible 
with rca~ouable rc:;tri<:tion ~ impo:;('d upou courtroom ])('IJ<t\·ior in the inter-
ests of decorum . Cf. Il/i11ois "· Allc~t. 397 U. S. 3a7 (1970). Thus, when 
cngaginp; in intNdtnugp;; nt the bench, tlw trial judge is not rl'quircd to 
allow public· or pre·"~ int rur~ion upon tlw huddle. i\or do<'.' t hi" opinion 
intimate that j11dgl'~ arc rr~trieted in their ability to eonduc·t conferences 
in chambers, ina ~mueh a~ such coufcrcncc~ arc di~tinct from trial 
prorecdi11gs. 
"" For rxmnplr , national securit~· ronr·<•rns about ronfident iality may 
somctimr!' warrant closures dming ~cn s iti, · e portions of 1rial prorccclings, 
such ns tc,.: timony about state ;;ccret::;. Cf. U11it ed States " · Nixon, 418 
U. S. 6K:l . 714- il6 (Hl74) . 
21 Significantly, rinsing a triul ]H('k~ r,·en the justifil'ation for b:uring the 
door to pr<'t ria I lwa rings: the ncce~,.:it~ · of pren•nting cli::~cmina tion of sup-
JWCs:sible prejudil'inl e1·id<·nce to the pnblic before the jury pool has 
become, in a Jmtetieal ~l'n ;;e, fiuitc and ~ubject to sequestration. 
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l\1R. JusTICE BRENNAN; concurring in the judgment. 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), held that 
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was personal to 
the accused, conferring no right of access to pretrial proceed-
ings that is separately enforceable by the public or the · press. 
The instant case raises the question whether the First Amend-
ment, of its own force and as applied to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, secures the public an independent 
right of access to trial proceedings. Because I believe that the 
First Amendmentr-of itself and as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendmentr-secures such a public 
right of access, I agree with the Court that, without more, 
agreement of the trial judge and the parties cannot constitu-
tionally close a tria.! to the public.1 
t Of course, the Sixth Amendment remains the source of the accused's 
bwn right to insist upon public judicial proceedings. Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368 (1979) . 
That the Sixth Amendment explicitly establishes a public trial right 
does not impliedly foreclose the derivation of such a right from other 
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution was not framed as a 
work of carpentry, in which all joints must fit snugly without overlapping. 
Of necessity, a document that designs a form of government will address 
central political concerns from a variety of perspectives. Significantly, 
this Court has recognized the open trial right both as a matter of the 
Sixth Amendment and as an ingredient in Fifth Amendment due process. 
See Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 614, 616 (1960); cf. In re 
Ol·iver, 333 U. S. 257 (i948) (Fourteenth Amendment due process). 
'~ . 
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While freedom of expression is made inviolate by the First 
Amendment, and, with only rare and stringent exceptions, may 
not be suppressed, see, e. g., Brown v. Glines,- U. S. -,-
(1979) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Nebraska Press Assn. v. 
Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 558-559 (1976); id., at 590 (BRENNAN, 
J., concurring in judgment); New York ·Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam opinion); Near 
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-716 (1931), the First Amend-
ment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as 
providing an equally categorical assurance of the correlative 
freedom of access to information, see, e. g., Saxbe v. Washing-
ton Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,849 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S. 
1, 16-17 (1965); see also Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 8-9 
(1978) (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 16 (STEWART, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 
supra, at. 404-405 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). But cf. id., 
at 397-398 (PowELL, J., concurring); Houch-ins, supra, at 27-
38 (STEVENS, J., dissenting): Saxbe, supra, at 856-864 (Pow-
ELL. J., diE:senting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 839-84·2 
(1974) (Douglas, J. , dissenting).2 Yet the Court has not 
ruled out a public access component to the First Amendment 
in every circumstance. Read with care and in context, our 
Annlo~ously, racial segregation has been found independently offensive 
to the Equal Protection nnd Fifth Amendment Due Process Clauses. Com-
pare Brown v. Board of Educat·ion, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954), with Bolling 
v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497,499-500 (1954). 
2 A conceptually separate, yet related , question is whether the media 
shonld eniny greater access rights than the general public. See, e. g., 
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 850 (1974) ; Pell v. Procunier,. 
417 U. S. 817, 834-835 (1974) . But no such contention is at stake here. 
Sinre the mrdia 's right of access is at least equal to that of the general· 
public, see ibid., this case is resolved by a decision that the state statute-
unconstitutionally restricts public access to trials. As a practical matter, 
however, the institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief benefiriary 
of a right of acress because it serves as the "agent" of interested citizens~ 
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decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that 
any privilege of access to governmental information is subject 
to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the informa-
tion and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality. 
See Houchins, supra;at 8-9 (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.) (access 
to prisons); Saxbe, supra, at 849 (same); Pell, supra, at 831-
832 (same); Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 541-542 (1965) 
(television in courtroom); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 
(1965) (validation of passport to unfriendly country). These 
cases neither comprehensively nor absolutely deny that public 
access to information may at times be implied by the First 
Amendment and the principles which animate it. 
The Court's approach in right of access cases simply reflects 
the special nature of a claim of First Amendment right to 
gather information. Customarily, First Amendment guaran-
tees are interposed to protect communication between speaker 
and listener. When so employed against prior restraints, free 
speech protections are almost insurmountable. See Nebraska 
Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S., at 558-559 (1976); New 
York Times Co. v. United States, supra, 403 U.S., at 714 ( 1971) 
(per curiam opinion). See generally Brennan, Address, 32 
Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 176 (1979). But the First Amendment 
embodies more than a commitment to free expression and 
communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a 
structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican 
system of self-government. See United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938): Grosjean v. 
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-250 (1936); Stromberg 
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Brennan, supra, at 176-
177; Ely, Democracy and Distrust 93-94 (1980); Emerson, 
The Svstem of Freedom of Expression 7 (1970); Meiklejohn, 
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948); 
Bark, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 23 (1971). Implicit in this structural 
role is not only "the principle that debate on public issues 
~hQuld be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," New York 
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Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), but the 
antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well 
as other civic behavior-must be informed.8 The structural 
model links the First Amendment to that process of communi-
cation necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails 
solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the indis-
pensable conditions of meaningful communication.4 
However, because "the stretch of this protection is theoreti-
cally endless," Brennan, supra, at 177, it must be invoked 
with discrimination and temperance. For so far as the par-
ticipa.ting citizen's need for information is concerned, " [ t] here 
J ./'Thi8 idea has bePn forP;:;hadowed in Ml{. Ju:;'l'IcE PowELL's dissent in 
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-863 (1974): 
"What. is at :;take here is the sociPtal function of the Fir;:;t Amendment 
in pre;;erving free public dil:icussion of governmental affairs. No aspect. 
of that cun,;titntional guarantee il:i more rightly treal:iured than it:; pro-
tection of the ability of our people through free and open debate to con-
sider and resolve their own destiny. . . . '[The] ... First Amendment 
is one of the vital bulwarks of our national commitment to intelligent self-
government.' . . . It embodies our Nation's commitment to popular 
self-determination and our abiding faith that the sure3t course for devel-
oping sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views on public 
issues. And public debate must. not only be unfettered; it must also be 
informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated that First 
Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas as 
well as the right of free exprrl:il:iion.'' (Footnote and citations omitted.) 
4 The technique of deriving specific rights from the structure of our 
constitutional government, or from other explicit rights, is not novel. The 
right of suffrage has been inferred from the nature of "a free and demo-
cratic society" and from its importance as a "preservative of other basic 
civil and political rights . .. .'' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 561-562 
(1964); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34, n. 74 (1973). 
So, too, the explicit freedoms of speech, petition, and assembly have 
yielded a correlative guarantee of certain associational activities. NAACP 
v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 430 (1963). See also Rodriguez, supra, at 33-34 
(indicating that rights may be implicitly embedded in the Constitution); id., 
at 62-63 (BRF;NNAN, J., dissenting); id. , at 112-115 (MARSHALL, J., dissent• 
ing); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 308 · (1965) . (BREN ... 
NAN, J., concurring). 
. ' 
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are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by 
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow." 
Zemel v. Rusk, supra, 381 U. S., at 16-17. An assertion of the 
prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed 
by considering the information sought and the opposing inter-
ests invaded.5 
This judicial ta.sk is as much a matter of sensitivity to prac-
tical necessities as it is of abstract reasoning. But at least 
two helpful principles may be sketched. First, the case for a 
right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring 
and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings 
or information. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-362 
(1970). Such a tradition commands respect in part because 
the Constitution carries the gloss of history. More impor-
tantly, a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judg-
ment of experience. Second, the value of access must be 
measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical 
statements that all information bea.rs upon public issues; what 
is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular 
government process is important in terms of that very process. 
To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult 
historical and current practice with respect to open trials, 
and weigh the importance of public access to the trial process 
itself. 
II 
"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public 
trial to an a.ccused has its roots in our English common law 
5 Analogously, we have been somewhat cautions in applying First 
Amendment protections to communication by way of nonverbal and non-
pictorial conduct. Some behavior is so intimately connected with expres-
sion that for practical purposes it partakes of the same transcendental 
constitutioual value as pure speech. See, e. g., Tinker v. Des Moines 
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 505-506 (1969) . Yet where the connec-
tion between expression and action is perceived as more tenuous, com-
municative interests may be overridden by competing social values. Soo, 
c. fl ., Huuhes v. Superior Court, 339 U, S. 460, 46.4-46,5 (1950), 
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heritage." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 266 (1948); see Gan~. 
nett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., at 419-420 (BLACK-
MUN, J., dissenting). Indeed, historically and functionally, 
open trials have been closely associated with t~e development 
of the fundamental procedure of trial by jury. In re Oliver, 
supra, at 266; Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. 
Q. 381, 388 (1932).0 Pre-eminent English legal observers and 
commentators have unreservedly acknowledged and applauded 
the public character of the common-law trial process. See 
T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum 77, 81-82 (1970); 7 2 E. 
Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 103 (6th ed. 1681); 3 
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *372-
373 (13th ed. 1800); 8 M. Hale, The History of the Common 
Law of England 342-344 (6th ed. 1820); n 1 J. Bentham, Ra-
tionale of Judicial Evidence 584-585 (1827). And it appears 
that "there is little record, if any, of secret proceedings, crimi-
nal or civil, having occurred at any time in known English 
history." Gannett, supra, at 420 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); 
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 269, n. 22; ·Radin, supra, at 
386-387. 
This legacy of open justice was inherited by the English 
settlers in America. The earliest charters of colonial govern-
ment expressly perpetuated the accepted practice of public 
trials. See Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, 
6 "[The public trial] seems almost a necrssary incident of jury trials, 
since the presence of a jury ... already insured the presence of a large 
part of the public. We need scarcely be reminded that the jury was the· 
patria, the 'country' and that it was in that capacity and not as judges, 
that it was summonea." Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp .. 
L. Q. 381, 388 (1932); see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England *349 (13th ed. 1800) ("trial by jury; called also the trial per 
pais, or by the country"); T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1583) '('91 
'(1970 ed .). 
7 First publi~hed in 1583. 
8 First publi~hed in 1765. 
9 First eclition published in 1713.. 
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1677, ch. XXIII; 10 Pennsylvania Frame of Government, 1682, 
Laws Agreed Upon in England, V.11 "There is no evidence 
that any colonial court conducted criminal trials behind closed 
doors. . . ." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 425. 
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Subsequently framed state con-
stitutions also prescribed open trial proceedings. See, e. g., 
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, 1776, IX; 12 North Caro-
lina Declaration of Rights, 1776, IX; Js Vermont Declaration 
of .Rights, X ( 1777); 14 see also In re Oliver, supra, 333 U. S., 
at 267. "Following the ratification in 1791 of the Federal 
Constitution's Sixth Amendment, . . . most of the original 
states and those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted 
similar constitutional provisions." Ibid. 15 Today, the over-
whelming majority of States secure the right to public trials. 
Gannett, supra, at 414-415, n. 3 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); 
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 267-268, 271, and nn. 17-20. 
This Court too has persistently defended the public charac-
ter of the trial process. In re Oliver established that the Due 
10 Quoted in 1 B, Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documrntary History 
129 (1971). 
11 !d., at 140. 
12 !d., at 265. 
13 !d., at 287. 
14 !d., at 323. 
1 5 To be sure, some of these constitutions, such as the Pennsylvania 
Declaration of Rights, couched their public trial guarantees in the language 
of the accused's rights. But although the Court has read the Federal 
Constitution's explicit public trial provision, U. S. Canst. Amend. VI, as 
benefiting the defendant alone, it does not follow that comparably worded 
state guarantees must be so construed. See Gannett Co . v. DePasquale, 
supra, 443 U. S., at 425, and n. 9 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); cf. also 
Mallott v. Alaska, - Ala. -, -, n. 12 (1980). And even if the 
specific state public trial protections must be invoked by defendants, those 
state constitutional clauses still provide evidence of the importance 
attached to open trials by the founders of our state governments. Indeed, 
it may have been thought that linking public trials to the accused's privi-
leges was the most effective way of assuring a vigorous representative for 
the pop\1lar interest, 
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids closed 
criminal trials. Noting the "universal rule against secret 
trials," 333 U. S., at 266, the Court held that 
"[i] n view of this nation's historic distrust of secret pro.-
ceedings, their inherent dangers to freedom, and the 
universal requirement of our fedenil and state . govern-
ments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of 
his liberty without due process oflaw means at least that 
an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison." ld., at 
273.16 
Even more significantly for our present purpose, Oliver recog-
nized that open trials are bulwarks of our free and democratic 
government: public access to court proceedings is one of the 
numerous "checks and balances'' of our system; because "con-
temporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an 
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," id., at 
270. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 350 (1966). 
Indeed, the Court focused with particularity upon the public 
trial guarantee "as a safeguard against any attempt to employ 
our courts as instruments of persecution," or "for the suppres-
sion of political and religious heresies." Oliver, supra, at 270. 
Thus, Oliver acknowledged that open trials are indispensable 
to First Amendment political and religious freedoms. 
By the same token, a special solicitude for the public char-
acter of judicial proceedings is evident in the Court's rulings 
upholding the right to report about the administration of 
justice. While these decisions are impelled by the cla.ssic pro-
tections afforded by the First Amendment to pure communi-
10 Notably, Olive!' did not rest upon the simple incorporntion of the· 
Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth, but upon notions intrinsic to due 
process, because the criminal contempt proceedings at issue in the case· 
were "not within 'all criminal prosecutions' to which [the Sixth] ..•. 
Amendment applies." Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616 (1960);; 
ll.e~ ali!A n. 1, sup1'a, 
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.cation, they are also bottomed upon a keen appreciation of 
the structural interest served in opening the judicial system 
to public iuspection.17 So, in upholding a privilege for report-
ing truthful information abo1,1t judicial misconduct proceed ... 
ings, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 
829 (1978), emphasized that public scrutiny of the operation 
of a judicia.! disciplinary body implicates a. major purpose of 
the First Amendment-"discussion of governmental affairs," 
id., at 839. Again, Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 
U. S., at 559, noted that the traditional guarantee against 
prior restraint "should have particular force as applied to 
reporting of criminal proceedings .... " And Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 492 (1975), instructed that 
" [ w] ith respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the func-
tion of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and 
to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon 
the administration of justice." See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 
424 U.S. 448, 473-474, 476-478 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissent-
ing) (open judicial process is essential to fulfill "the First 
Amendment guarantees to the people of this Nation that they 
shall retain the necessary means of control over their 
. t' t' ") ms 1tu wns. . . . . 
Tradition, contemporaneous state practice, and this Court's 
own decisions manifest a. common understanding that "[a] 
trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is 
public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). 
As a matter of la.w and virtually immemorial custom, public 
trials have been the essentially unwavering rule in ancestral 
England and in our own Nation. See In re Oliver, supra. 333 
u. s., at 266-268; Gannett Co. V. DePasquale, supra, 443 u. s.~ 
at 386, n. 15; id., at 418-432, and n. 11 (BLACKMUN, J., dis-
1 7 As Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in his opinion for the Massachu-. 
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Cowley v. Pulsijel', 137 Mass. 392, 394 
(1884), "the privilege [to publish reports of judicial proceedings] and the 
access of the public to the courts stand in reason upon common ground,'" 
~t;!e :(,ewis v. Levy, El., Bl., & El. 537 (1858). 
... 
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sen tin g) .18 Such abiding adherence to the principle of open 
trials "reflect[s] a profound judgment about the way in which 
law should be enforced and justice administered." Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968). 
III 
Publicity serves to advance several of the particular pur-
poses of the trial (and, indeed, the judicial) process. Open 
trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our 
judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and 
accura.te adjudication of guilt or innocence. See, e. g., Estes 
v. Texas, supra, 381 U. S., a.t 538-539 (1965). But, as a fea-
ture of our governing. system of justice, the trial process serves 
other, broadly political, interests, and public access advances 
these objectives as well. · To that extent, trial access possesses 
specific structural significance.10 
18 The dictum in Branz burg v. Haye, 408 U. S. 665, 684-685 (1972), that 
"[n] ewsmen ... may be prohibited from attending or p\iblishing informa-
tion about trials if such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant 
a fair trial ... ," is not to the contrary; it simply notes that rights of 
access may be curtailed where there are sufficiently powerful counterYai!-
ing considerations. See ante, at 4. 
10 By way of analogy, we have fashioned rules of criminal procedure to 
serve interests implicated in the trial process beside those of the defendant. 
For example, the exclusionary rule is prompted not only b~· the acru~ed's 
interest in vindicating his own rights, but also in part by the independent 
"'imperative of judicial integrity.'" See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio. 392 U. S. 
1, 12-13 (1968), quoting Elk-ins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222 (1960); 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357-359 (1974) (BRENNAN,·J., 
dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 484-485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J ., dissentiPg); id., at 470 (Holmes, J ., dissenting). And ~everal 
Members of this Court haYe insisted that criminal entrapment cannot be 
"countenanced" because the "obligation" to avoid "e11forcement of the 
law by lawle>'s means . .. goes beyond the convieticn of the particular 
defendant before the court. Public confidence in the fair and honorable 
administration of justice . . . is the transcending value at stake." Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U. S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J ., coneur-
dng in rntlt ; see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436-439 (1973) 
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The trial is a means of meeting "the notion, deeply rooted 
in the common law, that 'justice must sa.tisfy the appearance 
of justice.'" Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616 
(1960), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14 
(1954); accord, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., 
at 429 (BLACKMUN, J. , dissenting); see Cowley v. Pulsifer, 
137 Mass. 392, 394 ( 1884) (Holmes, J.). For a civilization 
founded upon principles of ordered liberty to survive and 
flourish, its members must share the conviction that they 
are governed equitably. That necessity underlies constitu-
tional provisions as diverse as the rule against takings with-
out just compensation, see PruneYard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, - U. S. -, -, and n. 7 (1980\ and the Equal 
Protecti01i Clause. It also mandates a system of justice that 
demonstrates the fairness of the la.w to our citizens. One 
major function of the trial, hedged with procedural protec-
tions and conducted with conspicuous respect for the rule of 
law, is to make that demonstration. See In re Oliver, supra, 
333 U. S., at 270, n. 24. 
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative pur-
pose of the trial process. Open trials assure the public tha.t 
procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded 
equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbi-
trariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law. Public 
access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve 
the objective of maintaining public confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice. See Gannett, supra, at 428- 429 (BLACK-
MUN, J ., dissenting). 
But the trial is more than a demonstrably just method of 
adjudicating disputes and protecting rights. It plays a pivotal 
role in the entire judicial process, and, by extension, in out 
(Douglas, J ., di~srnting) ; id., at 442-443 (S'rEWAHT, J. , dissenting); 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 455 (1932) (opinion of Hoberts, 
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form of government. Under our system, judges are not mer~ 
umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate 
branch of govermnent."0 While individual cases turn upon 
the controversies between parties, or involve particular prose-
cutions, court rulings impose official and practical conse-
quences upon members of society at la.rge. Moreover, judges 
bear responsibility for the vitally important task of constru-
ing and securing constitutional rights. Thus, so far as the 
trial is the mechanism for judicial faetfinding, as well as the 
initial forum for legal decisionmaking, it is a genuine govern~ 
mental proceeding. 
It follows that the conduct of the trial is preeminently a 
matter of public interest. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 
supra, 420 U. S., at 491-492; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio 
Show, 338 U. S. 912, 920 ( 1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., 
respecting denial of certiorari). More importantly, public 
access to trials acts as an important check, akin in purpose to 
the other checks and balances that infuse our system of gov-
ernment. "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject 
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is 
an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," In re 
Oliver, supra, at 270-an abuse tha.t, in many cases, would 
have ramifications beyond the impact upon the parties before 
the court. Indeed, "'[w]ithout publicity, all other checks 
20 The interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory law, 
while not legislation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is subject to special 
constraints and informed by unique considerations. Guided and confined 
by the Constitution and pertinent statutes, judges are obliged to be dis-
cerning, exercise judgment, and prescribe rules. Indeed, at times judges 
wield considerable authority to formulate legal policy in designated areas .. 
See, e. g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U. S. 375 (1970); Banco 
'Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964); Textile Worker.; 
Un·ion v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 456-457 (1957); P. Areeda, Anti-
trust Analysis 45-46 (2d ed. 1974) ("Sherman Act [is] ... a general 
authority to do what common law courts usually do: to use certain cus-
tomary techniques of judicial reasoning ... and to develop, refine, and 
\nnQv~te in the dynamic commo.A law trad\tion,''), 
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are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks 
are of small account.'" Ibid., at ·271, quoting 1 BenthamJ 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524; see 3 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries, *372; Hale, History of the Common Law 344; 1 J, 
Bryce, The American Commonwealth 514 (1931). 
Finally, with some limitations, a trial aims at true and 
accurate factfinding. Of course, proper factfinding is to the 
benefit of criminal defendants and of the parties in civil pro-
ceedings. But other, comparably urgent, interests are also 
often at stake. A miscarriage of justice that imprisons an 
innocent accused also leaves a guilty party at large, a con-
tinuing threat to society. Also, mistakes of fact in civil liti-
gation may inflict costs upon others than the plaintiff and 
defendant. Facilitation of the trial factfinding process, there-
fore, is of concern to the public as well as to the parties. 21 
Publicizing trial proceedings aids accurate factfinding. 
11Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown 
to the parties." In re Oliver, supra, at 270, n. 24; see Tanksley 
v. United States, 145 F. 2d 58, 59 (CA9 1944); 6 J. Wig-
more, Evidence in Trials in Common Laws§ 1834 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1976). Shrewd legal observers have averred that 
110pen examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence 
of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing 
up of truth, than the private and secret examination ... 
where a witness may frequently depose that in private, 
which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn 
tribunal." 
3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *373; see Tanksley v. Unitea 
States, supra, at 59-60; Hale, History of the Common Law, 
345; 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 522-523. 
And experience has borne out these assertions about the truth-
finding role of publicity. See 2 Hearings before the Subcom-
21 Further, the interrst in insuring that the innocent are not punished· 
tua? be shared by the general public, in addition to the accused himself:. 
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mittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 433-434, 437-438 
(1966). 
Popular attendance at trials, in sum, substantially furthers 
the particular public purposes of that critical judicial proceed-
ing.22 In that sense, public access is an indispensable element 
of the trial process itself. Tria.I access, therefore, assumes 
structural importance in our "government of laws," Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803). 
IV 
As previously noted, resolution of First Amendment public 
access claims in individual cases must be strongly influenced 
by the weight of historical practice arid by an assessment of 
the specific structural value of public access in the circum-
stances. With regard to the case at hand, our ingrained tradi-
tion of public trials and the importance of public access to the 
broader purposes of the tria1 process, tip the balance strongly 
toward the rule that trials be open. 23 What countervailing 
t 2 In advancing these purposes, the availability of a trial transcript is 
no substitute for a public presence at the trial itself. As any experienced 
appellate judge can attest, the "cold" record is a very imperfect reproduc-
tion of events that transpire in the courtroom. Indeed, to the extent that 
publicity serves as a check upon trial officials, "[r]ecordation ... would 
be found to operate rather as cloak[] than check[]; as cloak[] in reality, 
as check[] only in appearance." In re Oliver, supra, 333 U. S., at 271, 
quoting 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827); see 
Bentham, supra, at 577-578. 
n The pre:;umption of public trials is, of course, not at all incompatible 
with reasonable restrictions imposed upon courtroom behavior in the inter-
ests of decorum. Cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 (1970). Thus, when 
engaging in interchanges at the bench, the trial judge is not required to 
allow public or press intrusion upon ·the huddle. Nor does this opinion 
intimate that judges are restricted in their ability to conduct conferences 
in chambers, inasmuch as ·such conferences are distinct from trial 
proceedings. 
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interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this pre-: 
sumption of openness need not concern us now,24 for the stat-
ute at stake here authorizes trial closures at the unfettered dis-
cretion of the judge and parties. 2 ~ Accordingly, Va. Code 
19.2-266 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, anc{ 
the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court to the contrary 
·' !3h<iuld be reversed. 
21 For rxamplr, national security concerns about. confidentiality may 
sometimes warrant closures during sensitive portions of trial proceedings, 
such as testimony about state secrets. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 
u. s. 683, 714-716 (1974). 
25 Significnntly, clo;,ing a trial lacks even the justification for barring t.he. 
door to pretrial hearings: the necessity of preventing dissemination of sup-
pressible prejudicial evidence to the public before the jury pool has 
becotne, in a practical sense, finite and subject to sequestration. 
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Although I may end up joining another opinion 
after the dust has settled, I thought it best to 
circulate my present views about this case in the 
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MR. JUSTICE S~EVENS, concurring. 
This is a watershed case.~/ An additional word of 
emphasis is therefore appropriate. 
Twice before the rourt has implied that any gove~nmenta 1 
restriction on access to information, no matter ~ow severe an~ 
no matter how uniustifiea, would be constitutiona 1 1v acceptab 1 e 
so 1ong as it din not sing 1 e out the press fo~ special 
disabilities not applicable to the public at large. In a 
dissent joined by MR. JUS~ICE BRENNAN and MR. JUS~1~E MARSBA~L 
in Saxbe v. washins_ton Post ro., 417 u.s. 843, 850, MR. ,"TUS'T'IC'E 
POWELL unequivocally rejected the conclus'on "that any 
governmental restriction on press access to information, so 
long as it is not discriminatory, falls outsi~e the purview of 
First Amendment concern." Id., at 857 (emphasis in original). 
And in Ho!:!chins v. KQED~nc., 438 u.s. 1. , Jf)-40, 1 explained 
at length why MR. ,JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. ,lUS'I'IC'E POWELL anr T 
1/ See gtevens, Some ~houghts about a General Rule, ?1 Ar~z. 
L7 Rev. 599, 602 (1979): "Whereas t~e rourt has accorre~ 
virtually absolute protection to the fdissemination of 
information or ideasl, it has never. squarely he1~ thnt the 
racquisition of newsworthy matterl is ent~t 1 ed to any 
constitional protection whatsoever." 
were convinced that "fa]n official prison policy of concea 1 ing 
... knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the 
flow of information at its source abridges t~e freeoom of 
speech and of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution." Id., at 38. Since M'R.. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. JUSTirE BLACKMUN were unable to 
participate in that case, a major~ty of t~e rourt neit~er 
accepted nor rejected that conclusion or the contra~v 
concJusion expressed in the prevailing opinions.2/ ~odav, 
however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds t~at 
an arbitrary interference with access to important information 
is an abridgment of freedom of speech protecten by t~e ~irst 
Amendment. 
It is somewhat ironic that the Court should find more 
reason to recognize a right of access toAav than it ~i~ in 
Houchins. For Houchins involved the plight of a segment of 
society least able to protect itself, an attack on a long 
standing policy of concealment, and an absence of anv 
legitimate justification for abridging public access to 
information about how its government operates. In t~is case w~ 
-2/ "Neither tile FTrst Amendment nor the Fou~teent11 Amendment 
mandates a right of access to government information or. sources 
of information within the government's control." 438 U.S., at 
15 (opinion of BURGER, C.J.). 
"The First anc Fourteenth Amendments ro not guarantee the 
public a right of access to information generaten or cnn~rolle~ 
by government . ~he Constitution roes no more than assure 
the public and the press equal access once government has 
opened its doors." Ia., at 16 (S~WtlAR'I', ,J., concurring). 
are protecting the interests of the most powerful voices in t~P 
community, we are concerned with an almost unique exception ~o 
an established tradition of openness in the con~uct of criminal 
trials, and it is likely that the closure order was motivate~ 
by the judge's desire to protect the individual de~endant from 
the burden of a fourth criminal tria, .l1 
In any event, essentjally for the reasons stated in Part TT 
of my Houchin~ opinion, 438 u.s., at 30-38, T agree that the 
First Amendment protects the public and the press from 
abridgment of their rights of access to informatjon about the 
operation of their government, including the Ju~icial Branch: 
given the total absence of anv record iustification for the 
closure order entered in this case, that or~er violate~ t~e 
First Amendment. 
3/ Neither that likel.v motivation nor facts showing the risk 
that a fourth trial would have been necessary without closure 
of the third are disclosed in this record, however. 
-- \ 
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[June -, 1980] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether the right to 
attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the United States 
Constitution. 
I 
In March 1976, one Stevenson was indicted for the mur-
der of a hotel manager who had been found stabbed to 
death on December 2, 1975. Tried promptly in July 1976, 
Stevenson was convicted of second-degree murder in the 
Circuit Court of Hanover County, Va. The Virginia Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction in October 1977, holding that a 
bloodstained shirt purportedly belonging to Stevenson had 
been improperly admitted into evidence. Stevenson v. Com-
monwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S. E. 2d 779 (1977) . 
Stevenson was retried in the same court. This second trial 
ended in a mistrial on May 30, 1978 when a juror asked to be 
excused after trial had begun and no alternate was available.1 
1 A newspaper account published the next day reported the mistrial and 
went on to note that "[a] key piece of evidence in Stevenson's original 
conviction was a bloodstained shirt obtained from Stevenson's wife soon 
after the killing. The Virginia Supreme Court, however, ruled that the 
hirt wa entered into evidence improperly." App., at 34a. 
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A third trial, which began in the same court on June 6, 
1978, also ended in a mistrial. It appears that the mistrial 
may have been declared because a prospective juror had read 
about Stevenson's previous trials in a newspaper and had told 
other prospective jurors about the case before the retrial 
began. See App., at 35a-36a. 
Stevenson was tried in the same court for a fourth time 
beginning on September 11, 1978. Present in the courtroom 
when the case was called were appellants Wheeler and 
McCarthy, reporters for appellant Richmond Newspapers. Inc. 
Before the trial began, counsel for the defendant moved that 
it be closed to the public: 
"[T]here was this woman that was with the family of the 
deceased when we were here before. She had sat in the 
Courtroom. I would like to ask that everybody be ex-
cluded from the Courtroom because I don't want any 
information being shuffled back and forth when we have 
a recess as to what-who testified to what." Trans. of 
Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Close 
Trial to the Public, 2-3. 
The trial judge, who had presided over two of the three 
previous trials, asked if the prosecution had any objection 
to clearing the courtroom. The prosecutor stated he had no 
objection and would leave it to the discretion of the court. 
!d., at 4. Presumably referring to Virginia Code § 19.2-266, 
the trial judge then announced: "[T]he statute gives me that 
power specificially and the defendant has made the motion." 
He then ordered "that the Courtroom be kept clear of all 
parties except the witnesses when they testify." !d., at 4-5.~ 
The record does not show that any objections to the closure 
2 Virginia Code§ 19.2- 266 provides in part: 
"In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misde-
meanor cases, the court may, in its discretion , exclude from the trial any 
persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial; provided 
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order were made by anyone present at the time, including 
appellants Wheeler and McCarthy. ( 
Later that same day, however, apellants sought a hearing P 
on a motion to vacate the closure order. The trial judge 
granted the request and scheduled a hearing to follow the 
close of the day's proceedings. When the hearing began, the 
court ruled that the hearing was to be treated as part of the 
trial; accordingly, he again ordered the reporters to leave 
the courtroom, and they complied. 
At the closed hearing, counsel for appellants observed that 
no evidentiary findings had been made by the court prior to 
the entry of its closure order, and pointed out that the court 
had failed to consider any other, less drastic measures within 
its power to ensure a fair trial. Trans. of Sept. 11, 1978 
Hearing on Motion to Vacate, 11-12. Counsel for appellants 
argued that constitutional considerations mandated that before 
ordering closure, the court should first decide that the rights 
of the defendant could be protected in no other way. 
Counsel for defendant Stevenson pointed out that this was 
the fourth time he was standing trial. He also referred to 
((difficulty with information between jurors," and stated that 
he 11didn't want information to leak out," be published by 
the media, perhaps inaccurately, and then be seen by the 
jurors. Defense counsel argued that these things, plus the 
fact that "this is a small conununity," made this a proper 
case for closure. !d., at 16- 18. 
The trial judge noted that counsel for the defendant had 
made similar statements at the morning hearing. The court 
also stated: 
"[O]ne of the other points that we take into considera-
tion in this particular Courtroom is layout of the Court-
room. I think that having people in the Courtroom is 
distracting to the jury. Now, we have to have certain 
people in here and maybe that's not a very good reason. 
When we get into our new Court Building, people can 
1'9-243-0PINION 
4 RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA 
sit in the audience so the jury can't see them. Tha 
rule of the Court may be different under those circum-
stances ..•. " !d., at 19. 
The prosecutor again declined comment, and the court 
summed up by saying: 
"I'm inclined to agree with [defense counsel] that, if I 
feel that the rights of the defendant are infringed in any 
way, [when] he makes the motion to do something and 
it doesn't completely override all rights of everyone else, 
then I'm inclined to go along with the defendant's 
motion." !d., at 20. 
The court denied the motion to vacate and ordered the trial to 
continue the following morning "with the press and public 
excluded." I d., at 27; App., at 21a. 
What transpired when the closed trial resumed the next 
day was disclosed in the following manner by an order of 
the court entered September 12, 1978: 
"[I]n the absence of the jury, defendant by counsel 
made a Motion that a mis-trial e declared, which mo-
tion was taken under advisement. At the conclusion of 
the Commonwealth's evidence, the attorney for the de-
fendant moved the Court to strike the Commonwealth's 
evidence on grounds stated to the record, which Motion 
was sustained by the Court. And the jury having been 
excused, the Court doth find the accused NOT GUILTY 
of Murder, as charged in the Indictment, and he was 
allowed to depart." App., at 22a.3 
On September 27, 1978 the trial court granted appellants' 
motion to intervene nunc pro tunc in the Stevenson case. 
Appellants then petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for 
writs of mandamus and prohibition and filed an appeal from 
8 At oral argument, it was represented to the Court that tapes of the 
trial were available to the public as soon as the trial terminated. Tr. of 
Otal Arg., at 36. 
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the trial court's closure order. On July 9, 1979, the Virginia 
Supreme Court dismissed the mandamus and prohibition 
petitions and, finding no reversible error, denied the petition 
for appeal. App., at 23a-28a. 
Appellants then sought review in this Court, invoking both 
our appellate, 28 U. S. C. ~ 1257 (2), allCl certiorari jurisdic-
tion. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3). We postponed further con-
sideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the hearing 
of the case on the merits. - U. S. - (1979). We con-
clude that jurisdiction by appeal does not lie; 4 however, 
treating the filed papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari 
pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2103, we grant the petition. 
The criminal tria1 which appellants sought to attend has 
long since ended, and there is thus some suggestion that the 
4 In our view, the validity of Virginia Code § 19.2-266 was not suffi-
ciently drawn in question by appellants before the Virginia courts to invoke 
our appellate jurisdiction. "It is essential to our jurisdiction on 
appeal . . . that there be an explicit and timely insistence in the state 
courts that a state statute, as applied, is repugnant to the federal Con-
stitution, treaties or laws." Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. 
Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 185 (1945). Appellants never explicitly chal-
lenged the statute's validity. In both the trial court and the state 
supreme court, appellants argued that constitutional rights of the public 
and the press prevented the court from closing a trial without first 
giving notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the public and the 
press and exhausting every alternative means of protecting the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. Given appellants' failure explicitly to challenge 
the statute, we view these arguments as constituting claims of rights 
under the Constitution, which rights are said to limit the exercise of the 
discretion conferred by the statute on the trial court. Cf. Phillips v. 
United States, 312 U. S. 246, 252 (1941) ("[A]n attack on lawless 
exercise of authority in a particular case is not an attack upon the con-
stitutionality of a sta.tute conferring the authority ... . ") . Such claims 
are properly brought before this Court by way of our certiorari, rather 
than appellate, jurisdiction. See, e. g. , Kulka v. California Supe1ior Court, 
436 U. S. 84, 90, n. 4 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 244, and 
n. 4 (195H). We ~;hall, howrver, continue to refer to the partic'l:l as appel-
lant:; and appellee. See Kulka, supra. 
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case is moot. This Court has frequently recognized, how~ 
ever, that its jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated by the 
practical termination of a contest which is sho~lived by 
nature. See, e. g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 
368, 377-378 (1979); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 
539, 546-547 (1976). If the underlying dispute is "capable 
of repetition, yet evading review," Southern Pacific Terminal 
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911), it is therefore not moot. 
The Virginia Supreme Court's decision, 11 [f] in ding no re-
versible error in the judgment complained of," App., at 24a, 
sanctions total closure in this case and can reasonably be seen 
as opening the way for similar closure orders at future trials 
from which appellants, and others who desire to attend, are 
likely to be excluded. Most trials will be of sufficiently short 
duration that a closure order "will evade review, or at least 
considered plenary review in this Court." Nebraska Press, 
supra, at 547. Accordingly, we turn to the merits. 
II 
We begin consideration of this case by noting that the 
precise issue presented here has not previously been before 
this Court for decision. ln Gannett Co. Y. DePasquale, 443 
U. S. 368 ( Hl79). the Court expressly left open whether a. right 
of access to trials, as distinguished from hea.riugs on pretrial 
motions. was constitutionally guaranteed. It did uot decide 
whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the 
right of the public to attend, id., at 392, and n. 24, nor did the 
clissc'nting opinion reach this issue. !d., at 447 (BLACKMUN, 
J .. dissenting). 
In prior cases the Court has treated questions involving con-
flicts between publicity and a defendant's right to a fair trial; 
as W<' observed in l\rebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 
539. 547 (1976). "lt]lw problems preseuted by this lcoufiict] 
arc almost as old as the Republic." flee also, e. g., Gannett, \ 
supra; Murphy v. /?lorida, 421 U. S. 794 (1975); Sheppard v. 
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Maxwell, 384 r. S. 333 ( 1966); Estes V. 'l'exas, 381 U. S. 532 
(HJ65). But here for the first time the Court is asked to 
decide whether a crimi11al trial itself may be closed to the 
public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without 
any demonstration that closure is required to protect the 
defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other 
overriding consideration requires closure. 
A 
The origins of the proceeding which has become the modern 
trial in Anglo-American justice can be traced back beyond 
reliable historical records. We need not here review all de-
tails of its development; what is significant for present pur-
poses is that throughout its evolution, the trial has been open 
to all who cared to observe. 
In the days before the Norman Conquest, cases in England 
were generally brought before moots, such as the local court 
of the hundred or the county court, which were attended by 
the freemen of the community. Pollock, English Law Before 
the Norman Conquest, in 1 Selected Essays in Anglo-American 
Legal History 89 ( 1907). Somewhat like modern jury duty, 
attendance at these early meetings was compulsory on the 
part of the freemen. who were called upou to re11der judgment. \ 
!d., at 89-90; see also 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English 
Law 10, 12 (1927).5 
With the gradual evolution of the jury system in the years 
after the Norman Conquest, see, e. g., 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 
316, the duty of all freemen to attend trials to render judg-
5 That there is little in the way of a contemporary record from this 
period is not surprising . It has been noted by hi torians, see E. Jenks, 
A Short Histor~· of English Law 3-4 (2d eel. 1922), that the early Anglo-
Saxon laws "deal rather with the novel and uncertain, than with the 
normal and undoubted rules of law. . . . Why trouble to record that 
which every villnge elder knows? Only when a disputed point has long 
caused bloodshed and disturbance, or when a successful invader ... insists 
on a change, is il nccPssary to draw up a code." Ibid. 
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ment was relaxed, but there is no indication that criminal 
trials did not remain public. When certain groups were 
excused from compelled attendance, see The Statute of Marie-
borough, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 10; 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 79, 
and n. 4, the statutory exemption did not prevent them from 
attending; Lord Coke observed that those excused "are not 
compellable to come, but left to their own liberty." 2 E. 
Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 121 (6th ed. 1681).~r 
Although there appear to be few contemporary statements 
on the subject, reports of the Eyre of Kent, a general court 
held in 1313-1314, evince a recognition of the importance 
of public attendance apart from the "jury duty" aspect. It 
was explained that: 
"the King's will was that all evil doers should be pun-
ished after their deserts, and that justice should be min-
istered indifferently to rich as to poor; and for the better 
accomplishing of this, he prayed the community of the 
county by their attendance there to lend him their aid in 
the establishing of a happy and certain peace that should 
be both for the honour of the realm and for their own 
welfare." 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 268, quoting from the 
S. S. edition of the Eyre of Kent, vol. i., p. 2 (emphasis 
added). 
From these early times, although great changes in courts 
and procedure took place, one thing remained constant: the 
public character of the trial at which guilt or innocence was 
decided. Sir Thomas Smith, writing in 1565 about "the 
definitive proceedinges in causes criminall," explained that, 
6 Coke interpreted certain language of an earlier chapter of the same 
statute as specifically indicating that court proceedings were to be public 
in nature : "These words [In curia Domini Regis 1 are of great importance, 
for all Cnuses ought to be heard , ordered, and determined bt:>fore the 
Judges of the King's Courts openly in the King1s Courts, whither all per-
sons may resort . ... " 2 E. Coke, Institutes of the taws of England 1()3; 
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while the indictment was put in writing as in civil law 
countries: 
"All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the 
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so 
manie as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all 
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men may 
heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses 
what is saide." T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum 10~ 
(Alston ed. 1972) (emphasis added). 
Three centuries later, Sir Frederick Pollock was able to state 
of the "rule of publicity" that, "[h] e~;e we have one tradition, 
at any rate, which has persisted through all changes." F. Pol-
lock, The Expansion of the Common Law 31-32 (1904). See 
also E. Jenks, The Book of English Law 73-74 (6th ed. 1967): 
"[O]ne of the most conspicuous features of English justice, 
that all judicial trials are held in open court, to which the 
public have free access, .. . appears to have been the rule in 
England from time immemorial." 
We have found nothing to suggest that the presumptive 
openness of the trial, which English courts were later to call 
"one of the essential qualities of a court of justice," Daubney 
v. Cooper, 10 B. & C. 237. 240, 109 Eng. Rep. 438. 440 (K. B. 
1829), was not also an attribute of the judicial systems of 
colonial America. In Virginia, for example, such records as 
there are of early criminal trials indicate that they were open, 
and nothing to the contrary has been cited. See A. Scott, 
Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 128- 129 (1930); Reinsch, 
The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in 
1 Selected Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 405 
(1907). Inueed, when in the mid-1600's the Virginia Assem-
bly felt that the respect due the courts was "by the clamorous 
unmannerlynes of the people lost, and order, gravity and 
decoram which should manifest the authority of a. court in 
the court it selfe neglicted," the response was not to restrict 
the openness of the trials to the public, but instead tt0 pre. 
:'-···· 
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scribe rules for the conduct of those attending them. See 
Scott, supra, at 132. 
In some instances, the openness of trials was explicitly rec .. 
ognized as part of the fundamental law of the colony. The 
1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, for 
example, provided: 
"That in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, 
civil or criminal, any person or person, inhabitants of the S l 
said Province may freely come into, ~d attend the said 
courts, and hear and be present, at all or any such tryals 
as shall be there had or passed, that justice may not be 
done in a corner nor in any covert manner." Reprinted 
in Sources of Our Liberties 188 (R. Perry ed. 1959). See 
also 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights : A Documentary 
History 129 (1971) . 
The Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682 also pro-
vided "[t]hat all courts shall be open . . . ," Sources of Our 
~iberties, supra, at 217; 1 B. Schwartz, supra, at 140, and this 
declaration was rea.ffirmed in section 26 of the' Constitution 
adopted by Pennsylvania in 1776. See 1 B. Schwartz, supra, 
at 271. See also §§ 12 and 76 of the Massachusetts Body of 
Liberties, 1641, reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra, at 73, 80. 
Other contemporary writings confirm the recognition that 
part of the very nature of a criminal trial was its openness 
to those who wished to attend. Perhaps the best indication 
of this is found in an address to the inhabitants of Quebee 
which was drafted by a committee consisting of Thomas 
Cushing, Richard Henry Lee, and John Dickinson and ap-
proved by the First Continental Congress on October 26, 
1774. 1 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 
at 101, 105 (1904). This address, written to explain the 
position of the colonies and to gain the support of the people 
of Quebec, is an "exposition of the fundamental rights of the 
colonists, as they were understood by a representative assem-
bly chosen from all the colonies." 1 Schwartz, supra, a.t 221~ 
Because it was intended for the inhabitants of Quebec> who 
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had been ueducated under another form of government" and 
had only recently become English subjects, it was thought 
desirable for the Continental Congress to explain "the in-
estimable advantages of a free English constitution of govern-
ment, which it is the privilege of all English subjects to 
enjoy." 1 Journals 106. 
" [One] great right is that of trial by jury. This pro-
vides, that neither life, liberty nor property, can be taken 
from the possessor, until twelve of his unexceptionable 
countrymen and peers of his vicinage, who from that 
neighbourhood may reasonably be supposed to be ac-
quainted with his character, and the characters of the 
witnesses, upon a fair trial, and full enquiry, face to face, 
in open Court, before as many of the people as chuse to 
attend, shall pass their sentence upon oath against 
him ..• . " 1 Journals 107 (emphasis added). 
B 
As we have shown, and as was shown in both the Court's I 
opinion and the dissent in Gannett, supra, at 384, 386, n. 15; 
418-425, the historical evidence demonstrates conclusively 
that at the time when our organic laws were adopted, crim-
in,al trials both here and in England had long been presump-
tively open. This is no quirk of history; rather, it has long 
been recognized as an indispensible attribute of an Anglo-
American trial. Both Hale in the 17th century and Black-
stone in the 18th saw the importance of openness to the 
proper functioning of a trial; it gave assurance that the 
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it 
discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and deci-
sions based on secret bias or partiality. See, e. g., M. Hale, 
The History of the Common Law of England 343-345 (6th 
ed. 1820); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *372-373. Jeremy 
Bentham not only recognized the therapeutic value of open \ 
justice but regarded it as the keystone : 
"Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient : in 
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comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small 
account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institu .. 
tions might present themselves in the character of checks, 
would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; 
as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance." 1 J. 
Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidences 524 (1827),7 
Panegyrics on the values of openness were by no means con-
fined to self-praise by the English. Foreign observers of 
English criminal procedure in the 18th and early 19th cen-
turies came away impressed by the very fact that they had 
been freely admitted to the courts, as ma.ny were not in their \ 
own homelands. See L. Radzinowicz, A History of English 
Criminal Law 715, and n. 96 (1948). They marveled that 
" the whole juridical procedure passes in public," 2 P. J. Gros-
ley, A Tour to London; or new Observations on England 142 
(Nugent trans. 1772), quoted in Radzinowicz, supra, at 717, 
and one commentator declared that : 
"The main excellence of the English judicature consists 
in publicity, in the free trial by jury, and in the extraor-
dinary despatch with which business is transacted. The 
publicity of their proceedings is indeed astonishing. Free 
access to the courts is universally granted." C. Goede, 
A Foreigner's Opinion of England 214 (Horne trans. 
1822). (Emphasis added.) 
The nexus between openness, fairness, and the perception of 
fairness was not lost on them: 
"[T]he judge, the counsel, and the jury, are constantly 
exposed to public animadversion ; and this greatly tends 
to augment the extraordinary confidence, which the 
English repose in the administration of justice." Goede, 
supra, at 215. 
T Bentham also emphasiz,ed that open proceedings enhanced the per-
formance of all involved, protected the judge from imputations of dis-
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This observation raises the important point that "[t]he \ 
publicity of a judicial proceeding is a requirement of much 
broader bearing than its mere effect on the quality of testi-
mony." 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1834, at p. 435 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1976) .8 The early history of open trials in part reflects 
the widespread acknowledgement, long before there were 
behavioral scientists, that public trials had significant com-
munity therapeutic value. Even without such experts to 
frame the concept in words, people sensed from experience 
and observation that, especially in the administration of crim-
inal justice, the means used to achieve justice must have the 
I!Upport derived from public acceptance of both the process 
and its results. When a shocking crime occurs, a community 
reaction of outrage and public protest often follows. See H. 
Weihofen, The Urge to Punish 130-131 (1956). Thereafter 
the open processes of justice serve a prophylactic purpose, 
providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and 
emotion. Without an awareness that society's responses to 
criminal conduct are underway, natural human reactions of 
outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest them-
selves in some form of vengeful "self-help," as indeed they 
did regularly in the activities of vigilante "committees" on 
our frontiers. "The accusation and conviction or acquittal, 
as much perhaps as the execution of punishment, operate[] 
to restore the imbalance which was created by the offense or 
public charge, to reaffirm the temporarily lost feeling of secu-
rity, and, perhaps, to satisfy that latent 'urge to punish.' " 
Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal 
Proceedings, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1961). 
e A collateral aspect seen by Wigmore was the possibility that someone 
in attendance at the trial or who learns of the proceedings through pub-
licity may be able to furnish evidence in chief or contradict "falsifiers." 
6 Wigmore, supra, at 436. Wigmore gives examples of such occurrences. 
Id., at 436, and n. 2. 
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Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the 
vigilante the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot 
erase from people's consciousness the fundamental, natural 
yearning to see justice done-or even the urge for retribution. 
The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of 
justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis 
can occur if justice is "done in a corner [or] in any covert 
manner." Supra, at-. It is not enough to say that results 
alone will satiate the natural community desire for "satis-
faction." A result considered untoward may undermine pub-
lic confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from 
public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that 
the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted. 
To work effectively, society's criminal process "must satisfy 
the appearance of justice," Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 
11, 14 (1954), and the appearance of justice can best be pro-
vided by allowing people to observe it. 
Looking back, we see that when the ancient "town meet- 1-w \'J 
ing" form of trial became too cumbersome, ~ members 
of the community were delegated to act as its surrogates, but 
the community did not surrender its right to observe the con-
duct of trials. The people retained a "right of visitation" \ 
which enabled them to satisfy themselves that justice was in 
fact being done. 
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from 
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what 
they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial 
is conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity 
both for understanding the system in general and its workings 
in a particular case: 
"The educative effect of public attendance is a material 
advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and 
intelligent acquaintance acquired with the methods of 
government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies 




RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA 115 
secrecy.'' 6 Wigmore, supra, at 438. See also 1 Ben~ 
tham, supra, at 525. 
In earlier times, both in England and America, attendance 
at court was a common mode of "passing the time.'' See, 
e. g., 6 Wigmore, supra, at 436; Mueller, supra, at 6. With 
the press, cinema, and electronic media now supplying the 
representations or reality of the real life drama once available 
only in the courtroom, attendance at court is no longer a 
widespread pastime. Yet " [ i] t is not unrealistic even in this 
day to believe that public inclusion affords citizens a form of 
legal education and hopefully promotes confidence in the fair 
administration of justice." State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 
87- 88, 139 N. W. 2d 800, 807 (1966). Instead of acquiring 
information about trials by firsthand observation or by word 
of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it 
chiefly through the print and electronic media. In a sense, of 
this validates the media claim ~unctioning as surrogates for 
the public. While media representatives enjoy the same right 
of access as the public, they often are provided special seating 
and priority of entry so that they may report what people in 
attendance have seen and heard. This "contribute[s] to 
public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension 
of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system .... " 
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (BRENNAN, 
J., concurring). 
c 
From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by 
reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to 
conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very 
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice. This 
conclusion is hardly novel; without a direct holding on the 
issue, the Court has voiced its recognition of it in a variety 
of contexts over the years.9 Even while holding, in Levine v. 
a "Of course trials must be public and the public have a deep interest 
... 
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United States, 362 U.S. 611 (1960), that a criminal contempt 
proceeding was not a "criminal prosecution" within the mean-
ing of the Sixth Amendment, the Court was careful to note 
that more than the Sixth Amendment was involved: 
"[W]hile the right to a 'public trial' is explicitly guaran-
teed by the Sixth Amendment only for 'criminal prosecu-
tions,' that provision is a reflection of the notion, deeply 
in trials." Pennekamp v. FlMida, 328 U. S. 331, 361 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J, concurring). 
"The triul is a public event. What tmnspires in the court room is public 
property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (Douglas, J.). 
"[W J e have been unable to find a ~ingle instance of a criminal trial con-
ducted in camera in any fcdeml, state, or municipal court during the 
history of this country. Nor htwe we found any record of even one such 
secret rriminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of St;u Cham-
ber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted people secretly is in 
di~pute. . . . This nation's areepted practice of guanmtecing a public 
trial to an accused has it~ root~ in our English common law heritage. 
The exrlct date of its origin is obscure, but it likely evolved long before 
the settlement of our land as an accompaniment of the ancient institution 
of jury trial." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 266 (1948) (Black, J.) (foot-
notes omitted). 
"One of the demands of a democratic society is tha.t the public should 
know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what happens 
there, to the end that the public may judge whether our system of crim-
inal justice is fair and right." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 
338 U. S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from denial of 
cert.). 
"It is true that the public has the right to be informed as to what occurs 
in its courts, ... reporters of all media, including television, are always 
present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever occurs 
in open court . ... " Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 541-542 (1965) 
(Clark, J.); see also id., at 583-584 (Warren, C. J., concurring). (The 
Court ruled, however, that the televising of the criminal trial over the 
defendant's objections violated his due process right to a fair trial.) 
"The principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence has 
long been reflected in the 'Anglo-American distrust for secret trials.'" 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 349 (1966) (Clark, J.) . 
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rooted in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice.' . . . [D]ue process demands ap-
propriate rega.rd for the requirements of a public pro-
ceeding in cases of criminal contempt ... as it does 
for all adjudications through the exercise of the judi-
cial power, barring narrowly limited categories of excep-
tions .... " !d. , at 616 (citations omitted).10 
And recently in Gannett Co. Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368 
(1979), both the majority, 443 U. S., at 384, 386, n. 15, and 
dissenting opinions, 443 U. S., at 423, agreed that open trials 
were pa.rt of the common law tradition. 
Despite the history of criminal trials being presumptively 
open since long before the Constitution, the State presses its 
contention that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights 
contains any provision which by its terms guarantees to the 
public the right to attend criminal trials. Standing alone, 
this is correct, but there remains the question whether, ab-
sent an explicit provision, the Constitution affords protection 
against exclusion of the public from criminal trials. [ 1 
III 
A 
The First Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth, 
prohibits governments from "abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." These rxpressly guaranteed freedoms share a com-
mon core purpose of assuring freedom of communica.tion on 
matters relating to the functioning of government. Plainly 
it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of 
10 The Court went on to hold that, "on the particular circumstances 
of the ca;;r," :362 F . S., al 616, I he f\rcw-wd could not complain on appeal 
of lhe "~o-rnlled '::;ern·cy' of the prorPeding:::," id., at 617, herau~P, with 
counsrl pre,ent, he had failed to object or to reque::;t the judge to open 
the courtroom at t he time. 
1. 
. ' . 
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higher concern and importance to the people than the manner 
in which criminal trials are conducted; as we have shown, 
recognition of this pervades the centuries-old history of open 
trials and the opinions of this Court. Supra, at -, and n. 
The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the 
long history of trials being presumptively open. Public access 
to trials was then regarded as an important aspect of the 
process itself; the conduct of trials "before as many of the 
]Wople as chuse to a.ttend" was regarded as one of "the inesti-
mable advantages of a free English constitution of govern-
ment.'' Journals of the Continental Congress. supra, at 
106, 107. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech 
and press, the Fir·st Amendme11t can be read as protecting the 
right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to 
those explicit guarantees. "[T] he First Amendment goes 
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of 
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock 
of information from which members of the public may draw." 
F·irst Kational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765. 783 
(1978). Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen. 
"In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First 
Amendment right to 'receive information and idea.s.' " 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 762 ( 1972). What this 
means in the context of trials is that the First Amendment 
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,.,prohibit gov-
ernment from summarily closing courtroom doors which had 
long been open to the public at the time that amendment was 
a.dopted. "For the First Amendment does not speak equivo-
cally. . . . It must be taken as a command of the broadest 
scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-
loving society, will allow." Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 
252, 263 (1941). 
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend 
criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations 
concerning them as a "right of acces~,'' cf. Gannett, supra, at 
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397 (PowELL, J., concurring); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 
417 U. S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817 
(1974),11 or a "right to gather information," for we have rec-
ognized that "without some protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Branzburg 
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). The explicit, guaranteed 
rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a 
tria.I would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial 
could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily/~ 
B 
The right of access to places traditionally open to the pub-
lic, including criminal trials, may be seen as assured by the 
amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and 
press; and their a.ffinity to the right of assembly is not with-
out relevance. From the outset, the right of assembly was re-
garded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst 
to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment 
rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen.18 
11 Prownier and Saxbe, supm, are distinguishable in the sense that 
'they were concerned with penal institutions which, by definition, are not 
"open" or public places. Penal institutions do not share the long tradi· 
tion of openness, although traditionally there have been visiting commit-
tees of citizens, and there is no doubt that legislative committees could 
exercise plenary oversight and "visitation rights." Saxbe, supra, at 849, 
noted that "limitation on visitations is justified by what the Court of 
Appeals acknowledged as 'the truism that prisons are institutions where 
public access is generally limited.' . . . 494 F. 2d, at 999. See Adderley 
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966) [jails] .'' See also Greer v. Spack, 424 
U. S. 828 (1976) (military bases) . 
12 That the right to attend may be exercised by people Jess frequently 
today when information as to trials generally reaches them by way ot 
print and electronic media in no way alters the basic right . Instead of 
relying on personal observation or reports from neighbors as in the past, 
most people receive information concerning trials through the media whose 
representatives "are entitled to the same rights [to attend trials] as the 
general public." Estes v. Texas, supra, at 540. 
13 When the First Congress was debating the Bill of Rights, it was con-
tended that there was no need separately to assert the right of assembl)' 
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"The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those 
of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental." 
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). People assem-
ble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but 
also to listen, observe, and learn; indeed, they may "assem-
bl[e] for any lawful purpose," Hayue v. C. I. 0., 307 U.S. 496, 
519 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.). More recently we charac-
terized the right to assemble as "the right of the people to 
gather in public places for social or political purposes." 
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 615 (1971). In 
this same vein, in Hague v. C. I . 0 ., s'upra, Mr. Justice Roberts 
reminded that: 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they 
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and, time out of mind, have been used for pur-
poses of assembly, communicating thoughts between citi-
because it was subsumed in freedom of speech. Mr. Sedgwick of Massa-
chusetts argued that inclusion of "assembly" among the enumerated rights 
would tend to make the Congress 
"appear triflng in the eyes of their constituents. . . . If people freely 
converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-evident, 
unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that 
never would be called in question ... . " 1 Annals of Congress 731 (1789). 
Since the right existed independent of any written guarantee, Sedgwick 
went on to argue that if it were the drafting committee's purpose to pro-
tect all inherent rights of the people by listing them, "they might have 
gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights," but this was unnecessary, 
he said, "in a Government where none of them were intended to be in-
fringed ." 1 Annals of Congress 732. 
Mr. Page of Virginia responded, however, that at times "such rights 
have been opposed," and that "people have ... been prevented from 
assembling together on their lawful occasions": 
"[T]herefore it is well to guard against such stretches of authority, by 
inserting the privilege in the declaration of rights. If the people could 
be deprived of the power of assembly under any pretext whatsoever, they 
lnight be deprived of every other privilege contained in the clause." Ibid. 
The motion to strike "as:;embly" was defeated. ld., at 733. 
,, 
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zens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the 
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been 
a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties 
of citizens." !d., at 515. See also, e. g., Shuttlesworth 
v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147 (1969) . 
Public streets, sidewalks, and pa.rks are areas where First 
Amendment rights of speech and assembly are traditionally 
exercised; a trial courtroom also is a public place where the 
people generally-and representatives of the media-have a 
right to be present, and where their presence historically has 
been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what 
takes place.14 
c 
The State argues that the Constitution nowhere spells out 
a guarantee for the right of the public to attend trials, and 
that accordingly no such right is protected. The possibility 
that such a contention could be made did not escape the notice 
of the Constitution's draftsmen; they were concerned that 
some important rights might be thought disparaged because· 
14 It is of course true that the right of assembly in our Bill of Rights 
was in large part drafted in reaction to restrictions on such rights in Eng~ 
land . See, e. g., 1714, 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, ch. 5; cf. 1795, 36 Geo. 3, ch. 8. 
As we have shown, the right of Englishmen to attend trials was not 
similarly limited; but it would be ironic indeed if the very historic open-
ness of the trial could militate against protection of the right to attend 
it. The Constitution guarantees more than simply freedom from those 
abuses which led the Framers to single out particular rights. The very 
purpose of the First Amendment is to guarantee all facets of each right 
described ; its draftsmen sought both to protect the " rights of English-
men" and to enlarge their scope. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 
252, 263-265 (1941). 
"There are no contrary implications in any part of the history of the period 
in which the First Amendment was framed and adopted. No purpose in 
ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of securing for the people 
of the United States much greater freedom of religion, expression, assem-
bly, and petition than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed." !d., 
at 265. 
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not specifically guaranteed. It was even argued that becau~ 
.of this danger no Bill of Rights should be adopted. See, e. g., 
A. Hamilton, The Federalist no. 84. In a letter to Thomas 
Jefferson in October of 1788, James Madison explained why 
he, although "in favor of a bill of rights," had "not viewed it in 
a.n important light" up to that time: "I conceive that in a cer-
tain degree ... the rights in question are reserved by the man-
ner in which the federal powers are granted." He went on to 
state "there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration 
of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in 
the requisite latitude." 5 Writings of James Madison 271 
(Hunt ed. 1904).15 
But arguments such as the State makes have not precluded 
recognition of important rights not enumerated. Notwith-
standing the appropriate caution against reading into the 
Constitution rights not explicitly defined, the Court has ac-
knowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in 
enumerated guarantees. For example, the rights of associa-
tion and of privacy, the right to be presumed innocent and the 
right to be .i udged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel, appear 
nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights. Yet these 
important but unarticulated rights have nonetheless been 
found to share constitutional protection in common with ex-
plicit guarantees.16 The concerns expressed by Madison and 
15 Madison's comments in Congress also reveal the perceived need for 
some sort of constitutional "saving clause," which, among other things, 
would serve to foreclose application to the Bill of Rights of the maxim · 
that the affirmation of particular rights implies a negation of those not 
expressly defined. See 1 Annals of Congress 438-440 ( 1789) . See also, 
e. g., 2 J . Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 
651 (5th ed. 1891) . Madison's efforts, culminating in the Ninth Amend-
ment, served to allay the fears of those who were concerned that ex-
pressing certain guarantees could be read as excluding others. 
16 See, e. (!., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right. of asso-
ciation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), and Stanley v. 
~eorgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969) (right to privacy); Estelle v. Williams,~ • 
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others have thus been resolved; fundamental rights, even 
though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized by the 
Court as indispensable to the enjoymeut of rights explicitly 
defined. 
We hold tha.t the right to attend criminal trials 17 is implicit 
in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without the free .. 
dom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for cen• 
turies, important aspects of freedom of speech and "of the 
press could be eviscerated." Branzburg, rsupra, at 681. 
D 
Having concluded there was a guaranteed right of the pub-
lic under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to attend 
the trial of Stevenson's case, we return to the closure order 
challenged by appellants. The Court in Gannett, supra, made 
clear that although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the 
accused a. right to a public trial, it does not give a right to a 
private trial. 443 U. S., at 382. Despite the fact that this 
was the fourth trial of the accused and that none of the prior 
trials had been closed, the trial judge made no findings to 
support closure; no inquiry was made as to whether alterna-
tive solutions would ha.ve met the need to ensure fairness; 
there was no recognition of any right under the Constitution 
for the public or press to attend the trial. In contrast to the 
pretrial proceeding dealt with in Gannett, supra, there exist 
in the context of the trial itself various tested alternatives to 
satisfy the constitutional demands of fairness. See, e. g., 
Nebraska Pres8 Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S., at 563-56S; 
U. S. 501, 503 ( 1976), and Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478, 483-486 
(1978) (presumption of innocence); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970) 
(standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Guest, 
383 U. S. 745, 757-759 (1966), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 
630 (1969) (right to interstate travel) . 
17 Whr>ther the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a 
question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil 
Jmd criminal trials have been presumptively open. 
•. 
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Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S., at 357-362. There was nd 
suggestion that any problems with witnesses could not have 
been dealt with by their exclusion from the courtroom or their 
sequestration during the trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 
U. S., at 359. Nor is there anything to indica.te that seques-
tration of the jurors would not have guarded against their 
being subjected to any improper information. All of the 
alternatives admittedly present difficulties for trial courts, but 
none of the factors relied on here were beyond the realm of 
the manageable. Absent an overriding interest articulated in 
findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the 
public.18 Accordingly, the judgment under review is reversed. 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE PowELL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
18 We have no occasion here to define the circumstances in which all or 
parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the public, cf., e. g., 6 J. Wig· 
more, Evidence § 1835 (Chadbourn rev. 1876), but our holding today does 
not mean that the First Amendment rights of the public and representa· 
tives of the press are absolute. Just as a government may impose reason· 
able time, place, and manner restrictions upon the use of its streets in the 
interest of such objectives as the free flow of tra.ffic, see, e. g., Cox v. New 
Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941), so may a trial judge, in the interest of 
the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access 
to a trial. " [T]he question in a particular case is whether that control is 
exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge .. . the opportunities 
for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions 
immemoria.!ly associated with resort to public places." ld., at 574. It is 
far more important that trials be conducted in a quiet and orderly setting 
than it is to preserve that atmosphere on city streets. Compare, e. g., 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 17 (1949), with Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 
337 (1970), and Estes v. 'l'exas, 381 U. S. 532 (1965). Moreover, since 
courtrooms have limited capacity, there may be occasions when not every 
person who wishes to attend can be accommodated. In such situations, 
reasonable restrictions on general access are traditionally imposed, includ-
ing preferential seating for media representatives. Cf. Gannett, supra, at 
397-398 (PowELL, J ., concurring); Houchins v. KQED, Inc , 438 U. S. 
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MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
In the Gilbert & Sullivan operetta Iolanthe, the Lord Chancellor 
recites: 
"The Law is the true embodiment 
of everything that's excellent, 
It has no kind of fault or flaw, 
And I, my lords, embody the law." 
It is difficult not to derive more than a little of this flavor from 
both the .opinion of the Chief Justice and the concurring opinion of 
Mr. Justice Brennan in this case. The opinion of the Chief Justice 
states that: 
"[H]ere for the first time the Court is asked to 
decide whether a criminal trial itself may be 
closed to the public upon the unopposed request 
of a defendant, without any demonstration that 
closure is required to protect the defendant's 
superior right to a fair trial, or that some 
other overriding consideration requires 
closure." Ante, at 7. 
The · concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan states that 
- ... 
- 2 -
"[R]ead with care and in context, our decisions 
must therefore be understood as holding only that 
a ny privile ge of a ccess to gove r nmental 
information is subject to a degree of restraint 
dictated by the nature of the information and 
countervailing interests in security or 
confidentiality." Ante, at 2-3. 
For the reasons stated in my separate concurrence in Gannett 
Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 u.s. 368, 403 (1979), I do not believe 
that either the First or Sixth Amendments, as made applicable to the 
states by the Fourteenth, require that a State's reasons for denying 
public access to a trial, where both the prosecuting attorney and 
the defendant have consented to an order of closure approved by the 
judge, are subj ect to any additional constitutional review at our 
hands. And I most certainly do not believe that the Ninth Amendment 
confers upon us any such power to review orders of state trial 
judges closing trials in such situations. See Ante at 22 n. 15. 
We have at present fifty state judicial systems and one federal 
judicial system in the United States, and our authority to reverse a 
decision by the highest court of the state is limited to only those 
occasions when the state decision violates some provision of the 
United States Constitution. And that authority should be exercised 
with a full sense that the judges whose decisions we review are 
making the same effort as we to uphold the Constitution. As said by 
Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in the result in Brown v. Allen, 344 
u.s. 443, 540 "we are not final because we are infallible, but we 
are infallible only because we are final." 
The proper administration of justice in any nation is bound to 
be a matter of the highest concern to all thinking citizens. But to 
gradually rein in, as this Court has done over the past generation, 
all of the ultimate decisionmaking power over how justice shall be 
administered, not merely in the federal system but in each of the 
fifty states, is a task that no Court consisting cYf nine persons, 
- · _· [lowever gifted, is e~uaJ__to. Nor is it de sir able that"". such 
authority be exercised .oy· -such a tiny-·nuinerical fragment of the 220 
·. 
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million people who compose the population of this country. In the 
same concurrence just quoted, Mr. Justice Jackson accurately 
observed that "[t]he generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are so 
indeterminate as to what state actions are forbidden that this Court 
has found it a ready instrument, in one field or another, to magnify 
federal, and incidentally its own, authority over the states." Id. 
at 534. 
However high minded the impulses which originally spawned this 
trend may have been, and which impulses have been accentuated since 
the time Justice Jackson wrote, it is basically unhealthy to have so 
much authority concentrated in a small group of lawyers who have 
been appointed to the Supreme Court and enjoy virtual life tenure. 
Nothing in the reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) requires that this Court 
through ever broadening use of the Supremacy Clause smothe r a 
healthy pluralism which would ordinarily exist in a national 
government embracing fifty states. 
The issue here is not whether the "right" to freedom of the 
press conferred by the First Amendment to the Constitution overrides 
the defendant's "right" to a fair trial conferred by other 
amendments to the Constitution; it is instead whether any provision 
in the Constitution may fairly be read to prohibit what the trial 
judge in the Virginia state court system did in this case. Being 
unable to find any such prohibition in the First, Sixth, Ninth, or 
any other Amendments to the United States Constitution, or in the 
Constitution itself, I dissent. 
_~ ..... 
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Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia 
Memorandum to the Conference: 
I have today sent to the Printer the following changes in 
my June 11 draft: 
The question presented on page one should read: 
"The narrow question presented in this case is whether 
the right of the public and press to attend criminal 
trials is guaranteed under the United States 
Constitution." 
The first full paragraph on page six should read: 
"Since the Virginia Supreme Court declined plenary 
review, it is reasonably foreseeable that other trials 
may be closed by other judges without any more showing 
of need than is presented on this record. More often 
than not, criminal trials will be of sufficiently 
short duration that a closure order 'will evade 
review, or at least considered plenary review in this 
Court.' Nebraska Press, supra, at 547. Accordingly, 
we turn to the merits." 
Also on page six, the first paragraph of Part II should 
read: --
"We begin consideration of this case by noting 
that the precise issue presented here has not 
previously been before this Court for decision. In 
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), 
the Court was not required to decide whether a right 
of access to trials, as distinguished from hearings on 
~trial motions, was constitutionally guaranteed. 
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to 
the accused of a public trial gave neither the public 
nor the press an enforceable right of access to a 
pretrial suppression hearing. One concurring opinion 
specifically emphasized that 'a hearing on a motion 
before trial to suppress evidence is not a trial .... ' 
443 u.s., at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
Moreover, the Court did not decide whether the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a right of the 
public to attend trials, id., at 392 and n. 24: nor 
did the dissenting opinion-reach this issue. Id., at 
447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)." --
/ 
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On page seven, the first paragraph ' of Part II A should read: 
"The origins of the proceeding which has become the 
modern criminal trial in Anglo-American justice can be 
traced back beyond reliable historical records. We 
need not here review all details of its development, 
but a summary of that history is instructive. What is 
significant for present purposes is that throughout 
its evolution, the trial has been open to all who 
cared to observe." 
On page thirteen, the sentence following the citation to 
Weihofen should read: 
"Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an 
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet 
for community concern, hostility, and emotion." 
On page fourteen, the last sentence of the first paragraph 
should read: 
"To work effectively, it is important that society's 
criminal process 'satisf[ies] the appearance of 
justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 u.s. 11, 14 
(1954), and the appearance of fustice can best be 
provided by allowing people to observe it." 
On page nineteen, the first sentence of Part III B should 
read: 
"The right of access to places traditionally open 
to the public, as criminal trials have long been, may 
be seen as assured by the amalgam of the First 
Amendment guarantees of speech and press; and their 
affinity to the right of assembly is not without 
relevance." 
On pages twenty and twenty-one, the text from the sentence 
beginning "More recently we characterized .•.. " up to the end of 
Part III B should be deleted, and the following substituted in 
its place: 
"Subject to the traditional time, place, and manner 
restrictions, see, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 
u.s. 569 (1941); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
559, 560-564 (1965), streets, sidewalks, and parks are 
places traditionally open, where First Amendment 
rights may be exercised, see Hague v. C.I.O., 307 u.s. 
496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.); a trial 
courtroom also is a public place where the people 
generally--and representatives of the media--have a 
right to be present, and where their presence 
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity 
and quality of what takes place.l4n 
... 
-3-
And on page twenty-three, the third sentence of Part III D 
should read: 
"Despite the fact that this was the fourth trial of 
the accused, the trial judge made no findings to 
support closure: no inquiry was made as to whether 
alternative solutions would have met the need to 
ensure fairness; there was no recognition of any right 
under the Constitution for the public or press to 
attend the trial." 
I will circulate another print d draft as soon as it is 
available. 
P.S. It is most unfortunate that, although seven of us are 
of one mind on the essentials of this case--the openness of 
criminal trials--we fail, apparently, to clarify the confusion 
that followed in the wake of Gannett. We are under the same 
"Term end" pressures that accompanied Gannett, but I think we 
fall short if the present lack of a "Court" prevails. I have 
yet to see a writing, other than Bill ehnquist's, which is so 
at ~the assi ned opinion that the author of t~at 
se arate wr 1n could not a n ' e as 1 opinion. If 
di erences do exist, an a p s e made to 
cownunicate them and to work them out--as some have done. An 
unnecessarily''fractionated Court~serves no good purpose; it 
causes those reading our opinions to find differences of 
substance which are not actually there. 
/ 
To: The Chiet Just1oe 
Mr. Justice Btffennan 
Mr. Just~ 
Mr. Justi W · 
Mr. Just c~ ars 11 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevena 
From: Mr. Justice Blackmun 
C 1 rcula ted: _....., .._..II .._.N_.2.._4.t.....J-19.;u;8li.O'---
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MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment. a 
My opinion and vote in partial dissent last Term in Gannett 
~
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 406 (1979), compels my vote to 
reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virg~ ' 
I 
The Court's opinion and decision in this case are gratifying 
for me for two reasons: 
It is gratifying, first, to see the Court now looking to and 
relying upon legal history in determining the fundamental 
public character of the criminal trial. Ante, at 7-11, 15-17, 
and n.9. The partial dissent in Gannett, 443 u.s., at 419-433, 
took great pains in assembling -- I believe adequately -- the 




area of the law. See also MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's helpful review 
set forth as Part II of his opinion in the present case • . Ante, 
at 5-10. Although the Court in Gannett gave a modicum of lip 
service to legal history, 443 U.S., at 386, n.l5, it denied its 
'· 
obvious application when the defense and the prosecution, with 
no resistance by the trial judge, agreed that the proceeding 
should be closed. 
The Court's return to history is a welcome change in 
direction. 
It is gratifying, second, to see the Court wash away at 
least some of the graffiti that marred the prevailing opinions 
in Gannett. No less than 12 times in the primary opinion in 
that case, the Court (albeit in what seems now to have become 
clear dicta) observed that its Sixth Amendment closure ruling 
applied to the trial itself. The author of the first concur-
ring opinion was fully aware of this and would have restricted 
-
the Court's observations and ruling to the suppression hearing. ,< 
- 3 -
443 U.S., at 394. Nonetheless, he joined the Court's opinion, 
id., at 394, with its multiple references to the trial itself; 
the opinion was not a mere concurrence in the Court's judgment. 
And MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, in his separate concurring opinion, 
id o t at 403, quite understandably observed, as a consequence, ? 
that the Court was holding "without qualification," ibid., that 
"'members of the public have no constitutional right under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials,'" 
quoting from the primary opinion, id., at 391. The resulting 
confusion among commentators .!/ and journalists !:..I was not 
surprising. 
II 
The Court's ultimate ruling in Gannett, with such clarifica-
tion as is provided by the opinions in this case today, apparent-
ly is now to the effect that there is no Sixth Amendment right on 
the part of the public -- or the press -- to an open hearing on a 
motion to suppress. I, of course, continue to believe . that 
Gannett was in error, both in its interpretation of the 
- 4 -
Sixth Amendment generally, and in its application to the 
'' 
suppression hearing, for I remain convinced that the right to a 
public trial is to be found where the Constitution explicitly .. 
placed it in the Sixth Arnendment.ll 
The Court, however, has eschewed the Sixth Amendment route. 
Instead, it turns to other possible constitutional sources and 
invokes a veri table potpourri of them -- the speech clause of 
the First Amendment, the press clause, the assembly clause, the 
... 
Ninth Amendment, and a cluster of penumbral guarantees recog-
nized in past decisions. This course is troublesome, but it is 
the route that has been selected and, at least for now, we must 
live with it. No purpose would be served by my spelling out at 
length here the reasons for my saying that the course is 
troublesome. I need do no more than observe that uncertainty 
marks the nature and strictness of the standard of 
closure the Court adopts. The Court's opinion speaks of 11 an 
overriding interest articulated in findings, 11 ante, at 24: MR. 
•' 
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JUSTICE STEWART reserves, perhaps not inappropriately, 
"reasonable limitations," ante, at 2; MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN ·. 
presents his separate analytical framework; MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
in Gannett was critical of those Justices who, relying on the 
Sixth Amendment, concluded that closure is authorized only when 
"strictly and inescapably necessary," 443 U.S., at 399-400; and 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST continues his flat rejection of, among 
others, the First Amendment avenue. 
Having said all this, and with the Sixth Amendment set to 
one side in this case, I am driven to conclude, as a secondary 
position, that the First Amendment must provide some measure of 
protection for public access to the trial. The opinion in part-
ial dissent in Gannett explained that the public has an intense 
need and a deserved right to know about the administration of 
justice in general; about the prosecution of local crimes in 
particular; about the conduct of the judge, the prosecutor, 
defense counsel, police officers, other public servants, and 
No. 79-243 
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all the actors in the judicial arena; and about the trial 
itself. See 443 U.S., at 413, and n. 2, 414, 428-429, 448. 
See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 u.s. 469, 492 
(1975}. It is clear and obvious to me, on the approach the 
Court has chosen to take, that, by closing this criminal trial, 
the trial judge abridged these First Amendment interests of the 
public. 
I also would reverse, and I join the judgment of the Court. 
..,. 
fJ 
lu: l w u l t e1' J L s 1; 1 c , __ 
Mr. Ju.; t. ce Brt.>rman 
Mr . Ju9tlce White 
Mr. ,Tu ; t. c'e Ma.rshall 
Mr' J U ; c. B.:. 'lCkmun 
·~!·' Jt" " ' ~ONell 
;r . . J "~ c Rnrmquist . 
Jfr. Jubtice Stevens 
From : Mr . Justlce Stewart 
Ci rculated : 
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Richmond Newspapers, Inc., et al.,l 
Appellants, On Appeal from the Su-
v. · preme Court of Virginia. 
1Comm~nwealth of Virgiqia et al. 
[June -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring in the judgment. 
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, the Court 
held that the Sixt~ Amendment, which guarantees "the ac-
cused" the right to a public trial, does not confer upon rep-
resentatives of the press or members of the general public 
any right of access to a trial.1 But the Court explicitly left 
open the question whether such a right of access may be 
guaranteed by other provisions of the Constitution, id., at 
391-393. MR. JusTICE PowELL expressed the view that the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments do extend at least a lim-
ited right of access even to pretrial suppression hea.rings in 
criminal cases, id., at 397-403 (concurring opinion). MR. Jus-
TICE REHNQUIST expressed a contrary view, id., at 403-406 
(concurring opinion). The remaining members of the Court 
were silent on the question. 
Whatever the ultimate answer to that question may be with 
respect to pretrial suppression hearings in criminal cases, the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and 
the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well 
as criminal.2 As has been abundantly demonstra.ted in Pa.rt 
1 The Court also made clear that the Sixth Amendment does not give 
the accused the right to a private trial. 443 U. S., at 382. Compare 
Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24 (Sixth Amendment right of trial by 
jury does not include right to be tried without. a jury.). 
2 It has long been established that the protections of the First Amend-
ment are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by 
------
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II of the opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE, in MR. JusTICE 
BRENNAN's concurring opiriion, and in MR. JusTICE BLACK-
MUN's dissenting opinion last Term in the Gannett case, 443 
U. 8., at 406, it has for centuries been a basic presupposition 
of the Anglo-American legal system that trials shall be public 
trials. The opinions referred to also convincingly explain the 
many good reasons why this is so. With us, a trial is by very 
definition a proceeding open to the press and to the public. 
In conspicuous contrast to a milita.ry base, Greer v. Spock, 
424 U. 8. 82~; a jail, Adderle11 v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39; or a 
prison, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. 8. 817, a trial courtroom is a 
public place. Even more than city streets, ·sidewalks, and 
parks as a.reas of traditional First Amendment activity, e. g., 
Shuttleworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 174, a trial courtroom 
is a place where representatives of the press and of the public 
are not only free to be, but where their presence serves to 
11ssure the integrity of what goes on. 
But this does not mean that the First Amendment ·right 
of members of the public and representatives of the press to 
attend civil and criminal trials is absolute. · Just as a legisla-
ture may impose reasonable time, place and manner restric-
tions upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, so may 
~ trial judge impose reasonable limitations upon the unre .. 
stricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the 
press and members of the pl,lblic. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 
384 U. 8. 333. Much more than a city street, a trial court-
room must be a quiet and orderly place. Compare Kovacs 
v. Cooper, 336 U. 8. 77 with Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. 8. 337 
and Estes v. Texas, 381 U. 8. 532. Moreover, every court-
room has a finite physical capacity, and there may be occa-
the States. E.g , Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652. The First Amend-
ment provisions relevant to this case are those protecting free speech and 
a free press. The right to ~;-peak implies a freedom to listen, Kleindiemt 
v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753. The right to publish implies a freedom to 
gather information, Branzburg v. Hayu, 408· U. S. 665, 681. See con-
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eions when not all who wish to attend a trial may do so.3 
And while there exist many alternative ways to satisfy the 
constitutional demands of a fair tria}/ those demands may 
also sometimes justify limitations upon the unrestricted pres-
ence of spectators in the courtroom. 5 
Since in the present case the trial judge appears to hav~ 
given no reCQgnition to the right of representatives of the 
press and members of the public to be present at the Virginia 
murder trial over which he was presiding, the judgment under 
review must be reversed. 
It is upon the basis of these principles that I concur in the 
judgment. 
3 In such situations, representatives of the press must he assured access. 
Houchir~a v. KQED, Inc., 348 U. S. 1, 16 (concurring opinion). 
4 Such alternatives include sesquestration of juries, continuances, and 
changes of venue. 
5 This is not to say that only constitutional considerations can justify 
such restrictions. The preservation of trade secrets, for example, might 
justify the exclusion of the public from at least some segments of a civil 
trial. And the sensibilities of a. youthful prosecution witness, for exam-
lJle, might ju~;tify similar exclusion in a criminal trial for rape, so long as 
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial were not impaired. 
See, e. g., Stamicarbon, N. V. v. American Cyanamid Company, 506 F. 2d 
532, 539-542 . 
I 
I 
' I i 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-243 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., et al.,l 
Appe1lants, On Appeal from the Su~ 
v. preme Court of Virginia. 
Commonwealth of Virginia et al. 
[June -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE STEYENS, concurring. 
This is a watershed case~An additional word of emph~ 
sis is therefore appropriate. 
Twice before the~ implied that a.ny governmental 
restriction on access to information, no matter how severe 
and no matter how unjustified, would be constitutionally ac .. 
ceptable so long as it did not single out the press for special 
disabilities not applicable to the public at large. In a dissent 
joined by MR. JusTICE BRENNAN and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL 
ip/'&rbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 850, MR. 
v/.IusTICE PowELL unequivocaJly rejected the conClusion "that 
' any governmental restriction on press access to information, 
so long as it is not discriminatory, falls outside the purview 
of First Amendment concern." I d., at 857 (emphasis ·in 
original). And in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. I, 19-
40, I explained at length why MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, MR. 
JusTICE PowELL, and I were convinced that "[a]n official 
prison policy of concealing . . . knowledge from the ·public 
by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information at· its source 
Until to~ay the Court ~as accorded virtually absolute 
protection to the dissemination of informat~on or ideas, hut . 
never before has it square1y ~eld that t~e acquisition of I 
newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protP.ction 
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abridges the freedom of speech and of the press protected by. 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.", 
I ,d., at 38. Since MR. JusTJCE MARSHALL and MR. JusTICE 
BLACK1fUN were unable to participate in that case, a majority 
of the Court neither accepted nor rejected that conclusion or 
the contrary conclusion expr~ssed in. the prevailing opinions.,...._ __ _ 
Today, ho,vever, for the first time, the Court unequivocally 
holds that an arbitrary interference \\ith access to important 
information is an abridgment of&freedoms of speech and of the 
press protected by the First Amendment. 
It is somewhat ironic that the Court should find more 
reason to recognize a right of access today than it did in 
Houchins. For Houchins involved the plight of a segment 
of society least able to protect itself, an attack on a long. 
standing policy of concealment, and an absence of any legiti-
mate justification for abridging public access to information 
about how government operates. In this case we are pro .. 
tecting the interests of the most powerful voices in the com-
munity, we are concerne~ with an almost unique exception 
to an established tradition of openness in the conduct of crim-
inal trials, and it is likely that the closure order was moti-
vated by the judge's desire to protect the individual defendant 
<:>____}rom the burden of a fourth criminal trial. 
/ ~ In any event, ~'i'ii'i'n+iall:;\ for the ~easons sta.ted in Part II 
of my Houchins opinion, 438 U. S., at 30-38, I agree that the 
J} ----...;~"Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment man-
dates a right of access to government information or sources of information 
within the government's control." 438 U. S., a.t 15 (opinion of BuRGER, 
c. J.). 
· "The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a 
right of acc-ess to information generated or controlled by government . ..• 
The Constitution does no tnore than assure the public and the press equal 
·access once government has opened its doors." !d ., at 16 (STEWART, J., 
.-:> / ooncurring). :!J----''--' Neither that likely motivation nor facts showing the risk that a fifth 
trial would have been necessary without closure of the fourth are dit;close<:l" 
~n this record, however. 
~ See attached insert. 
as well as those 
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The absence of any articulate~ reason for the closure order 
is a sufficient basis for distinguishing this case from 
Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368. The ~ecision to~ay is 
in no way inconsistent with the perfectlv unambiguous 
holding in Gannett that the rights guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment are rights that may be asserted by the accused 
rather than members of the general public. In my opinion 
the Framers quite properly identified the party who has the 
greatest interest in the right to a pubJic trial . The 
language of the Sixth Amendment is worth emphasizing : 
"In aJl criminal prosecutions, the accused sha 1 l 
enjoy the right to a speedy and publ~trial , by an 
impartiaJ jury of the State an0 district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed , which district sha 1 1 
have been previously ascertained ~y law, and to he 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witness against him ; to have 
compulsory process for obtain5ng witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of rounse1 for his 















RleHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA ~ 
First Amendment protects the public and the press from 
abridgment of their rights of access to information about the 
operation of their government, including the Judicial Branch ; 
given the total absence of any record justification for the 
closure order entered in this case, that order violated th~ 
First Amendment. 
To: Mr. Jus t i ce Brennan 
Mr. Justice St R·.-.·art 
Mr. J ust ice IV'1 \~ 
Mr. Justic~s 
~ 
Mr. Jus tic Bl · :n • 
Mr. Jus t ic we 1 
CHANGES AS MARKED: Mr. Jus t ice Relmquist ~ Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: ______________ _ 
2nd DRAFT 
.JUN 2 6 1980 Recirculated: 
·SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-243 
ftich:monrt Newspapers, Inc., et al., l 
Appellants, On Appeal from the Su~ 
v. preme Court of Virginia, 
Cammgnwealth of Virginia et al. 
[June -, 1980] 
announced the judgment of the Court 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGERl ' • . h. llllland delivered an opinion in whlch Hr. Justlce W lte 
and Mr. Justice Stevens joined. 
The narrow question presented in this case is whether the 
right of the public and press to attend criminal trials is guar-
anteed under the United States Constitution. 
I 
In March 1976, one Stevenson was indicted for the mur-
der of a hotel manager who had been found stabbed to 
death on December 2, 1975. Tried promptly in July 1976, 
Stevenson was convicted of second-degree murder in the 
Circuit Court of Hanover County, Va. The Virginia Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction in October 1977, holding that a 
bloodstained shirt purportedly belonging to Stevenson had 
been improperly admitted into evidence. Stevenson v. Com-
monwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S. E. 2d 779 (1977). 
Stevenson was retried in the same court. This second trial 
·ended in a mistrial on May 30, 1978 when a juror asked to be 
·excused after trial had begun and no alternate was available.1 
• 1 A newspaper account published the next day reported the mistrial and 
went on to note that "[a] key piece of evidence in Stevenson's original 
conviction was a bloodstained shirt obtained from Stevenson's wife soon 
after the killing. The Virginia Supreme Court, however, ruled that the 
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u 'A third trial, which began in the same court on June 6, 
1978, also ended in a mistrial. It appears that the mistrial 
may have been declared because a prospective juror had read 
about Stevenson's previous trials in a newspaper and had told 
other prospective jurors about the case before the retrial 
began, See App., at 35a-36a. 
S,tevenson was tried in the same court for a fourth time 
t beginning on September 11, 1978. Present in the courtroom 
when the ease was called were appellants Whe~ler and 
1\:t;cCarthy, reporters for appellant Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
Before the trial began, counsel for the defendant moved that 
it be closed to the public: 
'r 
' f 
"[T]here was this woman that was with the family of the 
deceased when we were here before. She had sat in the 
Courtroom. I would like to ask that everybody be ex· 
eluded from the Courtroom because I don't want any 
information being shuffled back and forth when we have 
a .recess as to what-who testified to what." Trans. of 
Se.J?t. ,11, 1978 Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Close 
Td&l to the Public, 2-3. 
The trial judge, who had presided over two of the three 
previous trials, asked if the prosecution had any objection 
to clearing the courtroom. The prosecutor stated he had no 
objection and would leave it to the discretion of the court. 
Id., at 4. Presumably referring to Virginia Code § 19.2-266, 
the trial judge then announced: "[T]he statute gives me that 
power specificially and the defendant has made the motion.'' 
He then ordered "that the Courtroom be kept clear of all 
parties except the witnesses when they testify." Id., at 4-5.2 
The record does not show that any objections to the closure 
2 Virginia Code§ 19.2-266 provides in part: 
"In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misde-
mearlor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any 
persobs whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided 
that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated." 
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·order were made by anyone present at the time, includir~g 
. appellants Wheeler and McCarthy. · 
Later that same day, however, appellants sought a hearing 
·on a motion to vacate the closure order. The trial judge 
'granted the request and scheduled a hearing to follow the 
close of the day's proceedings. When the hearing began, the 
court ruled that the hearing was to be treated as part of the 
trial; accordingly, he again ordered the reporters to leave 
the courtroom, and they complied. 
At the closed hearing, counsel for appellants observed that 
no evidentiary findings had been made by the court prior to 
the entry of its closure order, and pointed out that the court 
had failed to consider any other, less drastic measures within 
its power to ensure a fair trial. Trans. of Sept. 11, 1978 
Hearing on Motion to Vacate, 11-12. Counsel for appellants 
argued that constitutional considerations mandated that before 
ordering closure, the court should first decide that the rights 
of the defendant could be protected in no other way. 
Counsel for defendant Stevenson pointed out that this was 
the fourth time he was standing trial. He also referred to 
"difficulty with information between jurors," and stated that 
he "didn't want information to leak out," be published by 
the ,nedia, perhaps inaccurately, and then be seen by the 
jurors. Defense ·counsel argued that these things, plus the 
fact that "this is a small community," made this a proper 
case for closure. ld., at 16-18. 
The trial judge noted that counsel for the defendant had 
made similar statements at the morning hearing. The court 
also stated: 
"[O]ne of the other points that we take into considera-
tion in this particular Courtroom is layout of the Court-
room. I think that having people in the Courtroom is 
distracting to the jury. Now, we have to have certain 
people in here and maybe that's not a very good reason. 
When we get into our new Court Building, people can 
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sit in the audience so the jury can't see them. The 
rule of the Court may be different under those circum-
stances. . • ." I d., at 19. 
The prosecutor again declined comment, and the court 
I!Ummed up by saying: 
"I'm inclined to agree with [defense counsel] that, if I 
feel that the rights of the defendant are infringed in any 
way, [when] he makes the motion to do something and 
it doesn't completely override all rights of everyone else, 
then I'm inclined to go along with the defendant's 
motion." I d., at 20. 
The court denied the motion to vacate and ordered the trial to 
continue the following morning "with the press and public 
excluded." ld., at 27; App., at 21a. 
What transpired when the closed trial resumed the next 
day was disclosed in the following manner by an order of 
the court entered September 12, 1978: 
"[I]n the absence of the jury, the defendant by counsel 
made a Motion that a mis-trial be declared, which mo-
tion was taken tinder advisement. At the conclusion of 
the Commonwealth's evidence, the attorney for the de-
fendant moved the Court to strike the Commonwealth's 
evidence on grounds stated to the record, which Motion 
was sustained by the Court. And the jury having been 
excused, the Court doth find the accused NOT GUILTY 
of Murder, as charged in the Indictment, and he was 
allowed to depart." App., at 22a.8 
On September 27, 1978 the trial court granted appellants' 
motion to intervene nunc pro tunc in the Stevenson case. 
· Appellants then petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for 
writs of mandamus and prohibition and filed an appeal from 
8 At oral argument, it was represented to the Court that tapes of the 
trial were available to the public as soon as the trial terminated. Tr. d 
. 'Oral Arg., at 36. 
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the trial court's closure order. On July 9, 1979, the Virginia 
Supreme Court dismissed the mandamus and prohibition 
petitions and, finding no reversible error, denied the petition 
for appeal. App., at 23a-28a. 
Appellants then sought review in this Court, invoking both 
our appellate, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), and certiorari jurisdic-
tion. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3). We postponed further con-
sideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the hearing 
of the case on the merits. - U. S.- (1979). We con-
clude that jurisdiction by appeal does not lie; 4 however, 
treating the filed papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari 
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2103, we grant the petition. 
The criminal trial which appellants sought to attend has 
long since ended, and there is thus some suggestion that the 
4 In our view, the validity of Virginia Code § 19.2-266 was not suffi-
ciently drawn in question by appellants before the Virginia courts to invoke 
our appellate jurisdiction. "It is essential to our jurisdiction on 
appeal . . . that there be an explicit and timely insistence in the state 
courts that a state statute, as applied, is repugnant to the federal Con-
stitution, treaties or laws." Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. 
Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 185 (1945). Appellants never explicitly chal-
lenged the statute's validity. In both the trial court and the state 
supreme court, appellants argued that constitutional rights of the public 
and the press prevented the court from closing a trial without first 
giving notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the public and the 
press and exhausting every alternative means of protecting the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. Given appellants' failure explicitly to challenge 
the statute, we view these arguments as constituting claims of rights 
under the Constitution, which rights are said to limit the exercise of the 
discretion conferred by the statute on the trial court. Cf. Phillips v. 
United States, 312 U. S. 246, 252 (1941) ("[A]n attack on lawless 
exercise of authority in a particular case is not an attack upon the con-
stitutionality of a statute conferring the authority .•.. ") . Such claims 
are properly brought before this Court by way of our certiorari, rather 
than appellate, jurisdiction. See, e. g., Kulka v. California Superior Court, 
436 U. S. 84, 90, n. 4 (1978); Hans(Jn v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 244, and 
n. 4 (1958) . We shall, however, continue to refer to the parties as appel-
lants and appellee. See Kulka, supra. 
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case is moot. This Court has frequently recognized, how-
ever, that its jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated by the 
practical termination of a contest which is short-lived by 
nature. See, e. g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 
368, 377-378 (1979); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 
539, 546-547 (1976). If the underlying dispute is "capable 
of repetition, yet evading review," Southern Pacific Terminal 
Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 ( 1911), it is not moot. 
Since the Virginia Supreme Court declined plenary review, 
it is reasonably forseeable that other trials may be closed by 
other judges without any more showing of need than is pre-
sented on this record. More often than not, criminal trials 
will be of sufficiently short duration that a. closure order "will 
evade review, or at least considered plenary review in this 
Court." Nebraska Press, supra, at 547. Accordingly, we 
turn to the merits. 
II 
We begin consideration of this case by noting that the pre-
cise issue presented here has not previously been before this 
Court for decision. In Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 
U.S. 368 (1979), the Court was not required to decide whether 
a right of access to trials, as distinguished from hearings on 
pretrial motions, was constitutionally guaranteed. The Court 
held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to the accused of 
a public trial gave neither the public nor the press an enforce-
able right of access to a pretrial suppression hearing. One 
concurring opinion specifically emphasized that "a hearing on 
a motion before trial to suppress evidence is not a trial . ... " 
443 U. S., at 394 (BuRGER, C. J., concurring). Moreover, the 
Court did not decide whether the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments guarantee a right of the public to attend trials, 
id., at 392, and n. 24: nor did the dissenting opinion reach this 
issue. ld., at 447 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). 
In prior cases the Court has treated questions involving con· 
flicts between publicity and a defendant's right to a fair trial; 
•C.. .... ··. 
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as we observed in Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 
539, 547 (1976), "[t]he problems presented by this [conflict] 
are almost as old as the Republic." See also, e. g., Gannett, 
supra; Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 
(1965) . But here for the first time the Court is asked to 
decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the 
public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without 
any demonstration that closure is required to protect the 
defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other 
overriding consideration requires closure. 
A 
The origins of the proceeding which has become the modern J 
criminal trial in Anglo-American justice can be traced back 
beyond reliable historical records. We need not here review 
all details of its development, but a summary of tha.t history 
is instructive. What is significant for present purposes is that 
throughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who 
ca.red to observe. 
In the days before the Norman Conquest, cases in England 
were generally brought before moots, such as the local court 
of the hundred or the county court, which were attended by 
the freemen of the community. Pollock, English Law Before 
the Norman Conquest, in 1 Selected Essays in Anglo-American 
Legal History 89 (1907). Somewhat like modern jury duty, 
attendance at these early meetings was compulsory on the 
part of the freemen, who were called upon to render judgment. 
1 d., at 89-90; see also 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English 
Law 10, 12 (1927),5 
6 That there is little in the way of a contemporary record from this 
period is not surprising. It has been noted by historians, see E. Jenks, 
A Short History of English Law 3-4 (2d ed. 1922), that the early Anglo-
Saxon laws "deal rather with the novel and uncertain, than with the 
normal and undoubted rules of law. . . . Why trouble to record that 
which every village elder knows? Only when a disputed point has long 
,, 
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With the gradual evolution of the jury system in the years 
after the Norman Conquest, see, e. g., 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 
316, the duty of all freemen to attend trials to render judge 
ment was relaxed, but there is no indication that criminal 
trials did not remain public. When certain groups were 
excused from compelled attendance, see The Statute of Marie-
borough, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 10; 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 79, 
and n. 4, the statutory exemption did not prevent them from 
attending; Lord Coke observed that those excused "are not 
compellable to come, but left to their own liberty." 2 E. 
Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 121 (6th ed. 1681).6 
Although there appear to be few contemporary statements 
on the subject, reports of the Eyre of Kent, a general court 
held in 1313-1314, evince a recognition of the importance 
of public attendance apart from the "jury duty" aspect. It 
was explained that: 
"the King's will was that all evil doers should be pun-
ished after their deserts, and that justice should be min-
istered indifferently to rich as to poor; and for the better 
accomplishing of this, he prayed the community of the 
county by their attendance there to lend him their aid in 
the establishing of a happy and certain peace that should 
be both for the honour of the realm and for their own 
welfare." 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 268, quoting from the 
S. S. edition of the Eyre of Kent, vol. i., p. 2 (emphasis 
added). 
caused bloodshed and disturbance, or when a successful invader . .. insists 
·on a change, is it necessary to draw up a code." Ibid. 
6 Coke interpreted certain language of an earlier chapter of the same 
statute as specifically indicating that court proceedings were to be public 
in nature : "These words [In curia Domini Regis] are of great importance, 
for all Causes ought to be heard, ordered, and determined before the 
Judges of the King's Courts openly in the King's Courts, whither all per-
.sons may resort . ... " 2 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England lo:J. 
(6th ed. 1681) (emphasis added). 
·. 
~: ... .. 
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From these early times, although great changes in courts 
and procedure took place, one thing remained constant: the 
public character of the trial a.t which guilt or innocence was 
decided. Sir Thomas Smith, writing in 1565 about "the 
definitive proceedinges in causes criminall," explained that, 
while the indictment was put in writing as in civil law 
countries: 
"All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the 
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so 
manie as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all 
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men may 
heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses 
what is saide." T. Smith, De Republioo Anglorum 101 
(Alston ed. 1972) (emphasis added). 
Three centuries later, Sir Frederick Pollock was able to state 
of the "rule of publicity" tha.t, "[h] ere we have one tradition, 
at any rate, which has persisted through all changes." F. Pol-
lock, The Expansion of the Common Law 31-32 (1904). See 
~lso E. Jenks, The Book of English Law 73-74 (6th ed. 1967): 
"[O]ne of the most conspicuous features of English justice, 
that all judicial trials are held in open court, to which the 
public have free access, . . . appears to have been the rule in 
England from time immemorial." 
We have found nothing to suggest that the presumptive 
openness of the trial, which English courts were later to call 
"one of the essential qua.Iities of a court of justice," Daubney 
v. Cooper, 10 B. & C. 237, 240, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K. B. 
1829), was not also an attribute of the judicial systems of 
colonial America. In Virginia, for example, such records as 
there are of ea.rly criminal trials indicate that they were open, 
and nothing to the contrary has been cited. See A. Scott, 
Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 128-129 (1930); Reinsch, 
'The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in 
1 Selected Essa.ys in Anglo-American Legal History 405 
(1907) . Indeed, when in the mid-1600's the Virginia Assem .. ' ... 
' 
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bly felt that the respect due the courts was "by the clamorous 
unmannerlynes of the people lost, and order, gravity and 
decoram which should manifest the authority of a court in 
the court it selfe neglicted," the response was not to restrict 
the openness of the trials to the public, but instead to pre-
scribe rules for the conduct of those attending them. See 
Scott, supra, at 132. 
In some instances, the openness of trials was explicitly rec-
ognized as part of the fundamental law of the colony. The 
1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, for 
example, provided: 
"That in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, 
civil or criminal, any person or persons, inhabitants of the 
said Province may freely come into, and attend the said 
courts, and hear and be present, at all or any such tryals 
as shall be there had or passed, that justice may not be 
done in a corner nor in any covert manner." Reprinted 
in Sources of Our Liberties 188 (R. Perry ed. 1959). See 
also 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights : A Documentary 
History 129 (1971) . 
The Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682 also pro-
vided "[t]hat all courts shall be open .. . ," Sources of Our 
Liberties, supra, at 217; 1 B. Schwartz, supra, at 140, and this 
declaration was reaffirmed in section 26 of the Constitution 
adopted by Pennsylvania in 1776. See 1 B. Schwartz, supra, 
at 271. See also §§ 12 and 76 of the Massachusetts Body of 
Liberties, 1641, reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra, at 73, 80. 
Other contemporary writings confirm the recognition that 
part of the very nature of a criminal trial was its openness 
to those who wished to attend. Perhaps the best indication 
of this is found in an address to the inhabitants of Quebec 
which was drafted by a committee consisting of Thomas 
Cushing, Richard Henry Lee, and John Dickinson and ap-
proved by the First Continental Congress on October 26, 
1774. 1 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 
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at 101, 105 (1904) . This address, written to explain the 
I 
position of the colonies and to gain the support of the people 
of Quebec, is an "exposition of the fundamental rights of the 
colonists, as they were understood by a representative assem-
bly chosen from all the colonies." 1 Schwartz, supra, at 221. 
Because it was intended for the inhabitants of Quebec, who 
had been "educated under another form of government" and 
had only recently become English subjects, it was thought 
desirable for the Continental Congress to explain "the in-
estimable advantages of a free English constitution of govern-
ment, which it is the privilege of all English subjects to 
~njoy." 1 Journals 106. 
"[One] great right is that of trial by jury. This pro-
vides, that neither life, liberty nor property, can be taken 
from the possessor, until twelve of his unexceptionable 
countrymen and peers of his vicinage, who from that 
neighbourhood may reasonably be supposed to be ac-
quainted with his character, and the characters of the 
witnesses, upon a fair trial, and full enquiry, face to face, 
in open Court, before as many of the people as chuse to 
attend, shall pass their sentence upon oath against 
him .... " 1 Journals 107 (emphasis added). 
B 
As we have shown, and as was shown in both the Court's 
opinion and the dissent in Gannett, supra, at 384, 386, n. 15; 
418-425, the historical evidence demonstrates conclusively 
tha.t at the time when our organic laws were adopted, crim-
inal trials both here and in England had long been presump-
tively open. This is no quirk of history; rather, it has long 
been recognized as an indispensible attribute of an Anglo-
American trial. Both Hale in the 17th century and Black-
stone in the 18th saw the importance of openness to the 
proper functioning of a trial; it gave assurance that the 
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it 
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discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and deci~ 
sions based on secret bias or partiality. See, e. g., M. Hale, 
The History of the Common Law of England 343-345 (6th 
ed. 1820); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *372-373. Jeremy 
Bentham not only recognized the therapeutic value of open 
justice but regarded it as the keystone: 
"Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in 
comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small 
account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institu-
tions might present themselves in the character of checks, 
would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; 
as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance." 1 J. 
Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidences 524 (1827) .7 
Panegyrics on the values of openness were by no means con-
fined to self-praise by the English. Foreign observers of 
English criminal procedure in the 18th and early 19th cen~ 
turies came away impressed by the very fact that they had 
been freely admitted to the courts, as many were not in their 
own homelands. See L. Radzinowicz, A History of English 
Criminal Law 715, and n. 96 (1948) . They marveled that 
"the whole juridical procedure passes in public," 2 P. J. Gros-
Iey, A Tour to London; or new Observations on England 142 
(Nugent trans. 1772), quoted in Radzinowicz, supra, at 717, 
and one commentator declared that: 
"The main excellence of the English judicature consists 
in publicity, in the free trial by jury, and in the extraor· 
dinary despatch with which business is transacted. The 
publicity of their proceedings is indeed astonishing. Free 
access to the courts is universally granted." C. Goede, 
A Foreigner's Opinion of England 214 (Horne trans. 
1822). (Emphasis added.) 
'Bentham also emphasized that open proceedings enhanced the per-
formance of all involved, protected the judge from imputations of dis-
honesty, and served to educate the public. Id., at 522- 525. 
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The nexus between openness, fairness, and the perception of 
fairness was not lost on them: 
"[T]he judge, the counsel, and the jury, are constantly 
exposed to public animadversion; and this greatly tends 
to augment the extraordinary confidence, which the 
English repose in the administration of justice." Goede, 
Bupra, ·at 215. 
This observation raises the important point that "[t]he 
publicity of a judicial proceeding is a requirement of much 
broader bearing than its mere effect on the quality of testi-
mony." 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1834, at p. 435 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1976).8 The early history of open trials in part reflects 
the widespread acknowledgement, long before there were 
behavioral scientists, that public trials had significant com-
munity therapeutic value. Even without such experts to 
frame the concept in words, people sensed from experience 
and observation that, especially in the administration of crim-
inal justice, the means used to achieve justice must have the 
support derived from public acceptance of both the process I 
and its results. 
When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of 
outrage and public protest often follows. See H. Weihofen, 
The Urge to Punish 130-131 (1956). Thereafter the open 
processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, I 
providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and 
emotion. Without an awareness that society's responses to 
criminal conduct are underway, natural human reactions of 
outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest them-
selves in some form of vengeful "self-help," as indeed they 
s f\. collateral aspect seen by Wigmore was the possibility that someone 
jn attendance at the trial or who learns of the proceedings through pub-
licity may be able to furnish evidence in chief or contradict "falsifiers." 
6 · Wigmore, supra, at 436. Wigmore gives examples of such occurrences. 
ld., at 436, and n. 2. 
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did regularly in the activities of vigilante "committees" on 
our frontiers. "The accusation and conviction or acquittal, 
as much perhaps as the execution of punishment, operate[] · 
to restore the imbalance which was created by the offense or 
public charge, to reaffirm the temporarily lost feeling of secu-
rity, and, perhaps, to satisfy that latent 'urge to punish.' " 
Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal 
Proceedings, 110 U: Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1961). 
Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the 
vigilante the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot 
erase from people's consciousness the fundamental, natural 
yearning to see justice done-or even the urge for retribution. 
The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of 
justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis 
c.an occur if justice is "done in a corner [or] in any covert 
manner." Supra, at-. It is not enough to say that results 
alone will satiate the natural community desire for "satis-
faction." A result considered untoward may undermine pub-
lic confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from 
public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that 
the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted. 
To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal l 
process "satisf[ies] the appearance of justice," Offutt v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) , and the appearance of 
justice ca.n best be provided by allowing people to observe it. 
Looking back, we see that when the ancient "town meet-
ing" form of trial became too cumbersome, twelve members 
of the community were delegated to act as its surrogates, but 
the community did not surrender its right to observe the con-
duct of trials. The people retained a "right of visitation" 
which enabled them to satisfy themselves that justice was in 
fact being done. 
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from 
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what 
they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial 
is conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity 
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both for understanding the system in general and its workings 
in a particular case: 
"The educative effect of public attendance is a material 
adva~tage. Not only is respect for the law increased and 
~nteiligent acquaintance acquired with the methods of 
government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies 
is secured which could never be inspired by a system of 
secrecy." 6 Wigmore, supra, at 438. See also 1 Ben-
tham, supra, at 525. 
In earlier times, both in England and America, attendance 
at court was a common mode of "passing the time." See, 
e, g., 6 Wigmore, supra, at 436; Mueller, supra, at 6. With 
the press, cinema, and electronic media now supplying the 
representations or reality of the real life drama once available 
only in the courtroom, attendance at court is no longer a 
wide~pread pastime. Yet "[i]t is not unrealistic even in this 
day tq believe that public inclusion affords citizens a form of 
legal education and hopefully promotes confidence in the fair 
administration of justice." State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 
87- 88, 139 N. W. 2d 800, 807 (1966) . Instead of acquiring 
information about trials by firsthand observation or by word 
of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it 
c~i~fly through the print and electronic media. In a sense, 
this validates the media claim of functioning as surrogates for 
the public. While media representatives enjoy the same right 
of access as the public, they often are provided special seating 
and priority of entry so that they may report what people in 
attendance have seen and heard. This "contribute[s] to 
public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension 
of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system .... " 
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 587 (BRENNAN, 
J ., concurring). 
c 
From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by 
reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to 
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conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very 
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice. This 
conclusion is hardly novel; without a direct holding on the 
issue, the Court has voiced its recognition of it in a variety 
of contexts over the years.0 Even while holding, in Levine v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 611 (1960), that a criminal contempt 
proceeding was not a "criminal prosecution" within the mean-
8 "Of course trials must be public and the public have a deep interest 
in trials." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 361 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J, concurring). 
"The trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public 
property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 374 (1947) (Douglas, J.). 
"[W]e have been unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial con-
ducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the 
history of this country. Nor have we found any record of even one such 
secret criminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of Star Cham-
ber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted people secretly is in 
dispute. . . . This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public 
trial to an accused has its roots in our English common law heritage. 
The · exact date of its origin is obscure, but it likely evolved long before 
the settlement of our land as an accompaniment of the ancient institution 
of jury trial." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 266 (1948) (Black, J.) (foot-
notes omitted). 
"One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public should 
know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what happens 
there, to the end that the public may judge whether our system of crim-
inal justice is fair and right." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc ., 
338 U. S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from denial of 
cert.). 
"It is true that the public has the right to be informed as to what occurs 
in its courts, . . . reporters of all media, including television, are always 
present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever occurs 
in open court .... " Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 541-542 (1965) 
(Clark, J.); see also id., at 583-584 (Warren, C. J., concurring). (The 
Court ruled, however, that the televising of the criminal trial over the 
defendant's objections violated his due process right to a fair trial.) 
"The principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence has 
long been reflected in the 'Anglo-American distrust for secret trials.' " 
Sheppard v. Maxwell~ 384 U. S. 333, 349 (1966) (Clark, J.). 
,( 
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ing of the Sixth Amendment, the Court was careful to note 
that more than the Sixth Amendment was involved: 
" [W]hile the right to a 'public trial' is explicitly guaran-
teed by the Si~th Amendment only for 'criminal prosecu-
tions,' that provision is a reflection of the notion, deeply 
rooted in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice.' . . . [D]ue process demands ap-
propriate regard for the requirements of a public pro-
ceeding in cases of criminal contempt ... as it does 
for all adjudications through the exercise of the judi-
cial power, barring narrowly limited categories of excep-
tions . ... " !d., at 616 (citations omitted).10 
And recently in Gannett Co. Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 •U. S: 368 
(1979), both the majority, 443 U. S., at 384, 386, n. 15, and 
dissenting opinions, 443 U. S., at 423, agreed that open trials 
were part of the common law tradition. 
Despite the history of criminal trials being presumptively 
open since long before the Constitution, the State presses its 
contention that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights 
contains any provision which by its terms guarantees to the 
public the right to attend criminal trials. Standing alone, 
this is correct, but there remains the question whether, ab-
sent an explicit provision, the Constitution affords protection 
against exclusion of the public from criminal trials. 
III 
A 
The First Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth, 
prohibits governments from "abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
10 The Court went on to hold that, · "on the particular circumstances 
of the case," 362 U. S., at 616, the a~used could not complain on appeal 
of the "so-called 'secrecy' of the proceedings," id., at 617, because, with 
counsel present, he had failed to object or to request the judge to open 
the courtroom at the time. 
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ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev~ 
~nces." These expressly guaranteed freedoms share a corn~ 
mon core purpose of assuring freedom of cornmunica.tion on 
matters relating to the functioning of government. Plainly 
it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of 
higher concern and importance to the people than the manner 
in which criminal trials are conducted; as we have shown, 
recognition of this pervades the centuries-old history of o en 
~s and the opinions of this Court. Supra, at , and n. 
\_!) ~'The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the 
long history of trials being presumptively open. Public access 
to trials was then regarded as an important aspect of the 
process itself; the conduct of trials "before as many of the 
people as chuse to attend" was regarded as one of "the inesti-
mable advantages of a free English constitution of govern-
ment." 1 Journals of the Continental Congress, supra, at 
106, 107. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech 
and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the 
right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to 
those explicit guarantees. "[T]he First Amendment goes 
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of 
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock 
of information from which members of the public may draw." 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 783 
(1978). Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen. 
"In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First 
Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas.'" 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972). What this 
means in the context of trials is that the First Amendment 
guarantees of speech ancl press, standing alone, prohibit gov-
ernment from summarily closing courtroom doors which had 
long been open to the public at the time that amendment was 
adopted. "For the First Amendment does not speak equivo-
cally. . . . It must be taken as a command of the broadest 
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scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty· 
loving society, will allow,'' Bridges v, California, 314 U. S. 
252, 263 (1941), 
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend 
criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations 
concerning them as a "right of access," cf. Gannett, supra, at 
397 (PowELL, J., concurring); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 
417 U. S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817 
(1974),11 or a "right to gather information," for we have rec-
ognized that "without some protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Branzburg 
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). The explicit, guaranteed 
rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a 
trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial 
could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily.12 
:B 
The right of access to places traditionally open to the pub- ~ 
lie, as criminal trials have long been, may be seen as assured by 
the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and 
11 Procunier and Saxbe, supra, are distinguishable in the sense that 
they were concerned with penal institutions which, by definition, are not 
"open" or public places. Penal institutions do not share the long tradi-
tion of openness, although traditionally there have been visiting commit-
tees of citizens, and there is no doubt that legislative committees could 
exercise plenary oversight and "visitation rights." Saxbe, supra, at 849, 
noted that "limitation on visitations is justified by what the Court of 
Appeals acknowledged as 'the truism that prisons are institutions where 
public access is generally limited.' . . . 494 F . 2d, at 999. See Adderley 
v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 41 (1966) [jails] ." See also Greer v. Spock, 424 
U. S. 828 (1976) (military bases) . 
1 ~ That the right to attend may be exercised by people less frequently 
today when information as to trials generally reaches them by way of 
print and electronic media in no way alters the basic right. Instead of 
relying on personal observation or reports from neighbors as in the past, 
most people receive information concerning trials through the media whose 
representatives "are entitled to the same right:; [to attend trials] as the 
general public." Estes v. Texas, supra, at 540. 
·. 
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press; and their affinity to the right of assembly is not with-
out relevance. From the outset, the right of assembly was re-
garded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst 
to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment 
rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen.18 
"The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those 
of free speech and free press and is equally fundamentaL'~ 
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). People assem-
ble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but 
also to listen, observe, and learn; indeed, they may "assem-
bl[e] for any lawful purpose," Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U.S. 496, 
519 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.). Subject to the traditional 
time, place, alld manner restrictions, see, e. g., Cox v. New· 
Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 559, 560-564 (1965), streets, sidewalks, and parks are 
13 When the First Congress was debating the Bill of Rights, it was con-
tended that there was no need separately to assert the right of assembly 
because it was subsumed in freedom of speech. Mr. Sedgwick of Massa-
chusetts argued that inclusion of "assembly" among the enumerated rights· 
would tend to make the Congress 
"appear triflng in the eyes of their constituents. . . . If people freely 
converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-evident, 
unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that 
never would be called in question .... " 1 Annals of Congress 731 (1789). 
Since the right existed independent of any written guarantee, Sedgwick 
went on to argue that if it were the drafting committee's purpose to pro-
tect all inherent rights of the people by listing them, "they might have 
gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights," but this was unnecessary, 
he said, "in a Government where none of them were intended to be in-
fringed ." 1 Annals of Congress 732. 
Mr. Page of Virginia responded, however, that at times "such rights 
have been opposed," and that "people have .. . been prevented from 
assembling together on their lawful occasions" : 
"[T]herefore it is well to guard against such stretches of authority, by 
inserting the privilege in the declaration of rights. If the people could 
be deprived of the power of assembly under any pretext whatsoever, they 
might be deprived of every other privilege contained in the clause." Ibid. 
·The motion to strike "assembly" was defeated. Id., at 733. 
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places traditionally open , where First Amendment rights may , 
be exercised, see Hague v. C. I . 0., 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939) 
( opiuion of Roberts, J.); a trial courtroom also is a public 
place where the people generally-and representatives of the 
media- have a right to be present, and where their presence 
historically has beeu thought to enhance the integrity and 
quality of what takes place.11 
c 
The State argues that the Constitution nowhere spells out 
a guarantee for the right of the public to attend trials, and 
that accordingly no such right is protected. The possibility 
that such a contention could be made did not escape the notice 
of the Constitution's draftsmen; they were concerned that 
some important rights might be thought disparaged because 
not specifically guaranteed. It was even argued that because 
of this danger no Bill of Rights should be adopted. See, e. g., 
A. Hamilton, The Federalist no. 84. In a letter to Thomas 
Jefferson in October of 1788, James Madison explained why 
he, although "in favor of a bill of rights," had "not viewed it in 
14 It is of course true that the right of assembly in our Bill of Rights 
was in large part draft.ed in reaction to restrictions on such rights in Eng-
land. See, e. g., 1714, 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, ch. 5; cf. 1795, 36 Geo. 3, ch. 8. 
As we have shown, the right of Englishmen to attend trials was not 
similarly limited ; but it would be ironic indeed if the very historic open-
ness of the trial could militate against protection of the right to attend 
it. The Constitution guarantees more than simply freedom from those 
abuses which led the Framers to single out particular rights. The very 
purpose of the First Amendment is to guarantee all facets of each right 
described ; its draftsmen sought both to protect the "rights of English-
men" and to enlarge their scope. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 
252, 263-265 (1941) . 
"There are no contrary implications in any part of the history of the period 
in which the First Amendment was framed and adopted. No purpose in 
ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of securing for the people 
of the United States much greater freedom of religion, expression, assem-
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an important light" up to that time: "I conceive that in a cer-
tain degree .. . the rights in question are reserved by the man-
ner in which the federal powers are granted." He went on to 
state "there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration 
of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in 
the requisite latitude." 5 Writings of James Madison 271 
(Hunt ed. 1904) .15 
But arguments such as the State makes have not precluded 
recognition of important rights not enumerated. Notwith-
standing the appropriate caution against reading into the 
Constitution rights not explicitly defined, the Court has ac-
knowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in 
enumerated guarantees. For example, the rights of associa-
tion and of privacy, the right to be presumed innocent and the 
right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel, appear 
nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights. Yet these 
jmportant but unarticulated rights have nonetheless been 
found to share constitutional protection in common with ex-
plicit guarantees.16 The concerns expressed by Madison and 
1 ~ Madison's comments in Congress also reveal the perceived need for 
some sort of constitutional "saving clause," which, among other things, 
would serve to foreclose application to the Bill of Rights of the maxim 
that the affirmation of particular rights implies a negation of those not 
expressly defined. See 1 Annals of Congress 438-440 (1789). See also, 
e. g., 2 J . Story, Commentaries on the Const.itution of the United States 
651 (5th ed. 1891) . Madison's efforts, culminating in the Ninth Amend-
ment , served to allay the fears of those who were concerned that ex-
pressing certain guarantees could be read as excluding others. 
16 See, e. g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (right of asso-
ciation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), and Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969) (right to privacy) ; Estelle v. Williams, 425 
U. S. 501, 503 (1976), and Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478, 483-486 
(1978) (presumption of innocence); In re Winship , 397 U. S. 358 (1970) 
(standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt) ; United States v. Guest, 
383 U. S. 745, 757-759 (1966), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 
630 (1969) (right to interstate travel). 
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,others have thus been resolved; fundamental rights, even 
though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized by the 
Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights · explicitly 
defined. 
We hold that the right to attend criminal trials 17 is implicit 
in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without the free-
dom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for cen-
turies, important aspects of freedom of speech and "of the 
press could be eviscerated." Branzburg, supra, at 681. 
D 
Having concluded there was a guaranteed right of the pub-
lic under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to attend 
the trial of Stevenson's case, we return to the closure order 
challenged by appellants. The Court in Gannett, supra, made 
clear that although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the 
accused a right to a public tria.l, it does not give a right to a 
private trial. 443 U.S., at 382. Despite the fact that this was 
the fourth trial of the accused, the trial judge made no findings J 
to support closure; no inquiry was made as to whether alterna-
tive solutions would have met the need to ensure fairness; 
there was no recognition of any right under the Constitution 
for the public or press to attend the trial. In contrast to the 
pretrial proceeding dealt with in Gannett, supra, there exist 
in the context of the trial itself various tested alternatives to 
satisfy the constitutional demands of fairness. See, e. g., 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S., at 563-565; 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S., at 357-362. There was no 
suggestion that any problems with witnesses could not have 
been dealt with by their exclusion from the courtroom or their 
sequestration during the trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 
U. S., at 359. Nor is there anything to indicate that seques-
17 Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a 
question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civi1 
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tration of the jurors would not have guarded against their 
being subjected to any improper information. All of the 
alternatives admittedly present difficulties for trial courts, but 
none of the factors relied on here were beyond the realm of 
the manageable. Absent an overriding interest articulated in 
findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the 
public.18 Accordingly, the judgment under review is reversed. 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE PowELL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
18 We have no occasion here to define the circumstances in which all or 
parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the public, cf., e. g., 6 J. Wig-
more, Evidence § 1835 (Chadbourn rev. 1876), but our holding today does 
not mean that the First Amendment rights of the public and representa-
tives of the press are absolute. Just as a government may impose reason-
able time, place, and manner restrictions upon the use of its streets in the 
interest of such objectives as the free flow of traffic, see, e. g., Cox v. New 
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), so may a trial judge, in the interest of 
the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access 
to a trial. "[T]he question in a particular case is whether that control is 
exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge . . . the opportunities 
for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions 
immemorially associated with resort to public places." !d., at 574. It is 
far more important that trials be conducted in a quiet and orderly setting 
than it is to preserve that atmosphere on city streets. Compare, e. g., 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), with Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 
337 (1970), and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) . Moreover, since 
courtrooms have limited capacity, there may be occasions when not every 
person who wishrs to attend can be accommodated. In such situations, 
reasonable restrictions on general access are traditionaUy imposed, includ-
ing preferential seating for media representatives. Cf. Gannett, supra, at 
397-398 (PowELL, J., concurring) ; Houchins v. KQED, Inc ., 438 U. S. 
1. 17 (1978) (STEWART, J ., concurring) ; id., at 32 (STEVENs, J., dissenting). 
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JusTICE MARSHALL 
joins, concurring in the judgment. 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) , held that 
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was personal to 
the accused, conferring no right of access to pretrial proceed-
ings that is separately enforceable by the public or the press. 
The instant case raises the question whether the First Amend-
ment, of its own force and as applied to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, secures the public an independent 
right of access to trial proceedings. Because I believe that the 
First Amendment-of itself and as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment-secures such a public 
right of a.ccess, I agree with t9e ~1faliiy that, without more, 
agreement of the trial judge and tlie parties cannot constitu-
tionally close a trial to the public.1 
1 Of course, the Sixth Amendment remains the source of the accused's 
own right to insist upon public judicial proceedings. Gannett Co. v. 
DePa8quale, 443 U. S. 368 (1979). 
That the Sixth Amendment explicitly establishes a public trial right 
does not impliedly foreclose the derivation of such a. right from other 
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution was not framed as a 
work of carpentry, in which all joints must fit snugly without overlapping. 
Of necessity, a document that designs a form of government will address 
central political concerns from a variety of perspectives. Significantly, 
this Court has recognized the open trial right both as a matter of the 
Sixth Amendment and as an ingredient in Fifth' Amendment due process. 
See Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 614, 616 (1960); cf. In re 
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I 
While freedom of expression is made inviolate by the First 
Amendment, and, with only rare and stringent exceptions, may 
not be suppressed, see; e. g., Brown v. Glines,- U. S. -,-
(1979) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Nebraska Press Assn. v. 
Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 558-559 (1976); id., at 590 (BRENNAN, 
J., concurring in judgment); New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam opinion); Near 
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-716 (1931), the First Amend-
ment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as 
providing an equally categorical assurance of the correlative 
freedom of access to information, see, e. g., Saxbe v. Washing-
ton Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,849 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 
1, 16-17 (1965); see also Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 8-9 
(1978) (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 16 (STEWART, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 
supra, at 404-405 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). But cf. id., 
at 397-398 (PowELL, J., concurring); Houchins, supra, at 27-
38 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Saxbe, supra, at 856-864 (Pow-
ELL, J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-842 
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).2 Yet the Court has not 
ruled out a public access component to the First Amendment 
in every circumstance. Read with care and in context, our 
Analogously, racial segregation has been found independently offensive 
to the Equal Protection and Fifth Amendment Due Process Clauses. Com-
pare Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954), with Bolling 
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499-500 (1954). 
~A conceptually separate, yet related, question is whether the media 
should enioy greater access rights than the general public. See, e. g., 
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co ., 417 U.S. 843,850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 
417 U. S. 817, 834-835 (1974). But no such contention is at stake here. 
Since the media's right of access is at least equal to that of the general 
public, see ibid., this case is resolved by a decision that the state statute 
unconstitutionally restricts public access to trials. As a practical matter, 
however, the institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary 
of a right of access because it serves as the "agent" of interested citizens., 
and f~nnele information about trials to a large number of individuals . 
.. 
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.decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that 
any privilege of access to governmental information is subject 
to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the informa-
tion and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality. 
See Houchins, supra, at 8-9 (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.) (accese 
to prisons); Saxbe, supra, at 849 (same); Pell, supra, at 831-
832 (same); Estes v. Texas , 381 U. S. ·532, 541- 542 (1965) 
(television in courtroom); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 
(1965) (validation of passport to unfriendly country). These 
cases neither comprehensively nor absolutely deny that public 
access to information may at times be implied by the First 
Amendment and the principles which animate it. 
The Court's approach in right of access cases simply reflects 
the special nature of a claim of First Amendment right to 
gather informa.tion. Customarily, First Amendment guaran-
tees are interposed to protect communication between speaker 
and listener. When so employed against prior restraints, free 
speech protections are almost insurmountable. See Nebraska 
Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S. , a.t 558-559 (1976); New 
York Times Co. v: United States, supra, 403 U.S., at714 (1971) 
(per curiam opinion). See generally · Brennan, Address, 32 
Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 176 (1979). · But the First Amendment 
embodies more than a commitment to free expression and 
communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has · a 
structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican 
system of self-government. See United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938); Grosjean v. 
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249- 250 (1936); Stromberg 
v. California, 283 U.S. 359,369 (1931); Brennan, supra, a.t-176-
177; Ely, Democra.cy and Distrust 93- 94 (1980); Emerson, 
The Svstem of Freedom of Expression 7 (1970); Meiklejohn, 
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948); 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 23 (1971). Implicit in this structural 
role is not only "the principle that debate on public issues 
shQuld be · u·ninhibited1 robust1 and wide-open," New 'York 
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Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), but the 
antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well 
as other civic behavior-must be informed.3 The structural 
model links the First Amendment to that process of communi-
cation necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails 
solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the indis-
pensable conditions of meaningful communication.~ 
However, because "the stretch of this protection is theoreti-
cally endless," Brennan, supra, at 177, it must be invoked 
with discrimina.tion and temperance. 'For so far as the par-
ticipating citizen's need for information is concerned, "[t]here 
3 This idea has been foreshadowed in MR. Jus•rrcE PowELL's dissent in I 
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-863 (1974): 
"What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment 
in preserving free public 'discussion of governmental affairs. No aspect 
of that constitutional guarantee is more rightly treasured than its pro-
tection of the ability of our people through free and open debate to con-
ider and resolve their own drstiny. . . . '[The] ... First Amendment 
is one of the vit~l bulwarks of our national commitment to intelligent self-
government.' . . . It embodies our Nation's commitment to popular 
self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest course for devel-
oping sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views on public 
issues. And public debate must. not only be unfettered; it must also be 
. informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated that First 
Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas as· 
well as the right of free expression." (Footnote and citations omitted.) 
4 The technique of deriving specific rights from the structure of our 
constitutional government, or from other explicit rights, is not novel. The 
right of suffrage has been inferred from the nature of "a free and demo-
cratic society" and from its importance as a "preservative of other basic 
civil and political rights .... " Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. · 533, '561-562' 
(1964); San Antonio School Dist. v .'Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34, n.-74 (1973) .. 
So, too, the explicit freedoms of speech, petition, and assembly have 
yielded a correlative guarantee of certain associational activities. NAACP' 
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) . See also Rodriguez, supra, at 33-34· 
(indicating that rights may be implicitly embedded in the Constitution); id.,. 
'at 62-63 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); id., at 112-115 (MARSHALL,'J., dissent-
ing); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 · (.1965) (Bu.F..bu-
J:'AN, ·J., con~.rring). 
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.ar-e few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by 
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow." 
Zemel v. Rusk, supra, 381 U. S., at 16--17. An assertion of the 
prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed 
by considering the information sought and the opposing inter-
ests invaded.G 
This judicial task is as much a matter of sensitivity to prac-
tical necessities as it is of abstract reasoning. But at least 
two helpful principles may be sketched. First, the case for a 
right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring 
and vita.! tradition of public entree to particular proceedings 
or information. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,361-362 
{1970). Such a tradition commands respect in part because 
the Constitution carries the gloss of history. More impor-
tantly, a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judg-
ment of experience. Second, the value of access must be 
measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical 
statements tha.t all information bea.rs upon public issues; what 
is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular 
government process is important in terms of that very process. 
To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult 
historical and current practice with respect to open trials, 
and weigh the importance of public access to the trial process 
itself. 
II 
"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public 
trial to an accused has its roots in our English common law 
G Analogously, we have been somewhat cautions in applying First 
Amendment protections to communication by way of nonverbal and non-
pictorial conduct. Some behavior is so intimately connected with expres-
sion that for practical purposes it partakes of the same transcendental 
constitutional value as pure speech. See, e. g., Tinker v. Des Moines 
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 505-506 (1969). Yet where the connec-
tion between expression and action is perceived as more tenuous, com. 
municative interests may be overridden by competing social values. See, 
e. g., Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 464-465 (1930), 
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heritage." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 266 (1948); see Gan-. 
nett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., at 419-420 (BLACK-
MUN, J., concurring a11d dissenting). Indeed, historically and 
functionally, open trials have been closely associated with the 
development of the fundamental procedure of trial by jury. 
In re Oliver, b'Upra, at 266; Radin , The Right to a Public 
Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q. 381, 388 (1932).n Pre-eminent English 
legal observers and commentators have unreservedly acknowl-
edged and applauded the public character of the common-law 
trial process. See T. Smith. De Republica Anglorum 77, 81-
82 (1970); 7 2 E. Coke. Institutes of the Laws of England 103 
(6th ed. 1681); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws 
of England *372- 373 (13th ed. 1800); 8 M. Hale, The History 
of the Common Law of Engla.nd 342-344 (6th eel. 1820); 9 1 
J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 584-585 (1827). 
And it appears that "there is little record, if any, of secret pro-
ceedings, criminal or civil , having occurred at any time in 
known English history." Gannett, supra, at 420 (BLACKMUN, 
J., concurring and dissenting); see also In re Oliver, supra, at 
269, n. 22; Radin , ~;-upra, at 386-387. 
This legacy of open justice was inherited by the English 
settlers in America. The earliest charters of colonial govern-
ment expressly perpetuated the accepted practice of public 
trials. See Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, 
6 "[The public trial] seems almost a necessary incident of jury trials, 
since the presence of a jury . .. already insured the presence of a large 
part of the public. We need scarcely be reminded that the jury was the 
patria, the 'country' and that it was in that capacity and not as judges, 
that it was summoned.'!. Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. 
L. Q. 381, 388 (1932) ; see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England *349 (13th ed. 1800) ("trial by jury; called also the trial per 
pais, or by the country") ; T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1583) 79 
(1970 ed.). 
· 7 First published in 1583. 
8 First published in 1765. 
11 First edition published in 1713. 
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l677, ch. XXIII; 10 Pennsylvania Frame of Government, 1682, 
Laws Agreed Upon in England, V.11 "There is no evidence 
that any colonial court conducted criminal trials behind closed 
doors. . . ." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 425. 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring and dissenting). Subsequently 
framed state constitutions also prescribed open trial proceed~ 
ings. See, e. g., Pen11sylvania Declaration of Rights, 1776, 
IX; 12 North Carolina Declara.tion of Rights, 1776, IX; ta 
Vermont Declaration of Rights, X (1777); u see also I·n re 
Oliver, supra, 333 P. S .. at 267. "Following the ratification 
in 1791 of the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, ... 
most of the origi11al states and those subsequently admitted to 
the Union adopted similar constitutional provisions." /bid. 10 
Today, the overwhelming majority of States securel!:: right 3 to public trials. Gannett, supra, at 414-415, n.£(BLACK~ 
MUN, J., concurring and dissenting); see also In re Oliver, 
supra, at 267- 268, 271. and nn. 17- 20. 
This Court too has persistently defended the public chara.c~ 
10 Quoted in 1 B, Schwartz, T he Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 
129 (1971) . 
11 !d., at, 140. 
1 2 /cl ., a t 265. 
13 /d., at 287. 
14 !d., at 323. 
15 To be sure , somr of thrse constitutions, such as the Pennsylvania 
Declaration of Rights, couched their public trial guarantees in the language 
of the accused's rights. But although the Court has read the Federal 
Constitution 's explicit public trial provision, U. S. Const. Amend. VI , as 
benefiting the defendant alone, it does not follow that comparably worded 
state guarantees must be so construed. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 
s·upra, 44~ U. S., at -!25, and n. 9 (BLACKM,UK, .J.. concurring and di~ent­
ing) ; cf. al~o Mal/ott\' . Ala.~Jka, - Ala.-, 11. 12 (1980). And even i'f 
the ~prcific ~tatr· pttblil' trial protection" mu~t br ittvokrd L~· defrndnnts, 
thosr ;.;tat e ron:stitutionnl clau:sc:-: :still provide evidrnce of thL· importance 
attached to open trials by the founders of our state governments. Indeed, 
it may have been thought that linking public trials to the accused's privi-
leges was the most effective way of assuring a vigorous representative for · 
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ter of the trial process. In re Oliver established that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids closed 
criminal trials. Noting the "universal rule against secret 
trials," 333 U. S., at 266, the Court held that 
II [i] n VieW Of thiS nation'S historiC distrUSt Of SeCret prO,. 
ceedi'ngs, their inherent dangers to freedom, and the 
universal requirement of our federal and state govern .. 
ments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of 
his liberty without due process of law means at least that 
an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison." Id., at 
273.16 
Even more significantly for our present purpose, Oliver recog-
nized that open trials are bulwarks of our free and democratio 
government: public access to court proceedings is one uf the 
numerous "checks and balances'' of our system, because- "con .. 
temporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an 
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," id., at 
270. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 350 (1966), 
Indeed, the Court focused with particularity upon the· public 
trial guarantee "as a safeguard against any attempt to employ 
our courts as instruments of persecution," or "for the suppres-
sion of political and religious heresies." Oliver, supra, at 270. 
Thus, Oliver acknowledged tha.t open trials are indispensable 
to First Amendment political and religious freedoms. 
By the same token, a special solicitude for the public char-
acter of judicial proceedings is evident in ·the Court's" rulings 
upholding the right to report about the administration of 
justice. While these decisions are impelled by the classic pro-
tections afforded by the First Amendment to pure communi-
10 Notably, Oliver did not rest upon the simple incorporation of the 
Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth, but upon notions intrinsic to due 
process, because the criminal contempt proceedings at issue in the case 
were "not within 'all criminal prosecutions' to which · [the Sixth] .. , 
Amendment applies." Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616 (1960); 
see also n. 1, supra. 
" I 
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, eation, they are also bottomed upon a keen appreciation of 
the structural interest served in opening the judicial system 
to public inspection.17 So, in upholding a privilege for repor~ 
ing truthful information about judicial misconduct proceed-
ings, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 
829 ( 1978), emphasized that public scrutiny of the operation 
of a judicial disciplinary body implica.tes a major purpose of 
the First Amendment--"discussion of governmental affairs,"' 
id., at 839. Again, Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 
U. S., at 559, noted that the traditional guarantee against 
prior restraint "should have particular force as applied to 
reporting of criminal proceedings. . . . " And Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975), instructed that 
" [ w] ith respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the func-
tion of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and 
to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon 
the administration of justice." See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 
424 U.S. 448, 473-474, 476-478 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissent-
ing) (open judicial process is essential to fulfill "the First 
Amendment guarantees to the people of this Nation that they 
shall retain the necessary means of control over their 
. t't t' ") ms 1 u 1ons. . . . . 
Tradition, contemporaneous state practice, and this Court's 
own decisions manifest a common understanding that "[a] 
trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is 
public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). 
As a matter of law and virtually immemorial custom, public 
trials have been the essentially unwavering rule in ancestral 
England and in our own Nation. See In re Oliver, supra, 333 
U. S., at 266-268; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., 
at 386, n. 15; id., at 418-432, and n. 11 (BLACKMUN, J., con-
IT As Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in his opinion for the Massachu .. 
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 
(1884), "the privilege [to publish reports of judicial proceedings] and the 
access of the public to the courts stand in reason upon common ·grounc:l:" 
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em-ring and dissenting).18 Such abiding adherence to the 
principle of open trials "reflect [s] a profound judgment about 
the way in which law should be enforced and justice admin-
istered." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 155 (1968). 
III 
Publicity serves to advance several of the particular pur-
poses of the trial (and, indeed, the judicial) process. Open 
trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our 
judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and 
accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence. See, e. g., Este8 
v. Texas, 8Upra, 381 U. S., at 538-539 (1965). But, as a fea-
ture of our governing system of justice, the trial process serves 
other, broadly political, interests, and public access advances 
these objectives as well. To that extent, trial access possesses 
specific structural significa.nce.10 
1 8 The dirtum in Branzburg Y . Hayes. 40~ U.S. 665, 6R4-685 (1972), that 
"[n]ewsmen .. . may be prohibited from attending or publishing informa-
tion about trials if such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant 
a fair trial . .. ," is not to the contrary; it simply notes that rights of 
access may be curtailed where there are sufficiently powerful countervail-
ing considerations. See ante, at 4. 
10 By way of analogy, we have fashioned rules of criminal procedure w 
serve intere~;ts implicated in the trial proress beside those of the defendant. 
For example, the exclusionary rule is prompted not only by the accused's 
interest in vindicating his own rights, but also in part by the independent 
"'imperative of judicial integrity.'" See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio. 392 U. S. 
1, 12-13 (1968), quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222 (1960) ~ 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 357-359 (1974) (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting) ; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 484-485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ; id., at 470 (Holmes, J ., dissenting). And several 
Members of this Court have insisted that criminal entrapment cannot be-
"countenanced" because the "obligation" to avoid "enforcement of the· 
law by lawless means ... goes beyond the convicticn of the particular 
defendant before the court. Public confidence in the fair and honorable-
administration of justire .. . is the transcending value at stake." Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U. S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
tin~ in result ; s~ United States v.. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,. 436-43} (1973) 
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The trial is a means of meeting "the notion, deeply rooted 
in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the appearance 
of justice.'" Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616 
(1960), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14 
(1954); accord, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., 
at 429 (BLACKMl'N. J .. concurring and Jissenting); see Cowley 
v. P·ulsifer, 137 Mass. 3n2. 394 (1884) (Holmes. J.). For a 
civili:mtion foundrd upon pri11cipks of ordered liberty to sur~ 
vive and flourish, its members must share the conviction that 
they are governed equitably. That necessity underlies cou~ 
stitutional provisious as diverse as the rule against takings 
without just compensation. see PruneYard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, - U. S. --, -, and n. 7 (1980), and the Equal 
Protection Clause. It also mandates a. system of justice that 
demonstrates the fairness of the law to our citizens. One 
major function of the trial, hedged with procedural protec~ 
tions and conducted with conspicuous respect for the rule of 
law, is to make that demonstration. See In re Oliver, supra, 
333 U. S., at 270, n. 24. 
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative pur-
pose of the trial process. Open trials assure the public that 
procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded 
equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbi-
trariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law. Public 
access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve 
the objective of maintaining public confidence in the aclminis-
tration of justice. See Gannett, supra, at 428-429 (BLACK-
MUN, J., concurring am! dissenting). 
But the trial is more than a demonstrably just method of 
adjudicating disputes and protecting rights. It plays a. pivotal 
role in the entire judicial process, and, by extension, in our 
(Douglas, J ., dissenting) ; id .. at 442-443 (S1'EWA1t'f, J. , dist>enting); 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 455 (1932) (opinion of Roberts, 
J.) ; Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 413, 423, 425 (1928) (Brandeiil, J., 
dis~Jenting). 
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form of government. Under our system, judges are not mere 
umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate 
branch of govemrnent.20 While individual cases turn upon 
the controversies between parties, or involve particular prose-
cutions, court rulings impose official and practical conse-
quences upon members of society at large. Moreover, judges 
bear responsibility for the vi~ally important task of constru-
ing and securing constitutional rights. Thus, SQ far as the 
trial is the mechanism for judicial fa{)tfinding, as well 8.s the 
initial forum for legal decisionmaking, it is a genuine govern-
mental proceeding. 
It follows that the conduct of the trial is preeminently a 
matter of public interest. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 
supra, 420 U. S., at 491-492; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio 
Show, 338 U. S. 912, 920 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., 
respecting denial of certiorari). More importantly, public 
access to trials acts as an important check, akin in purpose to 
the other checks and balances that infuse our system of. gov-
ernment. "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject 
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is 
an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," In re 
Oliver, supra, at 270-an abuse that, in many cases, would 
have ramifications beyond the impact upon the parties before 
the court. Indeed, " ' [ w] ithout publicity, all other checks 
2o The interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory law, 
while not legislation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is subject to special 
constraints and informed by unique considerations. Guided and confined 
by the Constitution and pertinent statutes, judges are obliged to be dis-
cerning, exercise judgment, and prescribe rules. Indeed, at times judges 
wield considerable authority to formulate legal policy in designated areas. 
See, e. g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U. S. 375 (1970) ; Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964); Textile Workers 
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 456-457 (1957) ; P. Areeda, Anti-
trust Analysis 45-46 (2d ed. 1974) ("Sherman Act [is] ... a general 
authority to do what common law courts usually do: to use certain cus-
tomary techniques of judicial reasoning ... and to develop, refine, .and 
innovate in the dynamic common law· tradition."). 
' • 
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are insufficient : in comparison of publicity, aU other checks 
sre of small account.'" Ibid., at '271, quoting 1 Bentham, 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524; see 3 Bla.ckstone, Com-
mentaries, *372; Hale, History of the Common Law 344; 1 J. 
Bryce, The American Commonwealth 514 (1931). 
Finally, with some limitations, a trial aims at true and 
accurate factfinding. Of course, proper factfinding is to the 
benefit of criminal defendants and of the parties in civil pro· 
ceedings. But other, comparably urgent, interests are also 
often at stake. A miscarriage of justice that imprisons a.n 
innocent accused also leaves a guilty party at large, a con-
tinuing threat to society. Also, mistakes of fact in civil liti-
gation may inflict costs upon others than the plaintiff and 
defendant. Facilitation of the trial factfinding process, there-
fore, is of concern to the public as well as to the parties.21 
Publicizing trial proceedings aids accurate factfinding. 
"Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown 
to the parties." In re Oliver, supra, at 270, n. 24; see Tanksley 
v. United States, 145 F. 2d 58, 59 (CA9 1944); 6 J. Wig-
more, Evidence in Trials in Common Laws§ 1834 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1976). Shrewd legal observers have averred that 
"open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence 
of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing 
up of truth, than the private and secret examination ... 
where a witness may frequently depose that in private, 
which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn 
tribunal." 
3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *373; see Tanksley v. United 
States, supra, at 59- 60; Hale, History of the Common Law, 
345 ; 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 522-523. 
And experience has borne out these assertions about the truth-
finding role of publicity. See 2 Hearings before the Subcom-
21 Further, the interest in insuring that the innocent are not punished 
may be shared by the general public, in addition to the accused himself. 
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interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this pre-: 
sumption of openness need not concern us now/4 for the stat-
ute at sta.ke here authorizes trial closures at the unfettered dis-. 
cretion of the judge and parties. 25 Accordingly, Va. Cod~ 
19.2-266 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, anq 
the ,decision of the Virginia Supreme Court to the contta~ 
!3hould ·be :reversed. 
24 For example, national security concerus about confidentiality may 
sometimes warrant closures during s('lnsitive tw.rtions of trial proceedings, 
such as testimony about state secrets. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 
u. s. 683, 714-716 (1974) . 
25 Significantly, l'lo~ing u trial lack:;; even the justification for barring the 
door to pretrial hearings: the necessity of preventing dissemination of sup-
pressible prejudicial evidence to the public before the jury pool ·has 
become, in a practical sense, finite and subject to sequestration. 
vf'' 
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MR. Jus'riCE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment. 
My opinion and vote in partial dissent last Term in Gan-
net Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 406 (1979), compels 
my vote to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia. 
. I 
The decision 111 this case is gratifying for me for two 
reasons: 
It is gratifying, first, to see the Court now looking to and 
relying upon legal history in determining the fundamental 
public character of the criminal trial. Ante, at 7-11, 15-17, 
and n. 9. The partial dissent in Gannett, 443 U. S., at 419-
433, took great pains in assembling-! believe adequately-
the historical material and in stressing its importance to this 
area of the law. See also MR. JusTICE BRENNAN's helpful 
review set forth as Part II of his opinion in the present case. 
Ante, at 5- 10. Although the Court in Gannett gave a modi-
cum of lip service to legal history, 443 U. S., at 386, n. 15, it 
denied its obvious application when the defense and the pros-
ecution, with no resistance by the trial judge, agreed that the 
proceeding should be closed. 
The Court's return to history is a welcome change in 
direction. 
It is gratifying, second, to see the Court wash away at least 
some of the graffiti that marred the prevailing opinions in 
/~ 
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Gannett. No less than 12 times in the primary opinion in 
that case, the Court (albeit in what seems now to have be-
come clear dicta) observed that its Sixth Amendment closure 
ruling applied to the trial itself. The author of the first con-
curring opinion was fully aware of this and would have re-
stricted the Court's observations and ruling to the suppres-
sion hearing. 443 U. S., at 394. Nonetheless, he joined the 
Court's opinion, id., at 394, with its multiple references to 
the trial itself; the opinion was not a mere concurrence in the 
Court's judgment. And Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST, in his sep-
arate concurring opinion, id., at 403, quite understandably 
observed, as a consequence, that the Court was holding 
"without qualification." ·ibid., that "'members of the public 
have no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to attend criminal trials,' " quoting from the 
primary opinion, id., at 391. The resulting confusion among 
commentators 1 and journalists 2 was not surprising. 
1 Sec, e. g., Stephenson, Fair Trial-Free Press: U:ght~ in Continuing 
Conflict, 46 Brooklyn L. Rev. ~m, 6:3 (1979) ("intended reach of the 
majority opinion is unclear" (footnote omitted)); The Supreme Court, 
1978 Term, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 60, 65 (1979) ("widespread uncertainty 
over what the Court held"); Note, 51 Colo. L. Rev. 425, 4:32-433 (1980) 
(''Gannett can be intt•rprC'ted to ,;anction the clo~ing of triab"; citing 
"1 he uncertainty of the languagt• in Gaunett," and it~ "ambiguous sixth 
amendment holding"); Note, 11 Tex. Tech. L. Hev. 159, 170-171 (1979) 
("perhaps much of the pre~rnt and imminent confm;ion lies in the Court's 
own statement of its holding"); Borow and Kruth, Closed Preliminary 
Hearings, 55 Calif. State Bar J. 18, 23 (1980) ("Despite the public dis-
claimers . . . , the majority holding appears to embmce the right of 
access to trial. as well as pretrial hearings"); Goodale, Gannett Means 
What it Says ; But Who Knows What it Says?, Nat'! Law J., Oct. 15, 
1979, at 20; see also Keefe, The Boner Called Gannett, 66 A. B. A. J. 
227 (1980) . 
2 The press-perhaps the segment of society most profoundly affected 
by Gannett-has called the Court's drcision "cloudy," Birmingham Post-
Herald, Aug. 21, 1979, at A4; ··confused," Chicago Sun-Time.;, Sept. 20, 
1979, at 56 (cartoon) ; ''incoherent," B1-1ltimore Sun, Sept. 22, 1979, at A14; 
"mushy," Washington Post, Aug. 10, 1979, at Al5; and a "muddle,'' 
Time, Sept. 17, 1979, at 82, and New:sweek, Aug. 27, 197!), at 69. 
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II 
The Court's ultimate ruling in Gannett, with such clarifi-
cation as is provided by the opinions in this case today, 
apparently is now to the effect that there is no Sixth Amend-
ment right on the part of the public-or the press-to an 
open hearing on a motion to suppress. I, of course, continue 
to believe that Gannett was in error, both in its interpreta-
tion of the Sixth Amendment generally, and in its applica-
tion to the suppression hearing. for I remain convinced that 
the right to a public trial is to be found where the Constitu-
tion explicitly placed it-in the Sixth Amendment.3 
The Court, however, has eschewed the Sixth Amendment 
route. The plurality turns to other possible constitutional 
sources and invokes a veritable potpourri of them-the speech 
clause of the First Amendment, the press clause, the assem-
bly clause, the Ninth Amendment, and a cluster of penumbral 
guarantees recognized in past decisions. This course is trou-
blesome, but it is the route that has been selected and, at 
least for now, we must live with it. No purpose would be 
served by my spelling out at length here the reasons for my 
saying that the course is troublesome. I need do no more 
than observe that uncertainty marks the nature-and stric -
ness-of the standard of closure the Court adopts. The 
plurality opinion speaks of"all overriding interest articulated 
in findings," ante, at 24; MR. JusTICE STEWART reserves, per-
haps not inappropriately, "reasonable limitations," ante, at 2; 
MR. JusTICE BHENNAN presents his separate analytical frame-
work; MR. JusTICE PowELL in Gannett was critical of those 
Justices who, relying on the Sixth Amendment, concluded 
a I shall not again seek to drmonstrale the errors of analyHis in the 
Court's opinion in Gan·nett. I notr, however, that the very existence of 
the pre.·rnt <'a:-se illust m fp,; the u! !Pr fallacy of thinking, in this context, 
that "the pnblic intere;;t. is fully protected by the participant;; in the 
litigation." Ganuett Co . Y. DePa~quale, 443 U . S. :368, 3S4 (1979). Cf.. 
·id., at 438-439 (opinion in partial clis;;ent). 
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that closure is authorized only when "strictly and inescapably 
necessary," 443 U. S., at 339-400; and MR. JusTICE REHN-
QUIST continues his fiat rejection of, among others, the First 
Amendment avenue. 
Having said all this, and with the Sixth Amendment set 
to one side in this case, I am driven to conclude, as a second-
ary position, that the First Amendment must provide some 
measure of protection for public access to the trial. The 
opinion in partial dissent in Gannett explained that the pub-
lic has an intense need and a deserved right to know about 
the administration of justice in general; about the prosecu-
tion of local crimes in particular; about the conduct of the 
judge, the prosecutor, defense counsel, police officers, other 
public servants, and all the actors in the judicial arena; and 
about the trial itself. See 443 U. S. , at 413, and n. 2, 414, 
428- 429, 448. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 
420 U. S. 469, 492 (1975). It is clear and obvious to me, 
on the approach the Court has chosen to take, that, by clos-
ing this criminal trial , the trial judge abridged these First 
Amendment interests of the public. 
I also would reverse, and I join the jud~ment of the Court., 
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
In the Gilbert & Sullivan operetta Iolanthe, the Lord Chan-
cellor recites: 
"The Law is the true embodiment 
of everything that's excellent, 
It has no kind of fault or flaw, 
And I, my lords, embody the law." 
It is difficult not to derive more than a little of this flavor 
from the various opinions supporting the judgment in this 
case. The opinion of THI<: CHIEF JusTICE states that: 
"[H] ere for the first time the Court is asked to decide 
whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public 
upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any 
demonstration that closure is required to protect the de-
fendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other 
overriding considera.tion requires closure." Ante, at 7. 
/ The opinion of MR. JusTICJ<J BRENNAN states that; 
"[R]ead with care and in context, our decisions must 
therefore be understood as holding only that any privilege 
of access to governmental information is subject to a 
degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the informa-
tion and countervailing interests in security or confiden-
tiality." Ante, at 2-3. 
For the reasons stated in my separate concurrence in Gan-
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not believe that either the First or Sixth Amendments, as 
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, require that 
a State's reasons for denying public access to a trial, where 
both the prosecuting attorney and the defendant have con-
sented to an order of closure approved by the judge, are sub-
ject to any additional constitutional review at our h~nds. 
And I most certainly do not believe that the Ninth Amend-
ment confers upon us any such power to review orders of 
state trial judges closing trials in such situations. See ante, 
at 22, n. 15. ' 
We have at present 50 state judicial systems and one federal 
judicial system in the United States, and our authority to 
reverse a decision by the highest court of the State is limited 
to only those occasions when the state decision violates some 
provision of the United States Constitution. And that .au-
thority should be exercised with a full sense that the judges 
whose decisions we review are making the same effort as we 
to uphold the Constitution. As said by Mr. Justice Jackson, 
concurring in the result in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 540 
"we are not final because we are infallible, but we are infalli~ 
ble only because we are final." 
The proper administration of justice in any nation is bound 
to be a matter of the highest concern to all thinking citizens. 
But to gradrally rein in, as this Court has done over the past 
generation, ,all of the ultimate decisionmaking power over 
how justice ' shall be administered, not merely in the federal 
system but in ea.ch of the 50 States, is a task that no Court 
consisting of nine persons, however gifted, is equal to. Nor is 
it desirable . that such authority be exercised by such a tiny 
numerical fragment of the 220 million people who compose the 
population of this country. In the same concurrence just 
quoted, Mr. Justice Jackson a.ccurately observed that "[t]he 
generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are so indetermi-
nate as to what state actions are forbidden that this Court 
has found it a ready instrument, in one field or another, to 
p •• 
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magnify federal , and incidentally its own, authority over the 
states." Id., at 534. 
However high minded the impulses which originally 
spawned this trend may have been, and which impulses have 
been accentua.ted since the time Justice Jackson wrote, it is 
basically unhealthy to have so much authority concentrated 
in a small group of lawyers who have been appointed to the 
Supreme Court and enjoy virtual life tenure. Nothing in the 
reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Mad:i8on, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) requiresthatthisCourtthrough 
ever broadening use of the Supremacy Clause smother a 
healthy pluralism which would ordinarily exist in a national 
government embracing 50 States. 
The issue here is not whether the "right" to freedom of the 
press conferred by the First Amendment to the Constitution 
overrides the defendant's "right" to a fair trial conferred by 
other amendments to the Constitution; it is instead whether 
any provision in the Constitution may fairly be read to pro-
hibit what the trial judge in the Virginia state court system. 
did in this case. Being unable to find any such prohibition 
in the First, Sixth, Ninth, or any other Amendments to 1the; 
United States Constitution, or in the Constitution itself1 I 
cli~'nt, 

